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ABSTRACT 
 
Security analysts play a central role in the functioning of financial markets through their 
privileged position as intermediaries between firms and investors. Analyst activity is important 
to reduce information uncertainty but it is not unbiased. On the one hand, the literature shows 
that these sophisticated agents promote market efficiency by facilitating the incorporation of 
new information into stock prices. On the other hand, there is evidence that analysts underreact 
to negative information and that they tend to be optimistic about firms they follow. 
Recent studies show that the market does not assimilate immediately the disclosure of a first-
time going-concern modified (GCM) audit report. This accounting event is part of a wide range 
of bad news events which investors are particularly inefficient at dealing with. My thesis 
explores how analysts deal with the GCM audit report and whether they facilitate the correct 
assimilation of such information into stock prices. In particular, I use a sample of 924 firms for 
which their auditors disclose a GCM audit report for the first-time between 01.01.1994 and 
31.12.2005. 
I find that security analysts anticipate the publication of a first-time GCM audit report. My 
results show that within the one-year period before the GCM disclosure, security analysts 
downgrade the average recommendation for GCM firms from “buy” to “hold” whereas similar 
non-GCM firms maintain an average “buy” rating. A number of robustness tests confirm that 
this finding is not sensitive to the criteria used to select the non-GCM control firm. Moreover, 
analysts are more likely to cease coverage of GCM firms prior to the GCM event than for 
matched control firms. In addition, I show that analysts react to the publication of a GCM audit 
report by ceasing coverage of GCM firms. 
My results suggest that investors do not recognize an average “hold” recommendation for a 
stock of a firm immediately before the announcement of a GCM audit report as an 
unfavourable message even considering that it represents a downgrade from a previous “buy” 
rating. In particular, I find that the negative short-term market reaction to the publication of a 
GCM audit report is significantly higher for firms with pre-event analyst coverage compared to 
firms with no pre-event analyst coverage. This suggests that analyst activity may be misleading 
the market in terms of the saliency of pre-GCM unfavourable news by issuing “disconfirming 
opinions” to the market and thus increasing the “surprise” associated with the publication of a 
GCM audit report. 
In addition, I show that analyst post-GCM coverage does not increase the efficiency with which 
the market assimilates the GCM audit report into stock prices. In particular, I fail to find 
significant differences between the post-GCM return performance of covered firms compared 
to firms with no analyst coverage. However, I show that the percentage of covered firms 
following the GCM disclosure is significantly higher for those with best post-GCM return 
performance than for those with worst post-GCM return performance. This suggests that post-
GCM return performance explains the decision of analysts to cover GCM firms but analyst 
coverage does not influence significantly the post-GCM return performance of such firms. 
Overall, my thesis contributes to the accounting and finance literature by showing that analyst 
activity is not providing investors with adequate value-relevant information for their 
investment decisions in the GCM bad news domain. Firstly, the reluctance of analysts to issue a 
clear unfavourable message about the stocks of GCM firms seems to explain why the “surprise” 
associated with the publication of a GCM audit report is greater for covered firms than for non-
covered firms. Secondly, the tendency of analysts to cease coverage of GCM firms and the low 
level of analyst coverage following the GCM announcement may explain why analyst coverage 
does not reduce the magnitude of the post-GCM negative drift. As such, analyst contribution to 
the price-discovery process in this case is likely confined to firms with high levels of analyst 
coverage. 
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Security analysts have long been seen as sophisticated processors of financial information. 
These market agents play a central role in the functioning of financial markets through 
their intermediation between firms and investors (Schipper, 1991). The increasing search 
for value-relevant information in highly competitive markets emphasises the key role of 
security analysts for this purpose. Nowadays, thousands of analysts are employed by 
hundreds of brokerage houses to provide investors with information that helps in their 
investment decisions. Interest in the activity of security analysts is not new. However, 
security analysts, more than ever, are the focus of much media attention and extensive 
academic research. 
The extant literature suggests that analyst coverage reduces information uncertainty 
(Zhang, 2006) and that efficient analyst information processing can facilitate the efficiency 
of security price setting (Beaver, 2002). The evidence that analyst opinions affect the prices 
of individual stocks is overwhelming. Studies show that, on average, markets react 
favourably (unfavourably) to positive (negative) information issued by security analysts 
(e.g., Stickel, 1991; Stickel, 1995; Womack, 1996; Barber et al., 2001; Mokoteli and Taffler, 
forthcoming). In addition, there is evidence that the market reaction to new information is 
faster for firms with higher levels of analyst coverage (e.g., Bhattacharya, 2001; Gleason 
and Lee, 2003; Zhang, 2006). 
The above evidence may lead us to believe that, contrary to investors (e.g., Odean, 1999; 
Barber and Odean, 2000; 2001; 2002), security analysts are efficient processors of 
information. However, several studies challenge this idea and present conflicting evidence 
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with Easterwood and Nutt’s (1999) definition of analyst rationality, which is that they 
should “immediately and without bias incorporate information into their forecasts”. For instance, 
the literature shows that analysts’ earnings forecasts are systematically higher than actual 
earnings (e.g., Brown, 1997) and the number of “buy” recommendations is persistently 
higher than the number of “sell” recommendations (e.g., Womack, 1996). Moreover, there 
is also evidence that analysts tend to report on stocks about which they have favourable 
views and avoid reporting on stocks about which they have unfavourable views (e.g. 
McNichols and O’Brien, 1997).  
Security analysts have come under fire from investors, politicians and regulators in the last 
years as a consequence of their biased behaviour. Two important episodes contribute to 
this hostile environment. The Enron scandal revealed that almost 90% of analysts covering 
the firm were still recommending the firms’ stock as a “buy” or “strong buy” just six 
weeks before its bankruptcy filing. The Global Analyst Research Settlement culminated in  
a massive investigation process, which proved that investment banks engaged in practices 
that created or maintained inappropriate influence over research analysts in seeking 
lucrative fees. Penalties reached $1.4 million. As a result, the regulatory authorities 
changed the analyst disclosure environment in an attempt to increase investors’ confidence 
in the integrity of financial markets. 
One of the most interesting research agendas in this domain is to explore how analysts 
deal with bad news events. Two important ideas contribute to the interest of this research 
question. First, the literature suggests that investors are significantly more inefficient in 
dealing with bad news in comparison to good news (e.g., Bernard and Thomas, 1989; 
Womack, 1996; Dichev and Piotroski, 2001; Kausar, Taffler, and Tan, forthcoming). Second, 
the marginal contribution of security analysts may be greater in the dissemination of bad 
news to investors given the distinct incentives that managers have to disclose information 
- 13 - 
conditional on itsʹ nature. Using the words of Hong, Lim, and Stein (2000), managers of 
firms sitting on good news “will push the news out the door themselves, via increased 
disclosures, etc”. For the opposite reason, managers will have fewer incentives to bring 
investors up to date quickly when firms are sitting on bad news. Therefore, the motivation 
of my thesis is to investigate the role of security analysts in the market’s reaction to bad 
news events and to understand whether they facilitate the correct assimilation of adverse 
information in stock prices. 
Studies suggest that security analysts share similar biases to those of non-sophisticated 
agents when dealing with negative information. For instance, there is evidence that 
analysts tend to underreact in the presence of negative information (e.g., Easterwood and 
Nutt, 1999; Abarbanell and Lehavy, 2003) and that they are predominantly optimistic 
when forecasting earnings of distressed firms (e.g., Das, 1998; Brown, 2001). The evidence 
that analysts are particularly inefficient when dealing with bad news is, however, almost 
exclusively confined to routine events, such as net losses, negative earnings surprises and 
forecast revisions. In fact, the literature has paid little attention to non-routine bad news 
events (i.e., those that are not part of the normal reporting cycle) that impact negatively on 
firms’ stock prices. 
The few exceptions addressing analyst behaviour in the non-routine bad news domain 
provide conflicting evidence about security analysts’ ability to anticipate such news and 
about the nature of their reaction (e.g., Griffin, 2003; Clarke et al., 2006). The clarification of 
these issues is particularly important since analyst activity aims at anticipating changes in 
company fundamentals as well as reacting to news or corporate reports (Michaely and 
Womack, 2005). Furthermore, there is little evidence on whether analyst activity promotes 
the correct assimilation of negative information in stock prices in the non-routine bad 
news domain. Investigating this issue clarifies whether analysts provide investors with 
- 14 - 
value-relevant information in this particular context. It follows that important questions 
still await a clear answer before we understand how security analysts behave in the 
presence of non-routine bad news which is the focus of this thesis. Key questions I address 
include such issues as:  Do sell-side analysts anticipate acute non-routine bad news? How 
do they react to the announcement of such news? Has there been any behavioural change 
following the implementation of the new regulatory changes? Do they accelerate the 
incorporation of negative information in stock prices? Are analysts interested in following 
such firms? 
My overarching research question in this thesis is how do security analysts deal with one 
of the most acute bad news non-routine accounting events: the going-concern audit report. 
The going-concern assumption is one of the basic principles underlying the preparation of 
financial statements. It assumes that accounts are drawn up on the basis that the business 
will continue to exist in the foreseeable future. This assumption is assessed annually by an 
independent auditor, who evaluates factors that may impact on the going-concern 
assumption. Such conditions relate to negative trends (e.g., recurring operating losses, 
negative cash flows from operating activities, adverse key financial ratios), indicators of 
possible financial difficulties (e.g., default on loans, denial of usual trade credit from 
suppliers, restructuring of debt), internal matters (e.g., work stoppages, substantial 
dependence on the success of a particular project) or external matters (e.g., legal 
proceedings, loss of a licence or patent). For those cases where the auditor considers that 
substantial doubt may exist regarding the continuance of the firm in the foreseeable future, 
he/she includes an explanatory paragraph in their audit report reflecting this uncertainty. 
As such, the going-concern modified (GCM) audit report offers a unique and original 
acute bad news context to investigate analyst behaviour. 
- 15 - 
My thesis contributes to both the academic literature and to investor understanding. From 
an academic perspective, my thesis links two areas of the accounting and finance literature 
that have been developing separately so far. By connecting the going-concern disclosure 
event with analyst behaviour, I provide original evidence about how security analysts deal 
with a major bad news accounting event. Moreover, I provide original evidence on 
whether analysts facilitate the assimilation of such adverse accounting events into security 
prices. From an investor vantage point, my work provides additional evidence of the 
usefulness and limitations of analysts’ activities. In particular, it answers the question of 
whether security analyst activity in the bad news domain is of value to investors in their 
investment decisions relating to such financially distressed firms. 
The objectives of my thesis may be summarized as follows: 
1. To test whether security analysts anticipate the GCM audit report by investigating 
if they downgrade more aggressively their stock recommendations for GCM firms 
in comparison to similar non-GCM firms within the pre-GCM period. 
Additionally, to test if analysts are more likely to cease coverage of GCM firms 
than similar non-GCM firms. 
2. To explore how security analysts react to the publication of a GCM audit report by 
comparing their stock recommendations for GCM firms between the pre- and 
post-GCM period. Additionally, to understand if security analyst interest in these 
firms remains after the announcement of such acute bad news. 
3. To investigate if pre-GCM analyst coverage facilitates the incorporation of bad 
news into the stock prices of GCM firms. In other words, to explore if analyst 
coverage reduces the market “surprise” associated with the publication of a GCM 
- 16 - 
audit report in terms of mitigating the short-term market reaction to such an 
announcement. 
4. To explore whether the regulatory changes introduced in the beginning of this 
decade impact appropriately on pre-GCM analyst expectations and whether these 
changes lead to investors being provided with better quality information by 
analysts. 
5. To provide evidence about the ability of analysts to facilitate the price-discovery 
process for GCM firms over the 12 months following publication of a GCM audit 
report and clarify if their activity promotes market efficiency in this acute  scenario 
of financial distress. 
6. To test if security analysts self-select the GCM firms they cover following the 
publication of a GCM audit report depending on their post-GCM return 
performance. 
  
These broad research questions are explored in my four empirical chapters where I 
formally test a number of research hypotheses. My methodology is drawn from previous 
studies addressing related issues and provides rigorous robustness tests to ensure that my 
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The main findings of my thesis can be briefly summarized as follows: 
1. I find that security analysts anticipate the GCM audit report announcement. This 
conclusion is based on the evidence that they become relatively more pessimistic 
about GCM firms compared with similar non-GCM firms as the event date 
approaches. In particular, I find that analysts downgrade stock recommendations 
for GCM firms from “buy” to “hold” within the one year period prior to the 
publication of a GCM audit report whereas stock recommendations for non-GCM 
firms maintain an average “buy” recommendation. In addition, I find that analysts 
are more likely to cease coverage of GCM firms. Overall, my results suggest that 
analysts recognize the financial deterioration of firms that subsequently receive a 
GCM audit report. 
2. I show that security analysts do not ignore the publication of a GCM audit report. 
Specifically, my results suggest that analysts are more likely to cease coverage of 
GCM firms compared with similar non-GCM firms immediately after the 
disclosure of a GCM audit report. Contrary to my expectations, I fail to find a 
significant change in their recommendations for GCM firms after the publication 
of such an adverse event. 
3. I find that analyst relative pessimism about the stocks of GCM firms does not 
provide a clear message to investors. In particular, my results demonstrate that the 
short-term market reaction to the publication of a GCM audit report is 
significantly more negative for firms with pre-GCM coverage than for firms with 
no pre-GCM coverage. This suggests that an average “hold” recommendation for 
a stock of a firm immediately before the announcement of a GCM audit report is 
- 18 - 
not perceived as an unfavourable message and may mitigate the impact of other 
unfavourable economic events in stock prices. 
4. My results suggest that the regulatory changes have restrained analysts’ pre-GCM 
recommendations and were effective in providing investors with qualitatively 
better information for financially distressed firms. In particular, I find that the 
recommendations for GCM firms become significantly more pessimistic following 
the implementation of such changes and that the significantly more adverse short-
term market reaction for firms with pre-GCM coverage is an exclusive 
phenomenon of the pre-regulatory changes period. 
5. I find that security analysts do not promote the post-GCM price-discovery process. 
My results suggest that analyst post-GCM coverage does not significantly increase 
the efficiency with which investors incorporate the GCM audit report in stock 
prices. I show that the post-event market performance of covered and non-covered 
GCM firms is not significantly different. 
6. I provide evidence that security analysts self-select the GCM firms they cover 
following the announcement of a GCM audit report. Specifically, I show that the 
percentage of covered firms with best post-GCM return performance is 
significantly higher than the percentage of covered firms with worst post-GCM 
return performance. This suggests that analyst interest in GCM firms following the 
event announcement is particularly low for firms with the worst return 
performance. 
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Overall, my thesis contributes to the accounting and finance literature by showing that 
analyst activity is not providing investors with value-relevant information in their 
investment decisions in this bad news domain. Despite analyst recognition of going-
concern uncertainties for GCM firms prior to the publication of a GCM audit report, 
investors do not perceive an average “hold” recommendation immediately before the 
GCM date as an unfavourable message. In particular, I show that the majority of stock 
recommendations for GCM firms operate in the wrong direction (i.e., they disconfirm 
other pre-GCM negative information through a “strong buy”, “buy” or “hold” 
recommendation), obstructing the incorporation of other unfavourable signals (e.g., 
negative momentum, high distress risk or high GCM probability) in stock prices. I also 
contribute to the ongoing debate about the efficiency with which the market assimilates 
the publication of a GCM audit report by showing that analyst disinterest on these firms  
(especially those with the worst post-GCM return performance) following such an 
announcement may help explain the post-GCM announcement drift (e.g., Taffler, Lu, and 
Kausar, 2004; Kausar, Taffler and Tan, forthcoming). 
The remainder of my thesis is organized as follows: chapter 2 reviews the relevant 
literature to understand the scope of my research. Chapter 3 describes the sample selection 
process and provides the descriptive statistics for my sample. Chapter 4 investigates if 
security analysts anticipate and react to the publication of a GCM audit report. Chapter 5 
re-examines analyst anticipation and reaction to such a bad news event by testing the 
robustness of my findings. Chapter 6 explores the short-term market reaction to the 
disclosure of a GCM audit report conditional on analyst coverage. Chapter 7 examines the 
relationship between post-GCM coverage and post-GCM stock returns performance. 
Chapter 8 presents my conclusions, discusses the limitations of this study and considers 
possible extensions for further work. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND RESEACH FRAMEWORK 
 
2.1. Introduction 
This chapter reviews the two areas of the literature that I connect in my thesis: analyst 
behaviour and going-concern opinions. Research on security analyst activity is extensive 
and continues to grow in quality and quantity. For instance, Ramnath, Rock, and Shane 
(2008) report that since 1992 no less than 250 such studies have been published in only the 
nine major research journals. Additionally, I found that more then 200 new working 
papers were posted in the Social Sciences Research Network with the word “analyst” in 
their abstract between May 2007 and May 2008.  The academic literature related to auditor 
going-concern opinions is not as vast, nevertheless, there are several dozen studies 
considering this issue published in research journals. 
The objective of this chapter is not to provide an extensive review of all the papers 
published in these two areas of the literature. Instead, I selectively review and discuss 
topics that are important to help understand the scope of my research. This chapter 
benefits from the implementation of a systematic review of the literature based on 
Tranfield, Denyer, and Smart (2003).1 This review process was conducted at an initial stage 
of my research to avoid the weaknesses of the traditional “narrative” review process. The 
systematic review process is anchored in an explicit method to identify, select and review 
                                                 
 
1 This methodology is mainly based in a search strategy that combines keywords in search strings. The search 
strings are used in citation databases that gather academic papers (ProQuest, EBSCO and Social Science Citation 
Index) to find studies relevant to my research. Examples of keywords are “going-concern”, “analyst behavior”, 
“recommendations”, “forecasts”, “optimism”, “underreaction” or “abnormal reaction”. 
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the relevant studies related to the research topic. These studies were, in a second stage, 
augmented by traditional methods based on cross-references. 
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature related to 
security analysts that impact on my research. Section 3 focuses on studies that connect 
analyst behaviour with bad news announcements. Section 4 reviews the going-concern 
literature, with particular emphasis on the market-based accounting research related to 
this information uncertainty. Section 5 summarizes the key findings of my literature 
review and section 6 presents the research framework for my thesis. 
 
2.2. Security analysts 
The literature on security analyst behaviour interfaces with several areas of accounting 
and finance research. This section is divided into five sub-sections and reviews the studies 
relevant to an understanding of my thesis framework. Firstly, I provide an overview of 
security analyst activity. Secondly, I review studies that investigate whether such analysts 
promote market efficiency. Thirdly, I review the literature addressing analyst biased 
behaviour. Fourthly, I cover studies analysing the impact of the recent regulatory changes 
on analyst activity. Lastly, I discuss the implications of these findings on my research. 
 
 2.2.1. The activity of security analysts 
I now briefly describe the activity of security analysts emphasising their importance as 
intermediaries between firms and investors and whether the market recognizes that 
security analysts have superior information about the firms they follow. 
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2.2.1.1. Analysts’ reporting environment 
Security analysts can be divided into two categories: buy-side and sell-side. Despite their 
similar fundamental functions, their research differs in a variety of ways. Groysberg et al. 
(2007) identify and summarize some of these: the scale and scope of their coverage, the 
sources of information on which their research is based, the private versus public 
dissemination of reports, their target audiences and the ways that they are compensated. 
The underlying source of these differences is driven by the differences between the 
employers of each analyst category. Buy-side analysts tend to be employed by money 
management firms or institutional investors, whereas sell-side analysts are usually 
employed at broker/dealer firms that serve individual and institutional investors 
(Schipper, 1991). As such, sell-side research is widely disseminated to institutional and 
retail clients, whilst buy-side research is private and only available to the buy-side firm’s 
portfolio managers. For this reason, I focus my research on sell-side analysts. 
Security analysts collect, process and disseminate information to current and prospective 
investors. Ramnath, Rock, and Shane (2008) identify important sources of information 
used by analysts in their activity: information from the SEC filings, earnings information, 
industry information, macroeconomic information, management communications and 
other information. After collecting and processing this information, analysts disseminate it 
in the form of research reports, which contain four main informational vehicles: earnings 
forecasts, target price forecasts, investment recommendations and conceptual arguments 
supporting the forecasts and recommendations. 
Analyst activity has increased dramatically over the years. Hong, Lim, and Stein (2000) 
document that sell-side analyst coverage of U.S. traded firms rose from less than 30% in 
1978 to 63% in 1996. This stock coverage is provided by thousands of analysts working for 
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hundreds of sell-side investment firms, who produce regular reports evaluating firms’ 
securities.2 Given their importance as intermediaries between firms and investors, analysts 
are usually seen as sophisticated agents, who tend to follow a portfolio of firms in a given 
industry or economic sector (Schipper, 1991).3 Their privileged access to information 
suggests that the stocks they recommend will experience superior performance.4 In fact, if 
brokerage houses did not believe that security analysts can generate superior returns, they 
would not spend large sums of money on security analysis. 
 
2.2.1.2. The importance of analysts 
There are several reasons justifying the importance of security analysts. I now present two 
of the most important. Firstly, there is evidence that analyst monitoring activity reduces 
the agency costs associated with the separation of ownership and control in the modern 
corporation (e.g., Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Cote and Goodstein, 1999; Doukas, Kim, and 
Pantzalis, 2000). In particular, the literature suggests that analyst monitoring and 
dissemination of managers’ decisions contribute to disciplining firm management (Chung 
and Jo, 1996) since managers are less likely to pursue activities that benefit themselves at 
the expense of shareholders. This monitoring and information diffusion is also believed to 
keep stock prices close to their fundamental values. As Doukas, Kim, and Pantzalis (2000) 
mention, “firms with weak analyst coverage are more likely to be plagued by information 
asymmetries and engage in non-value maximizing corporate activities”. 
                                                 
 
2 Jegadeessh et al. (2004) and Doukas et al. (2005) mention over 3.000 analysts working for more than 350 sell-side 
investment firms in the United States. 
3 Boni and Womack (2006) show that the typical analyst covers 10 firms and that the typical industry has 177 
firms. 
4 Beckers et al. (2004) mention that individual and institutional investors use analysts’ reports when they make 
portfolio selections or revision decisions. Additionally, they also state that analysts’ earnings forecasts are used in 
equity valuation models. 
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Secondly, analyst activity represents a vital source of information to investors and 
researchers given that analysts are viewed as surrogates for market expectations. This is 
crucial in the case of less sophisticated agents since they are not able to produce their own 
predictions (De Bondt and Thaler, 1990). As Beaver (2002) suggests, analyst activity seems 
to be particularly important for the average investor since he/she may lack the time, skill, 
or resources to analyse and interpret financial statements. Analysts’ forecasts and analysts’ 
recommendations are two key sources of information to the investment community that 
aim at anticipating changes in company fundamentals as well as  reacting to news or 
company reports (e.g., Michaely and Womack, 2005). In particular, analysts’ forecasts are 
used as proxy for market earnings expectations (e.g., Givoly and Lakonishok, 1984; La 
Porta, 1996; Brav and Lehavy, 2003) given the evidence that these forecasts often 
outperform time-series models (e.g., Brown and Rozeff, 1978; Collins and Hopwood, 1980; 
Fried and Givoly, 1982; Conroy and Harris, 1987)5 whereas analysts’ recommendations 
provide a clear and unequivocal course of action to investors (Elton, Gruber, and 
Grossman, 1986). 
 
2.2.1.3. The economic value of analysts’ information 
Security analysts are seen as sophisticated processors of financial information given their 
privileged position as intermediaries between firms and investors. Whether or not the 
market recognizes analysts’ superior information about the firms they follow is, in this 
                                                 
 
5 Hirshleifer (2001) argues that it is expected that rational agents provide at least positive incremental value in 
their forecasting activity. 
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context, particularly important. As such, I now review some of the studies that investigate 
if analysts’ recommendations and earnings forecasts have the ability to move stock prices.6 
Empirical research finds that, on average, markets react favourably (unfavourably) to 
recommendation upgrades (downgrades) (e.g., Bjerring, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen, 
1983; Elton, Gruber, and Grossman, 1986; Liu, Smith, and Syd, 1990; Beneish, 1991; Stickel, 
1995; Womack, 1996; Ryan and Taffler, 2006; Mokoteli and Taffler, forthcoming). In 
particular, these studies show that positive (negative) changes in analysts’ 
recommendations are associated with positive (negative) abnormal returns. In one of the 
most frequently cited papers in this area, Womack (1996) finds strong evidence that stock 
prices are significantly influenced by analysts’ recommendation changes. Using U.S. data, 
he finds that the price impact of a new “buy” recommendation occurs mostly around the 
announcement date whereas the price impact of a new “sell” recommendation may last for 
several months.7 More recently, Mokoteli and Taffler (forthcoming) provide further 
evidence that the value of new “buy” recommendations is short-lived whereas the market 
reaction to new “sell” recommendations is slow with the market continuing to underreact 
for at least 12 months. In a parallel U.K.-based study, Ryan and Taffler (2006) find that the 
impact of new “sell” recommendations is greater than that of new “buy” 
recommendations, especially in the case of small firms. In a supplementary study, Barber 
et al. (2001) documents the potential to earn higher returns by buying the most highly 
recommended stocks and short selling the least favourably recommended stocks.  
                                                 
 
6 Literature also suggests that price targets (e.g., Bradshaw, 2002; Brav and Lehavy, 2003) and the conceptual 
arguments in the analyst report (Hirst et al., 1995; Asquith et al., 2005) have informative value. For instance, Brav 
and Lehavy (2003) find a significant market reaction to price targets, both unconditionally and conditionally, on 
simultaneous recommendations and earnings forecasts revisions. Asquith et al., (2005) find that the stronger the 
conceptual argument, the more strongly the market reacts to the report. 
7 The post-recommendation drift associated with buy recommendations is significant and short lived (+2.4% for 
the first post-event month), but the post-recommendation drift associated with sell recommendations is larger 
and longer (-9.1% for the first six-month post-event period). 
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The literature also documents that upward (downward) earnings forecasts revisions are 
associated with positive (negative) abnormal returns. For instance, Abdel-khalik and 
Ajinkya (1982) find significant firm abnormal performance during the publication week of 
forecast revisions by Merrill Lynch analysts. Stickel (1991) also finds that earnings 
revisions affect prices, and that the impact is greater for extreme forecast changes. 
Moreover, he also documents that prices continue to drift in the direction of the revision 
for about six months.8 In a supplementary study, Stickel (1992) claims a positive 
relationship between analyst’s reputation and price impact of an earnings forecast revision 
announcement. Park and Stice (2000) and Chen, Francis, and Jiang, (2005) suggest a 
significant positive association between analyst forecast accuracy and the impact of 
forecast revisions. More recently, Clement and Tse (2003) suggest that investors’ responses 
to forecast revisions are influenced by the number of days elapsed since the last forecast 
and the forecast timeliness.  
In an attempt to understand the relative importance of various sources of analysts’ 
informational advantages, Ivkovic and Jegadeesh (2004) test two hypotheses: 1) analysts 
might be skilled at analysing the value relevance of public information; 2) analysts might 
possess the ability to gather a wide variety of information not readily available to investors 
and to efficiently process this information. Their results suggest that the value of analyst 
activity stems more from their independent collection of new information than from their 
interpretation of public information. 
 
                                                 
 
8 Stickel (1991) developed a trading strategy that predicted price reactions based on incomplete incorporation of 
such publicly available information. He found 6-month average abnormal returns of 8.22% and -5.44% 
respectively for his predicted best and worst performance portfolios. 
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2.2.2. Security analysts and market efficiency 
In an efficient market, security analyst activity would not able to identify over and 
undervalued stocks. According to the efficient market hypothesis, security prices fully 
reflect all available information (Fama, 1970) in the sense that new information is 
incorporated into securities’ prices without delay. Until recently, this paradigm was 
widely accepted in the academic finance literature. However, since the seminal work of 
Ball and Brown (1968), who provided the first convincing evidence of an incomplete 
market reaction to information, the efficient market hypothesis has been challenged by a 
vast number of empirical studies. Not surprisingly, behavioural finance emerged as an 
alternative to the traditional finance paradigm, arguing that some financial phenomena 
can be better understood using models in which some agents are not fully rational (e.g., 
Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1998; Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subramanyam, 1998). 
 
2.2.2.1. Conflicting results with the traditional finance paradigm  
Generally, the empirical behavioural finance literature finds two pervasive regularities 
inconsistent with the weak and semi-strong form of market efficiency: overreaction and 
underreaction (Shleifer, 2000). Overreaction means that security prices facing a long record 
of good (bad) news tend to become overpriced (underpriced) and have low (high) average 
returns afterwards. DeBondt and Thaler (1985; 1987) are amongst the first to show the 
existence of systematic price reversals for stocks experiencing long-term gains and losses. 
Underreaction is a widely known phenomenon identified by several empirical and 
theoretical studies. The theoretical underpinning of this “non-efficient” reaction to new 
value relevant information is that investors are slow in adjusting their expectations when 
receiving new information. For instance, Bernard and Thomas (1989) argue in favour of 
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investors’ delayed responses, Barberis, Schleifer, and Vishny, (1998) suggest that 
conservatism leads to the underreaction phenomenon and Hong and Stein (1999) argue 
that underreaction is due to firm-specific information gradually diffusing across the 
investing public. In short, when the market underreacts, good (bad) news is associated 
with an initial positive (negative) reaction that is followed by a subsequent drift in the 
same direction. 
Empirical evidence shows that the market underreacts to a wide range of self-selected and 
non-self-selected events. In the self-selected domain, examples relate to earning 
announcements (e.g., Bernard and Thomas, 1989; 1990; Mendenhall, 1991; Chan, 
Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok, 1996), initial public offerings (e.g., Aggarwal and Rivoli, 1990; 
Ritter, 1991; Loughran and Ritter, 1995; 2000), seasoned equity offerings (e.g., Spiess and 
Affleck-Graves, 1995), straight and convertible debt offerings (e.g., Dichev and Piotroski, 
1997; Lee and Loughran, 1998; Spiess and Affleck-Graves, 1999), dividend changes (e.g., 
Michaely, Thaler, and Womack, 1995), capital structure changes (e.g., Agrawal and Jaffe, 
2000), stock splits (e.g., Ikenberry, Rankine, and Stice, 1996; Ikenberry and Ramnath, 2002), 
exchanges listings (e.g., Dharan and Ikenberry, 1995), and spin-off processes (e.g., Cusatis, 
Miles, and Woolridge, 1993; Desai and Jain, 1999). In the non-self-selected domain, 
examples relate to bond rating changes (e.g., Dichev and Piotroski, 2001), analysts’ forecast 
and recommendation changes (e.g., Womack, 1996; Ryan and Taffler, 2006) and the going-
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2.2.2.2. Do security analysts facilitate market efficiency? 
The inconsistencies of the traditional paradigm in finance highlight the alleged importance 
of sophisticated agents that are less likely to misunderstand the implications of new 
information. As such, security analysts’ degree of sophistication may lead us to believe 
that analysts play a critical role in promoting market efficiency. In this section, I review 
some studies that investigate the relationship between analyst coverage and the speed 
with which markets assimilate new information. 
Brennan, Jegadeesh, and Swaminathan (1993) investigate the association between the 
number of analysts following a firm and the speed with which its stock prices react to 
common information. This study was motivated by evidence of a positive relationship 
between the number of informed investors and the speed of stock price adjustment to new 
information (Holden and Subrahmanyam, 1992; Foster and Viswanathan, 1993). Brennan, 
Jegadeesh, and Swaminathan (1993) find that market reaction to common information is 
faster for firms followed by a higher number of analysts and that a small number of 
analysts have little effect on the speed of the adjustment. 
Elgers, Lo, and Jr (2001) find that the security prices of firms with lower analyst coverage 
do not efficiently reflect all of the value-relevant information in their publicly available 
earnings forecasts. More specifically, these authors find that a simple trading strategy 
based on the ratio of price to one-year-ahead earnings forecasts yields significant positive 
abnormal returns. In a supplementary study, Gleason and Lee (2003) provide an 
explanation for the incomplete market reaction to forecast revisions (e.g., Givoly and 
Lakonishok, 1980; Stickel, 1991; Chan, Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok, 1996) by showing that 
analyst coverage affects the speed and efficacy of the price discovery process. In particular, 
they find that, after controlling for concurrent factors, the total post-revision drift over the 
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subsequent 12 months is much larger for firms with low analyst coverage than for firms 
with high analyst coverage.  
Bhattacharya (2001) suggests that the post-earnings drift (e.g., Bernard and Thomas, 1989, 
1990; Barberis, Schleifer, and Vishny, 1998; Hong and Stein, 1999) is attributable to a 
specific segment of the market, which is characterized by small traders transacting in firms 
with low-to-moderate analyst coverage. More recently, Zhang (forthcoming) suggests that 
security analysts play an important role in the efficiency with which the market 
incorporates earnings announcements in stock prices. This study provides two important 
results in this domain. First, the author finds that analysts are not responsive to earnings 
announcements in the sense that an important portion of their earnings forecast revisions 
do not take place immediately after the earnings announcements.9 Second, the post-
earnings-drift is significantly lower when the percentage of responsive analysts following 
the firm is higher. Overall, Zhang (forthcoming) suggests that security analysts play an 
important role in the efficiency with which the market incorporates earnings 
announcements in stock prices. 
In a related study, Hong, Lim, and Stein (2000) show that holding size fixed, momentum 
strategies work particularly well among stocks that have low analyst coverage, suggesting 
that momentum reflects the gradual diffusion of firm-specific information across the 
investing public. Moreover, Hong, Lim, and Stein (2000) find that the market reaction to 
stocks with low analyst coverage is particularly slow in the presence of bad news. 
                                                 
 
9 Zhang (2005) finds that 50% of analysts do not revise their forecasts within five calendar days after the earnings 
announcements. Moreover, about 15% (10%) of analysts revise their forecasts during the second (third) month 
after the earnings announcements. 
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In two recent studies, Jiang, Lee, and Zhang (2005) and Zhang (2006) explore the 
relationship between information uncertainty and the cross-section of stock returns. 
Interestingly, they use analyst coverage as one of the proxies for the level of information 
uncertainty.10 Jiang, Lee, and Zhang (2005) find that both price momentum and earnings 
momentum strategies work particularly well for high information uncertainty companies. 
For instance, when firms are sorted by recent changes in analyst forecast revisions, a 
strategy of buying positive revision stocks and shorting negative revision stocks yields 
average monthly returns that ranges from 0.77% to 1.30% (1.94% to 2.66%) for low (high) 
information uncertainty firms. Zhang (2006) indicates that the market reaction to new 
information is relatively complete for low-uncertainty stocks and incomplete for high-
uncertainty stocks. Moreover, the author finds that greater information uncertainty 
produces relatively lower future returns following bad news and relatively higher future 
returns following good news. 
 
2.2.3. Analyst biased behaviour 
Despite the studies pointing to the economic value of analyst information and the evidence 
that analysts facilitate the efficiency with which the market processes information, several 
studies suggest that analysts are biased. 
Easterwood and Nutt (1999) state that “a rational analysis of analyst behavior predicts that 
analysts immediately and without bias incorporate information into their forecasts”. However, 
there are several studies presenting conflicting evidence with this definition (e.g., Stickel, 
1990; DeBondt and Thaler, 1990; Abarbanell, 1991; Brown, 1997; Easterwood and Nutt, 
                                                 
 
10 Zhang (2006) clearly defines information uncertainty as the “ambiguity with respect to the implications of new 
information for a firm’s value”. 
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1999). I now review some of these studies and summarize two competitive explanations 
for such a biased behaviour. 
 
2.2.3.1. Analyst optimism 
There are a considerable number of studies claiming that security analysts are optimistic.11 
This optimism is derived from the systematic positive difference between forecast and 
actual earnings per share (e.g., Stickel, 1990; Abarbaell, 1991; Abarbanell and Bernard, 
1992; Kang, O’Brien, and Sivaramakrishnan, 1994; Brown, 1997; Lim, 2001; Brown, 2001) 
and from the permanent higher number of “buy” recommendations compared to the 
number of “sell” recommendations (e.g., Womack, 1996; Ho and Harris, 1998; Ryan and 
Taffler, 2006). 
For instance, Brown (1997) finds that predicted quarterly earnings are systematically 
higher than actual quarterly earnings. In addition, the author suggests that forecast errors 
are particularly severe for firms with specific characteristics such as non-S&P500 firms, 
small market capitalization firms and firms followed less by analysts. Using a different 
approach, Amir and Ganzach (1998) and Easterwood and Nutt (1999) divide analysts’ 
forecasts according to the nature of the information preceding the forecast and conclude 
that forecast behaviour is consistent with the notion of systematic optimism. In a 
subsequent study, Lim (2001) argues that positively biased forecasts may be considered a 
rational strategy to improve forecast accuracy. As the author argues, “rational analysts who 
aim to produce accurate forecasts may optimally report optimistically biased forecasts”. In fact, by 
                                                 
 
11 There are however, a number of studies arguing that analyst optimism is subject to a variety of caveats (e.g., 
Keane and Runkle, 1998; Kothari, 2001; Brown, 2001; Richardson et al., 2004; Ramnath et al., 2005): 1) the sample 
period considered; 2) whether the mean or median forecasts are used as evidence; 3) the forecast horizon; and 4) 
the use of statistical tests that establish the bias. 
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trading off bias to improve management access, analysts minimize the expected squared 
error of their forecasts. 
There is also evidence that analysts’ recommendations are issued in an optimistic manner. 
Generally, studies show that the number of “buy” recommendations is systematically 
higher than the number of “sell” recommendations. For instance, Womack (1996) finds 
that the “buy”/”sell” ratio is approximately 7/1 in the U.S. whereas Ho and Harris (1998) 
claim that this ratio varies between 4.1/1 and 5.2/1 depending on the rating system used. In 
addition, Barber et al. (2006) mention that “buy” recommendations peaked at 74% of the 
total at the end of the second quarter of 2000 whereas Ryan and Taffler (2006) estimate a 
ratio of 2.3/1 in the U.K. 
However, there is reliable evidence that analyst optimism has declined in recent years 
(e.g., Brown, 1997; Matsumoto, 1998; Brown, 2001; Barber et al., 2006; Mokoteli and Taffler, 
forthcoming). For instance, Brown (2001) reports that analyst forecasts turned from 
optimism to pessimism. In particular, the author finds a significant temporal shift in 
median earnings surprise from small negative (1984-1990) to small positive (1994-1999). 
Kothari (2001) highlights three explanations for this evidence: 1) analysts are learning from 
evidence of past bias; 2) change in analysts’ incentives and 3) the improvement in the 
quality of data used in the research examining analysts’ forecast properties. More recently, 
some studies claim that the regulatory changes in the analysts’ reporting environment 
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2.2.3.2. Analyst self-selection bias 
In general terms, analyst self-selection bias relates to analysts’ tendency to report on stocks 
about which they have favourable views and to avoid reporting on stocks about which 
they have unfavourable views. As such, analysts spend less effort in the coverage of 
underperforming stocks, which can explain, at least partially, why momentum strategies 
work particularly well for companies with low analyst coverage (e.g., Hong, Lim, and 
Stein, 2000). 
Hayes (1998) developed a mathematical model in which analysts’ incentives for gathering 
information are stronger for stocks that are expected to perform well. In particular, the 
model predicts that: 1) forecast accuracy should be higher for stocks that perform well than 
for stocks that perform poorly; 2) analysts seek to follow stocks they expect to perform 
well; 3) if a stock is not widely held, an analyst will initiate coverage only if the stock’s 
performance is expected to be good. 
The theoretical model of Hayes (1998) has empirical support. For instance, McNichols and 
O’Brien (1997) suggest that analysts tend to start covering firms they view favourably and 
stop covering firms they view unfavourably. Moreover, the authors find that stocks 
receiving initial coverage tend to obtain more “buy” recommendations than those already 
covered whereas stocks they drop tend to have lower ratings than those whose coverage 
continues. More recently, Das, Guo, and Zhang (2006) document that in the three 
subsequent years, initial public offerings with high residual coverage have significantly 
better returns and operating performance than those with low analyst coverage. As such, 
the authors suggest that the expectation of future firm performance is one latent 
determinant of selective coverage. 
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2.2.3.3. Explaining analyst biased behaviour 
Kothari (2001) identifies two broad categories of explanations for analyst optimism in 
analysts’ forecasts: incentive-based explanations and cognitive-bias explanations. I now 
summarize studies providing evidence consistent with these two explanations. 
 
2.2.3.3.1. Economic incentives 
Economic incentives are one of the most consistent explanations for analysts’ biased 
behaviour. These incentives are believed to produce conflicts of interest between 
brokerage firms and their clients, reducing analysts’ objectivity and independence.12  
The literature finds that analysts fear that a negative report may reduce the possibility of 
their investment banking firm doing business with the target firm in the future. For 
instance, Dugar and Nathan (1995) find that investment bank analysts produce more 
optimistic forecasts than non-investment bank analysts. Lin and McNichols (1998) report 
similar conclusions after exploring analysts’ long-term growth forecasts and 
recommendations. For the particular case of IPO companies, Michaely and Womack (1999) 
confirm that analysts’ recommendations are optimistically biased in the case of 
underwriter analysts and that their performance is significantly worse than with non-
underwriter analysts. In an additional study, O’Brien, McNichols, and Lin (2005) show that 
affiliated analysts are slower (faster) in downgrading (upgrading) recommendations 
                                                 
 
12 According to Michaely and Womack (2005), investment banks traditionally have three income sources that may 
potentially create conflicts of interest within the bank and with its clients: 1) corporate financing, the issue of 
securities and merger advisory services; 2) brokerage services and 3) proprietary trading. Some of the main 
potential conflicts are between the two first sources. The first is responsible primarily for completing transactions 
for new and current clients, and the second for maximizing commissions and spreads by providing timely, high 
quality and presumably unbiased information to their clients 
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compared to unaffiliated analysts. More recently, Barber, Lehavy, and Trueman (2007) find 
that recommendation upgrades (downgrades) by investment banks underperform 
(outperform) non-investment bank brokerages and independent research firms.  
There is also evidence that analysts working for brokerage firms tend to be significantly 
more optimistic than analysts working for non-brokerage houses (e.g., Carleton, Glezen, 
and Benefield, 1998; Hodgkinson, 2001) and that brokerage houses seem to reward 
analysts for their optimism (Hong and Kubik, 2003).13 Not surprisingly, commissions 
generated by followed stocks are one of the most important sources of analyst 
compensation (Michaely and Womack, 2005). As such, by issuing optimistic forecasts and 
favourable recommendations, analysts are encouraging investors to buy the company’s 
stock, and thus, generate brokerage commissions. Pessimistic forecasts and unfavourable 
recommendations generate lower commissions due to restrictions on short sales, limited 
availability and greater risk for options (Espahbodi, Dugar, and Tehranian, 2001). 
Finally, there are also studies arguing that analyst optimistic behaviour is related to their 
need to maintain good relations with firm management. In fact, analysts depend on 
corporate management for accurate and timely information about the companies they 
follow and they fear that companies will use this dependency as a weapon in the case of 
negative reports (Espahbodi, Dugar, and Tehranian., 2001). This hypothesis is consistent 
with the findings of Francis and Philbrick (1993) and Das, Guo, and Zhang (1998), who 
show that analysts’ forecasts are more optimistic for companies with greater earnings 
variability or that had a sell rating.  
                                                 
 
13 Hong and Kubik (2003) find that optimistic analysts are 38% less likely to move down the hierarchy and 90% 
more likely to move up the hierarchy. Moreover, this reward for optimism is more acute when analysts are 
covering stocks underwritten by their brokerage houses. 
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Several studies investigate the factors associated with the analyst decision to follow a firm 
besides the relationship between brokerage firms and their clientsFor instance, Previts et 
al. (1994) find that analysts prefer to follow firms that smooth earnings whereas Chung 
and Jo (1996) show that analysts tend to follow stocks of high quality firms. In addition, 
Lang and Lundholm (1996) find that analysts prefer to follow firms with more 
forthcoming disclosures, particularly in the context of direct investor relations 
communications, as opposed to public disclosures in annual and quarterly reports to 
shareholders. More recently, Botosan and Harris (2000) show that analysts following 
increases with firms’ decisions to include information on segment activity as part of their 
quarterly (as opposed to only annual) reports whilst Barth, Kasznik, and McNichols (2001) 
find that relative to industry peers, analyst following increases with R&D and advertising 
expenditures. Finally, Jegadeesh et al. (2004) show that analysts tend to favour “growth” 
stocks compared to “value” stocks and that they prefer firms associated with positive 
momentum. 
In a recent study, Liang, Riedl and Venkataraman (2008) augment the exant literature 
about the relationship between analysts, brokerage houses and firms followed by 
addressing the specific characteristics of analysts and brokerage houses who follow firms. 
At the analyst level, this study finds that an analyst is more likely to follow a firm that falls 
within his or her primary industry expertise and an analyst is more likely to follow a firm 
when his or her experience is greater relative to the other analysts following that firm. 
With regard to the employing brokerage house, Liang, Riedl and Venkataraman (2008) 
find that an analyst is more likely to initiate coverage of a firm if the company was 
previously followed by another analyst employed at the same brokerage house but who is 
no longer forecasting for that brokerage house. In addition, they show that an analyst is 
also more likely to cover a firm when the brokerage house has had a recent investment 
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banking relationship with the firm. Together, these findings suggest that analyst-firm 
pairings are determined not only by the characteristics of firms but also by a range of 
factors reflecting characteristics specific to the analyst and the employing brokerage house. 
 
2.2.3.3.2. Cognitive biases 
Several psychological errors are perceived to affect both sophisticated and non-
sophisticated agents. The tendency to be overoptimistic is one of the best documented 
examples. Montier (2002) states that such overoptimism results from a number of 
psychological biases, such as illusion of control and self-attribution.14 There is also 
evidence that overconfidence plays an important role in the decision-making process. This 
bias occurs when one believes the precision of one’s information is greater then it actually 
is and there is evidence that experts tend to be more confident than relatively 
inexperienced individuals (Griffin and Tversky, 1992). It follows that overconfidence may 
help to explain why security analysts believe they have superior investment insights. 
Another important psychological error potentially affecting analyst behaviour is the 
representativeness bias, first introduced by psychologists Daniel Kahneman and Amos 
Tversky. In the words of Hirschleifer (2001), representativeness “involves assessing the 
probability of a state of the world based on the degree to which the evidence is perceived as similar to 
or typical of the state of the world”. Put simply, it means that intuitive judgment is often the 
                                                 
 
14 The illusion of control is related to people feeling that they have influence over the outcome of uncontrollable 
events, which is described by Hirshleifer (2001) as a type of “magical thinking”. The self-attribution bias means 
that people attribute favourable outcomes to skill while bad outcomes are attributed to bad luck, or else they 
blame external factors for the failure (e.g., Fischhoff, 1982; Langer and Roth, 1975; Miller and Ross, 1975; Taylor 
and Brown, 1988). 
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only practical method for assessing uncertainty, because people do not normally have 
formal models for computing the probabilities of events. 
These cognitive biases help understand analysts’ biased behaviour and have been 
proposed to explain analysts’ forecast optimism (e.g., DeBondt and Thaler, 1985; 1987; 
DeBondt, 1992; Amir and Ganzach, 1998). For instance, De Bondt (1992) finds that long-
term earnings forecasts are significantly more optimistic for recent winners compared to 
recent losers. Amir and Ganzach (1998) argue that representativeness, along with 
optimism and anchoring, influences analysts’ forecasts and that this heuristic leads to 
extreme predictions or overreaction. In addition, Tamura (2002) suggests that analysts are 
affected by their personalities in forecasting, since relatively optimistic analysts tend to 
continue to be optimistic, while pessimistic analysts tend to continue to be pessimistic. 
 
2.2.4. Recent changes in analysts’ reporting environment 
The previous pages of this chapter highlight that analysts are generally optimistic, 
especially if they work for investment or brokerage firms. Concerns that investors were 
being misled by analysts’ optimistic research reports and by analyst conflicts of interest 
were triggered by the stock market downturn of 2000-2002 and by several corporate 
episodes where analysts were recommending “buy” ratings up until the scandals broke 
(e.g., Enron, WorldCom, Adelphia, Tyco). 
Recently, however, the policy-makers and regulators have introduced changes in the 
analysts’ reporting environment and in their relationship with target firms, investment 
and brokerage firms and investors. Below, I briefly describe the most important changes 
and review some studies addressing these issues. 
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 2.2.4.1. Regulation Fair Disclosure 
Before October 2000, it was common for firms to communicate value-relevant information 
to selected market agents before disclosing it to the public. This practice, which 
disadvantaged the “average” investor, was changed on the 23rd of October 2000 after the 
implementation of the Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD). In general terms, Reg FD 
requires the public disclosure of value-relevant information to the entire investment 
community in an attempt to increase investor confidence in the integrity of capital 
markets.15 
Several studies investigate the effectiveness of Reg FD. Heflin, Subramanyam, and Zhang 
(2003) find that companies significantly increased the quantity and quality of voluntary 
information disclosures after October 2000, in an apparent compensation for the decrease 
of private disclosures. This study also finds that abnormal returns following pre-earnings 
announcements became significantly smaller after that date. This conclusion is consistent 
with the findings of Bailey et al. (2003) and Eleswarapu, Thompson, and Venkataramen 
(2003), who suggest that prices became more informative about upcoming earnings after 
Reg FD. 
In an additional study, Gintschel and Markow (2004) observe a significant reduction in the 
average price impact associated with the dissemination of both earnings forecasts (34%) 
and stock recommendations (22%), especially for analysts working at prestigious 
brokerages and for optimistic analysts. There is also evidence that the number of 
                                                 
 
15 However, the introduction of Reg FD was controversial. Security analysts criticised Regulation FD suggesting 
that it would reduce the flow of information to the market. In broad terms, security analysts argued that 
managers would fear litigation arising from improperly interpreted public announcements or that the public 
disclosure of sensitive information that analysts only used to improve earnings forecasts could benefit 
competitors. For more detail, see Heflin et al. (2003). 
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companies followed per analyst decreased after Reg FD, reflecting the increase of 
information costs (Mohanram and Sunder, 2006).  
The literature reports mixed evidence about analysts’ earnings forecast dispersion 
following the implementation of Reg FD. For instance, Bailey et al. (2003), Irani and 
Karamanou (2003) and Mohanram and Sunder (2006) find less consensus among analysts 
forecasts whereas Heflin, Subramanyam, and Zhang (2003) fail to reach a similar 
conclusion. In addition, there is also mixed evidence regarding the impact of Reg FD on 
forecast accuracy. Bailey et al. (2003), Heflin, Subramanyam, and Zhang (2003) and 
Mohanram and Sunder (2006) find no significant changes whilst Findlay and Mathew 
(2006) suggest that analysts became less accurate after the implementation of Reg FD. 
 
2.2.4.2. Regulations NASD 2711 and NYSE 472 
Following Reg FD implementation, the regulatory authorities also felt the need to provide 
investors with better information to assess analyst research. This need was triggered by the 
perception that analysts avoided reporting their true expectations and that analysts’ 
conflicts of interest were conditioning their activity.16 In 2002, the SEC approved two 
proposals from the National Association of Security Dealers (NASD) and the New York 
                                                 
 
16 One of the most important episodes occurred in June 2001, when a Wall Street Journal article about an alleged 
misconduct of security analysts encouraged the New York Attorney General (NYAG) to investigate investment 
banks. This investigation found that investment banks engaged in practices that created or maintained 
inappropriate influence over research analysts seeking lucrative fees. In fact, in some cases, favourable analyst 
public recommendations did not match their true expectations expressed in internal e-mails. Following the joint 
investigation by the regulators, the SEC, the NYSE, the NASD, the NYAG and the ten U.S. investment firms 
involved reached a settlement commonly known as the “Global Analyst Research Settlement”. This settlement 
was announced on the 28th of April, 2003 and required the sanctioned banks to pay fines and penalties totalling 
roughly 1.4 billion dollars for their misconduct. In addition, the Settlement reinforces the previous regulatory 
changes by requiring, for instance, a physical separation between the investment banking and the research 
departments. 
- 42 - 
Stock Exchange (NYSE) that aimed at making analysts’ research output more meaningful. 
The NASD proposed the implementation of Rule 2711, “Research Analysts and Research 
Reports” whilst the NYSE proposed amendments to its Rule 472, “Communications with 
the Public”. These rules were approved on the 8th of May, 2002 with an effective date for 
implementing the disclosure provision of no later than the 9th of September, 2002 (NASD 
2711) and 5th of May 2003 (Rule 472). 
Both proposals share the same goals and aim to separate investment banking activity from 
research departments. Amongst other restrictions, these rules limit the relationships and 
communications between investment banking and research staff and prohibit analyst 
compensation based on specific investment banking transactions. In addition, the new 
regulatory environment requires analyst research reports to reveal the relationships 
between the security analyst, the investment bank and the subject company. Finally, 
analyst research reports have to display the proportion of the issuing firm’s 
recommendations that are “buys”, “holds” and “sells”. 
Few studies have investigated the efficacy of NASD Rule 2711 and NYSE Rule 472. 
However, in one of these few studies, Barber et al. (2006) show that the percentage of 
“buy” recommendations decreased (from 60% to 45%) and the percentage of “sell” 
recommendations increased (from 5% to 14%) following the regulatory change 
implementations.17 More recently, Mokoteli and Taffler (forthcoming) shows a dramatic 
change in the distribution of stock recommendations. To be precise, the authors reveal that 
the ratio of new “buys” to “sells” reaches 49:1 during 2000 but plunges to 0.9:1 in 2002. In 
                                                 
 
17 Barber et al. (2006) also find that before the regulatory changes, the percentage of “buy” recommendations 
between sanctioned and non-sanctioned brokers in the Global Analyst Research Settlement was economically 
small. However, after the regulatory changes, the percentage of “buy” recommendations for the sanctioned banks 
declined more sharply compared to the non-sanctioned banks. 
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addition, Madureira et al. (2008) show that, following the regulatory changes, optimistic 
recommendations have become less frequent whereas the neutral and pessimistic 
recommendations have become more frequent. However, affiliated analysts are still 
reluctant to issue pessimistic recommendations. Finally, Madureira et al. (2008) show that, 
contrary to price response to neutral and pessimistic recommendations, the price reaction 
to optimistic recommendations is significantly higher following the regulatory changes. 
 
2.2.5. Discussion 
This section reviews the relevant literature on security analyst activity which feeds into the 
general framework of my thesis. Two key ideas emerge from the previous pages: 1) 
security analysts play an important role in the functioning of financial markets, and 2) 
security analysts do not process information “immediately and without bias”. 
Evidence inconsistent with the efficient market hypothesis makes it hard to believe that 
investors assimilate new information efficiently (e.g., Bernard and Thomas, 1989; 
Michaely, Thaler, and Womack, 1995; Dichev and Piotroski, 2001; Taffler, Lu, and Kausar, 
2004). As such, security analysts, being sophisticated agents, should not exhibit similar 
errors and should facilitate the correct assimilation of information in stock prices. 
However, the literature shows that analyst activity is not unbiased. On the one hand, there 
is evidence that analyst coverage has a positive impact on the efficiency with which the 
market processes information (e.g., Brennan, Jegadeesh, and Swaminathan, 1993; 
Bhattacharya, 2001; Gleason and Lee, 2003; Zhang, 2006). On the other hand, the research 
evidence shows that security analysts are prone to behavioural biases in a similar fashion 
to non-sophisticated agents (e.g., De Bondt, 1992; Easterwood and Nutt, 1999; Michaely 
and Womack, 1999). 
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Despite the evidence that security analysts promote market efficiency, extant studies pay 
little attention to their role in the bad news domain. This is a puzzling result since the 
literature suggests that inefficient market reaction is particularly likely to occur in this 
case. For instance, Bernard and Thomas (1989) find that the post-earnings drift is more 
severe in the case of negative earnings surprises whereas Womack (1996) shows that the 
post-recommendation drift is larger and longer in the case of “sell” recommendations. 
Similarly, Dichev and Piotroski (2001) find that an abnormal reaction to Moody’s bond 
rating changes is concentrated in downgrades as opposed to upgrades whilst Kausar, 
Taffler, and Tan (forthcoming) suggest similar evidence for the going-concern audit report 
as opposed to the going-concern audit report withdrawn. It follows that investigating how 
security analysts deal with bad news may facilitate the understanding of the broader issue 
of how the market responds to negative information. 
In addition, the marginal contribution of security analysts may be greater in the bad news 
domain. In fact, as Hong, Lim, and Stein (2000) mention, “if the firm is sitting on bad news, its 
managers will have much less incentive to bring investors up to date quickly”. Intuitively, it 
makes sense to consider that managers have less incentive to disclose information that 
affects the firms’ value negatively. This idea is confirmed by Givoly and Palmon (1982) 
and Chambers and Penman (1984), who suggest that firms tend to delay earnings 
announcements when they report lower-than-expected earnings. However, it should be 
noted that there are also reasons to believe that managers have incentives to disclose bad 
news earlier than good news. Skinner (1994) present two reasons justifying this rationale: 
litigation and reputation. First, the U.S. legal environment allows stockholders to sue 
managers when there are large stock price declines on earnings announcement days. 
Second, the investment community may impose costs on firms whose managers are less 
than candid about potential earnings problems. Skinner (1994) explores this asymmetric 
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loss function in choosing managers’ voluntary disclosure policies and find consistent 
evidence with these two arguments. More recently, Kothari, Shu, and Wysocki (2008) 
show that managers withhold bad news up to a certain threshold. As such, do analysts 
provide investors with value-relevant information in the bad news domain? The next 
section reviews studies that address analyst behaviour and negative information. 
 
2.3. Security analysts and bad news 
Studying how efficiently analysts deal with bad news help us to understand why markets 
seem particularly slow to incorporate negative information. In this section, I review some 
studies that investigate: 1) analysts’ reaction to negative information; 2) analysts’ optimism 
towards companies in financial distress and 3) analysts behaviour in the presence of non-
routine bad news. 
 
2.3.1. Analyst reaction to negative information 
The majority of the studies investigating analysts’ forecasts in response to new information 
conclude that analysts do not process fundamental information efficiently. Moreover, there 
is evidence that analyst reaction depends on the nature of the information. 
There are several studies showing that analysts do not revise their forecasts efficiently in 
response to new information. Despite early evidence that analysts overreact to past 
earnings (DeBondt and Thaler, 1990), most of the research has concluded that analysts 
underreact to information, especially when such information is negative. One of the first 
studies suggesting that analysts underreact to earnings information is that of Abarbanell 
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and Bernard (1992). In particular, these authors fail to find a relationship between 
extremely high (low) forecasts and firms experiencing recent strong (weak) earnings 
performance, which is inconsistent with the notion of overreaction. There are other studies 
suggesting that analysts underreact to information. For instance, Elliott, Philbrick, and 
Weidman (1995) find that analysts systematically underweigh new information, 
particularly when revising forecasts downward. Chan, Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok (1996) 
show that analysts’ forecasts of earnings are slow to incorporate past earnings news, 
especially for firms that have performed poorly in the past. Abarbanell and Bushee (1997) 
document that analyst forecast revisions fail to consider all of the information in 
fundamental signals related to future earnings. Finally, Mikhail, Walther, and Willis (2003) 
also document that analysts underreact to prior earnings information but show their 
underreaction decreases as their experience following a firm increases. 
Two important studies provide clear evidence that analyst reaction to good news is 
distinct from bad news (Amir and Ganzach, 1998; Easterwood and Nutt, 1999). These 
studies argue that inefficient earnings forecasts are not characterized by a uniform pattern 
of overreaction or underreaction to information, but by  systematic optimism. For instance, 
Amir and Ganzach (1998) show that analysts tend to overreact in the case of positive 
forecast modifications (good news) and to underreact in the presence of negative forecast 
modifications (bad news).18 The authors justify their results using a behavioural 
framework of three heuristics that could influence earnings forecasts: leniency, 
representativeness, and anchoring and adjustment. Similarly, Easterwood and Nutt (1999) 
find that analysts’ systematic overreaction (underreaction) is exclusively related to positive 
(negative) earnings information, suggesting that analysts overweigh (underweigh) good 
                                                 
 
18 Amir and Ganzach (1998) distinguish between two types of forecast modification. Forecast revisions are 
defined as the difference between the new earnings forecast and the previous forecast. Forecast changes are 
defined as the difference between the prediction of future earnings and the previously announced earnings. 
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(bad) news. As such, the authors conclude that analysts are systematically optimistic in 
response to information. 
 
2.3.2. Analyst optimism and distressed firms  
The literature provides evidence that analyst optimism is not confined to healthy firms 
and that this bias is particularly manifested for firms in financial distress. For instance, 
there is evidence that analyst overestimation of earnings is higher for loss-making firms 
compared to non loss-making firms (e.g., Dowen, 1996; Hwang, Jan, and Basu, 1996; Das, 
1998; Degeorge, Patel, and Zeckhauser, 1999; Brown, 2001). In one of these studies, Das 
(1998) corroborates this conclusion after controlling for forecast horizon, year of forecast 
and industry affiliation. Using a sample of 480 firms with negative operating performance 
(loss firms) and 440 control non-loss firms for the period between 1985 and 1993, the 
author also shows that this bias declines as the earnings announcement date approaches. 
In a supplementary study, Brown (2001) finds that the percentage of analysts’ forecasts 
above actual earnings is generally higher for loss-making firms (65.8%) compared to 
profitable firms (53.0%). In addition, he also shows that the percentage of negative 
earnings surprises (forecast greater than actual) is almost twice as large compared to the 
percentage of positive surprises near the earnings announcement, suggesting that analysts 
are particularly inefficient when dealing with adverse information. 
Lim (2001) shows that analyst optimism is more severe for firms experiencing prior 
negative earnings surprise and for firms associated with poor past stock returns. 
Moreover, Ding, Charoenwong, and Seetoh (2004) demonstrate that analysts exhibit 
asymmetric behaviour towards positive and negative earnings growth. In particular, they 
find little evidence of biased earnings forecasts during periods of positive earnings growth 
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whereas for periods of negative earnings growth they show that analysts’ earnings 
forecasts are optimistically biased. 
Two studies investigate the relationship between analysts’ earnings forecasts and 
bankrupt firms. Moses (1990) finds that analyst forecasts for bankrupt firms become less 
accurate and more optimistically biased than for non-bankrupt firms as the bankruptcy 
date approaches. The author concludes that analyst forecast behaviour for bankrupt firms 
reflects conditions that are associated with failure. In the same domain, Espahbodi, Dugar, 
and Tehranian (2001) show that analysts’ forecasts are optimistic for both bankrupt and 
turnaround firms. However, they find that the forecast bias for bankrupt firms declines to 
insignificant levels one year before the bankruptcy filing whereas the same happens 
during the year of recovery for turnaround firms. According to Espahbodi, Dugar, and 
Tehranian (2001), analysts are unable to distinguish between bankrupt and turnaround 
firms after two or more consecutive years of poor performance. 
 
2.3.3. Analysts dealing with non-routine bad news 
Evidence on how security analysts deal with bad news is almost exclusively related to 
routine events, such as net losses, negative earnings surprises or forecast revisions. In fact, 
there is little evidence about how analysts deal with negative non-routine events, which 
can be defined as news that is not part of the normal reporting cycle (Griffin, 2003). 
In one of the few studies addressing this issue, Griffin (2003) investigates analyst 
behaviour for companies with corrective restatements or disclosures that lead to allegation 
of securities fraud. Two key findings are important for my research. Firstly, analysts seem 
to have low interest in following these companies. More specifically, Griffin (2003) finds 
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that the number of analysts covering such firms decreases slowly over several months 
following a corrective disclosure. Secondly, analysts do not anticipate the corrective 
restatements, but they react to such an event. In effect, there is evidence of strong forecast 
revision and decrease in forecast errors in the event-month, in contrast to the pre-event 
period. However, there are two studies showing that analysts are able to detect some types 
of accounting fraud before its public disclosure (Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney, 1996; Cotter 
and Young, 2007). Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1996) find that analysts anticipate the 
public announcement of an accounting fraud by dropping analyst coverage prior to the 
disclosure of such an event whereas Cotter and Young (2007) show that analysts use 
different signals to inform investors about different fraud types. In some cases, analysts 
cease coverage of firms associated with accounting fraud whilst in other cases analysts 
downgrade stock recommendations for such firms. 
In a recent study, Clarke et al. (2006) compare analysts’ recommendations for a sample of 
384 bankrupt firms with similar non-bankrupt firms from 1995 to 2001. Their results show 
that analysts are more aggressive in downgrading their stock recommendations for 
bankrupt firms than for matched firms as the bankruptcy date approaches, suggesting that 
analysts do not ignore the financial deterioration of bankrupt firms. As a result, Clarke et 
al. (2006) reject the notion that analysts issue biased recommendations for bankrupt firms. 
Using large price changes to proxy for public information shocks, Conrad et al. (2006) 
investigate how analysts’ recommendations respond to major news. They find that the 
probability of a change in analysts’ recommendations is conditional on the pre 3-day stock 
price change: analysts are more likely to downgrade a stock following an extreme price 
decrease than upgrade a stock following an extreme price increase. This suggests that 
analysts believe they have private information and that recommendation changes are 
“sticky” in one direction, with analysts reluctant to downgrade. In a parallel study, 
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McNichols, Lin and O’Brien (2005) find that analysts take longer to downgrade a stock 
compared to the upgrade decision and the reluctance to downgrade is more severe in the 
case of affiliated analysts.  
 
2.3.4. Discussion 
This section provides evidence that security analysts do not assimilate negative public 
information efficiently. The existing literature finds that analysts tend to underreact in the 
presence of adverse news and that they are particularly optimistic when forecasting the 
earnings of distressed firms. In addition, there is conflicting evidence about analysts’ 
ability to anticipate bad news and how they react to such news. 
Existing evidence is, however, almost exclusively confined to routine events with adverse 
market consequences, such as net losses, negative earnings surprises and forecast 
revisions. In fact, little is known about analyst behaviour in the presence of non-routine 
events, i.e. those that are not part of the normal reporting cycle. Amongst the few 
exceptions are the studies by Espahbodi, Dugar, and Tehranian (2001), Griffin (2003), 
Clarke et al. (2006) and Conrad et al. (2006). Interestingly, these studies provide conflicting 
results about the role of security analysts in the dissemination of information related to 
non-routine bad news events. Therefore, my thesis provides further evidence on how 
analysts deal with firms associated with a bad news event that is not part of the normal 
reporting cycle. Moreover, I investigate if analysts facilitate the incorporation of negative 
information in stock prices of such firms. 
The selection of my non-routine bad news event to facilitate a comprehensive 
understanding of the above issues is crucial. I select such an event based on the following 
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criteria: 1) it must not be part of the normal reporting cycle; 2) it must be perceived as a 
clear case of bad news; 3) it must be preceded by unfavourable economic events allowing 
its anticipation; 4) it must be evidence of inefficient market reaction; 5) it must provide a 
reasonable number of cases allowing a comprehensive analysis. 
Drawing on the previous literature and the above criteria, I use going-concern modified 
audit report disclosures as my non-routine bad news event. In fact, the GCM offers unique 
characteristics that facilitate a comprehensive analysis of the connection between security 
analysts, bad news and market performance. It is important at this stage to justify why I 
classify a GCM audit report as a “non-routine” bad news disclosure. SAS No. 59 states that 
auditors have to explicitly evaluate the going-concern status of a firm as part of the 
standard audit process. However, auditor decision to issue a GCM audit report is a non-
routine event on the actual going-concern audit process given the very low proportion of 
firms receiving such a severe opinion.19 The next section reviews research related to the 
going-concern audit report. 
 
2.4. The going-concern assumption 
Financial statements are the privileged information vehicle between firms and their 
stakeholders. The going-concern assumption is a fundamental principle in the preparation 
of financial statements. It states that an entity is ordinarily viewed as continuing in 
business for the foreseeable future. 
                                                 
 
19 I only find 924 firm-year observations for which auditors disclose a going-concern modified audit report for the 
first-time between 01.01.1994 and 31.12.2005 out of the entire population of non-finance, non-utility industry 
firms listed on the NYSE, AMEX or NASDAQ. 
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External auditors contribute to reducing information asymmetry between firms and their 
potential investors by providing an opinion on financial statements which, among other 
responsibilities, requires the monitoring of the going-concern assumption. If auditors 
develop serious doubts about the continuity of the firm in the foreseeable future, the 
going-concern assumption comes under question. It follows that auditors are required to 
report these uncertainties in the audit report, which is part of their “client’s” annual report. 
As such, a non-standard audit report about its financial statements is not desirable and, in 
particular, a going-concern modified audit report is a clear sign of bad news. 
 
2.4.1. Historical background 
The Statement on Auditing Practices (SAP) No.15, issued in 1942, represents the American 
Institute of Certified Public Accountants’ (AICPA) first formal effort to consider the effects 
of uncertainty on the audit report (Bell and Wright, 1995). The Statement suggests that the 
cumulative effect of uncertainties may be so great as to create a situation in which either an 
auditor’s report might require an exception, or it might not be possible to render an 
opinion. 
Following this, the Securities and Exchange Commission’s Accounting Series Release 
(ASR) No. 90 (1962), and the AICPA’s SAP No.33 (1963) required that the phrase “subject 
to” be used to introduce a qualification of opinion when the financial statements were 
materially affected by uncertainties. The need for a formal going-concern disclosure was 
first recognized in Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 2 (AICPA 1974), since the 
Auditing Standards Executive Committee concluded that uncertainty about the ability of 
an entity to continue should be reported in the same manner as any other uncertainty. 
Since then, SAS No. 34 (AICPA 1981) and SAS No. 59 (AICPA 1988) have provided 
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guidelines for the independent auditor’s evaluation and for the disclosure of going-
concern problems. 
SAS No. 34 entitled “The Auditor’s Consideration When a Question Arises about an Entity’s 
Continued Existence” accepts the premise that audit reports should be modified for going-
concern uncertainties and provides operational guidance to auditors on assessing a client’s 
likely continued existence. This statement states that while an audit does not include a 
search for evidential matter relating to an entity’s continued existence, when an auditor 
becomes aware of information contrary to its continued existence, modification of the 
audit report might become necessary. Under SAS No. 34, the auditor has a passive 
responsibility in assessing an entity’s continued existence. That is, the auditor is required 
to assess the firm’s going-concern status only when contrary information is discovered 
during the audit of the financial statements. 
Throughout its long history, the obligation to disclose going-concern uncertainties has 
been controversial (Jones, 1996). For instance, in 1982, the AICPA proposed to eliminate 
this requirement, but public opposition led this proposal to fail. In fact, there were 
complaints about situations in which firms had gone bankrupt without any warning about 
going-concern problems in the independent audit report. Literature addressing the 
usefulness of the audit opinion in the going-concern domain is also controversial. On the 
one hand, some studies suggest that independent auditor activity mitigates the 
information asymmetry between managers and owners given their intimate knowledge of 
the firm’s activities and future plans (e.g., Dopuch, Holthausen, and Leftwich, 1986; Jones, 
1996). On the other hand, there are also examples of studies arguing that auditor’s 
evaluation of such uncertainties is not superior to evaluations which statement users can 
make (e.g., Levitan and Knoblett, 1985; Mutchler, 1985; Dopuch, Holthausen, and 
Leftwich, 1987). 
- 54 - 
In response to public concern, AICPA issued expectation gap standards, including SAS 
No. 59, “The Auditorʹs Consideration of an Entityʹs Ability to Continue as a Going Concern”. In 
contrast to SAS No. 34, this statement requires auditors to evaluate whether substantial 
doubt exists about an audit clientʹs ability to continue as a going-concern for a reasonable 
period, which does not exceed one year beyond the date of the financial statements being 
audited. SAS No. 59 increased auditors’ responsibilities since it requires an explicit 
evaluation of a company’s continued viability in every audit. The first stage in making this 
going-concern evaluation requires the consideration of whether the results of the audit 
procedures identified existing conditions and events that indicate substantial doubt about 
the clientʹs ability to continue as a going-concern. Those conditions and events are divided 
into four categories: 1) negative trends, 2) other indications of possible financial 
difficulties, 3) internal matters, and 4) external matters. 
When, after considering conditions and events in the aggregate, the auditor believes that 
substantial doubt may exist, they should consider managementʹs plans for dealing with 
the effects of those conditions and events. If, after considering the conditions and events 
and managementʹs plans, the auditor concludes that substantial doubt remains, the audit 
report should include an explanatory paragraph to reflect this uncertainty. 
 
2.4.2. Informational content of the GCM audit report 
Employing the capital-market paradigm, several studies test whether the market 
recognizes the importance of a going-concern report by examining the stock price reaction 
surrounding the GCM announcement date. I now review the studies that find no evidence 
of market reaction to the GCM audit report, studies that claim there is a significant market 
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reaction to such accounting disclosures and studies that argue that market reaction 
depends on the ex-ante expectation of a forthcoming GCM audit report. 
 
2.4.2.1. Evidence of no-information value 
Some studies suggest that the disclosure of a going-concern audit report does not generate 
significant stock price reaction.20 For instance, Elliott (1982) fails to find a significant 
adverse reaction to such an event during the announcement period as well as for the 
subsequent 14 weeks. Alternatively, he shows that significant abnormal returns are 
observed in the 45-week period before the GCM announcement date. However, the author 
recognizes that his results may be related to his event date definition (i.e., the release date 
of annual earnings in the Wall Street Journal). In a supplementary study, Dodd et al. (1984) 
use the earlier of the 10-k or annual report SEC filing dates to define the GCM 
announcement date. In general, their findings confirm that the publication of a GCM audit 
report has little impact on stock prices around the event date and that markets anticipate 
the GCM qualification in the pre-event period. 
More recently, Herbohn, Ragunathan, and Garsden (2007) also fail to find evidence of a 
short-term market reaction to the publication of a first-time GCM audit report in the 
Australian market. Using a sample of 229 firm-year observations, the authors conclude 
that significant negative abnormal reaction is concentrated in the year prior to the GCM 
announcement. However, as the authors argue, there are some limitations in the control of 
their results that “might reduce the power of our short event-windows tests”. 
                                                 
 
20 There are also some studies claiming that stock price reaction to “subject to” opinions is not significantly 
different from unqualified opinions (e.g., Davis, 1982; Dodd et al., 1984). In addition, Ball et al. (1979) find that 
audit qualifications considered as a single group are not associated with a significant reduction in share prices. 
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2.4.2.2. Evidence of information value 
There are several examples of studies which directly (e.g., Firth, 1978; Fleak and Wilson, 
1994; Carlson, Glesen, and Benefield, 1998; Citron, Taffler, and Uang, 2008) and indirectly 
(e.g., Hopwood, McKeown, and Mutchler, 1989; Chen and Church, 1996; Holder-Webb 
and Wilkins, 2000; Willenborg and McKeown, 2001; Weber and Willenborg, 2003) provide 
evidence that investors acknowledge the importance of a GCM audit report disclosure.21 
Firth (1978) finds that the publication of a going-concern report has significant impact on 
the prices of U.K. companies around the event date. Using a different perspective, Fields 
and Wilkins (1991) corroborate the notion that going-concern reports have information 
value by finding significant positive returns associated with the withdrawal of the going-
concern report. In a more recent study, Carlson, Glesen, and Benefield (1998) improve on 
previous research by controlling for concurrent financial statement disclosures in their 
results and conclude that investors adjust stock prices following the GCM audit report 
announcement (usually within five days). In a recent study, Citron, Taffler, and Uang 
(2008) show that going-concern opinions are associated with significant negative price 
sensitive information in the U.K. market with no significant differences depending on 
when the going-concern opinion was first reported. 
                                                 
 
21 Several studies also support the notion that audit qualifications are associated with declines in stock prices (e.g., 
Chow and Rice, 1982; Banks and Kinney, 1982; Dopuch et al., 1986; Frost, 1991; Choi and Jeter, 1992). For instance, 
Chow and Rice (1982) corroborate this conclusion using a market model including an industry factor to calculate 
firm-specific stock returns. Dopuch et al. (1986) claim that media disclosures of qualified opinions are associated 
with significant negative stock price effects and the magnitude of the abnormal returns does not depend on 
whether or not the firm received a similar qualification in the previous year. Frost (1991) shows that the 
association between qualified opinions and negative returns is robust to changes in the economic climate and to 
the auditing environment. Finally, Choi and Jeter (1992) conclude that market responsiveness to earnings 
announcements declines significantly when a qualified opinion is disclosed. 
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There is also indirect evidence that going-concern opinions have information value. For 
instance, Hopwood, McKeown, and Mutchler (1989) find that such an opinion increases 
the likelihood of a forthcoming bankruptcy. In addition, Chen and Church (1996) and 
Holder-Webb and Wilkins (2000) find that market reaction to the announcement of 
bankruptcy is significantly lower for firms with previous going-concern opinions 
compared with non-GCM firms. Chen and Church (1996) demonstrate that results are 
robust after controlling for the predictability of bankruptcy, whereas Holder-Webb and 
Wilkins (2000) find similar results after controlling for the macroeconomic environment 
and firm-specific levels of financial distress. 
More recently, Willenborg and McKeown (2001) and Weber and Willenborg (2003) 
investigate the role of going-concern audit reports in micro-cap IPOs and conclude that the 
audit opinion is a valuable information to investors. For instance, Willenborg and 
McKeown (2001) find that a GCM opinion increments the predictive power of delisting 
IPO stocks, an event that is perceived as negative news by investors. Moreover, this study 
finds that GCM IPO firms significantly underperform those with no previous GCM.22 
Weber and Willenborg (2003) supplement Willenborg and McKeown’s (2001) study by 
highlighting that larger auditors with national scope (in opposition to local firms) provide 




                                                 
 
22 Willenborg and McKeown (2001) report that the mean (median) two-year raw returns for GCM IPOs is -41% (-
65%) compared with +24% (-15%) for non-GCM IPOs. 
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2.4.2.3. The importance of distinguish between “expected” and “unexpected” 
reports 
One of the factors affecting the market reaction to GCM audit report announcements is the 
ex-ante likelihood of such an event. The distinction between “expected” and “unexpected” 
GCM audit reports has in fact enhanced our understanding of whether the market reacts 
to this bad news event. For instance, studies like Fleak and Wilson (1994) and Jones (1996) 
show that the market reaction to the GCM audit report critically depends on the extent to 
which such an event is expected. 
These studies were triggered by the findings of Mutchler (1985) and Dopuch, Holthausen, 
and Leftwich (1987) who suggest that many going-concern qualifications simply confirm a 
pattern of financial deterioration that can be predicted using publicly available 
information.23 For instance, Mutchler (1985) uses discriminant analysis based on the top six 
ratios ranked by auditors as useful identifiers of going-concern problems and concludes 
that such a model is able to predict a going-concern opinion with a relatively high level of 
accuracy. Dopuch, Holthausen, and Leftwich (1987) develop a probit model using publicly 
available financial and market data to predict whether an auditor will issue a fist-time 
qualified opinion. They show that such a model works particularly well in the case of the 
going-concern opinions. 
Fleak and Wilson (1994) use Mutchler’s (1985) model to distinguish between “unexpected” 
and “expected” GCM audit qualifications and show that “unexpected” qualifications are 
in fact associated with negative abnormal returns. However, they do not find a significant 
                                                 
 
23 The going-concern prediction can be made using different statistical methods. Koh and Low (2004) compare the 
performance of different techniques such as neural networks, decision trees and logistic regression for this task. 
The first two techniques are considered data mining; only logistic regression can be considered a traditional 
statistical method. The results suggests that all three techniques give adequate results, but highlight that neural 
networks and decision trees can supplement and complete traditional statistic methods.  
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market reaction to the disclosure of unqualified opinions when such events are 
“expected”. In a supplementary study, Jones (1996) finds significant negative (positive) 
abnormal returns surrounding the release of the auditor’s report for firms receiving going-
concern opinions (unqualified opinions). More interestingly, the author uses a logistic 
regression containing public information to show that the magnitude of the abnormal 
returns depends on the extent to which the type of opinion was expected.  
Using a different approach, Blay and Geiger (2001) examine whether the magnitude of the 
abnormal returns surrounding the announcement of a going-concern audit report is 
related to the firm’s subsequent viability. The authors show that the abnormal returns of 
viable firms are significantly lower than those of firms that subsequently filed for 
bankruptcy, suggesting that a GCM has a more adverse impact in the case of viable firms.  
 
2.4.3. Medium-term reaction to the publication of a GCM audit report 
In three recent papers, Taffler, Lu, and Kausar (2004), Ogneva and Subramanyam (2007) 
and Kausar, Taffler, and Tan (forthcoming) discuss the medium-term market reaction to 
disclosure of a GCM audit report. Using a sample of 108 U.K. firms with a first-time GCM 
audit report published between 1995 and 2000, Taffler et al. (2004) show that markets take 
time to assimilate the impact of such an announcement. In particular, they find that firms 
underperform by between 24% and 31%, depending on the adopted benchmark, in the 12-
months after the information disclosure. Taffler et al. (2004) additionally show that their 
findings are not related to a “bad model” problem, with incorrect risk measurement or a 
post-earnings announcement drift phenomenon. As such, the authors suggest that 
investors are biased in their ability to process this bad news event “denying” the 
implications of a GCM audit report in the valuation of firms’ stock.  
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Interestingly, Ogneva and Subramanyam (2007) find no evidence of an anomalous market 
reaction following the GCM audit report announcement in their sample of 1,159 U.S. cases 
between 1993 and 2004. Ogneva and Subramanyam (2007) conclude that Taffler’s, Lu, and 
Kausar (2004) results are probably a country-specific phenomenon which may be caused 
by either specific institutional features or other peculiarities of the U.K. market. 
Ogneva and Subramanyam’s (2007) results are strongly rejected in a subsequent study by 
Kausar, Taffler, and Tan (forthcoming). Using a hand-collected sample from EDGAR 
between 1993 and 2005, this study shows a significant downward drift of -9% to -19%, 
depending on the benchmark model, over the one-year period subsequent to the GCM 
announcement date. Importantly, Kausar, Taffler, and Tan (forthcoming) suggest that 
Ogneva’s and Subramanyam (2007) results are contaminated by the use of a highly biased 
sample and by the approach they take for the notional reinvestment of proceeds of delisted 
GCM firms.  
 
2.4.4. Discussion 
The going-concern principle is one of the most important accounting assumptions that, 
when questioned by external auditors, is perceived as an acute and unambiguous case of 
bad news. The role of the auditor’s opinion in this context was reinforced over the years 
and nowadays auditors are required to explicitly evaluate a company’s continued viability 
in every audit they perform. 
This section summarizes studies addressing related issues highlighting three key ideas. 
First, most of the studies that investigate the market value of a GCM audit report conclude 
that users of financial statements find this disclosure to be value-relevant (e.g., Firth, 1978; 
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Fleak and Wilson, 1994; Carlson, Glezen, and Benefield, 1998). Second, there is also 
evidence that the negative reaction to the GCM audit report is significantly more severe for 
“unexpected” reports than for “expected” reports, emphasizing the importance of ex-ante 
expectations in the impact with which the market receives such news (e.g., Fleak and 
Wilson, 1994; Jones, 1996; Blay and Geiger, 2001). Third, there is evidence that investors do 
not immediately fully incorporate the implications of this bad news event (e.g., Taffler, Lu, 
and Kausar, 2004; Kausar, Taffler, and Tan, forthcoming). 
In this context, exploring how analysts behave in the presence of going-concern problems 
provides original evidence about the role of security analysts in the bad news domain 
more generally. More specifically, I investigate if analysts, as sophisticated agents, are able 
to detect going-concern problems before the public disclosure of a GCM audit report and 
tailor their stock recommendations and coverage decisions accordingly. At a different 
level, my thesis explores if analysts provide investors with value-relevant information in 
this scenario of high distress risk by facilitating the incorporation of negative information 
in stock prices. Firstly, I test if pre-GCM analyst coverage contributes to reducing the 
“surprise” associated with the publication of a GCM audit report. Secondly, I test if post-
GCM analyst coverage reduces the post-GCM announcement drift.  
 
2.5. Key Findings 
The preceding literature review highlights some important stylised facts relating to the 
scope and nature of my research. I now summarize the most important findings: 
1. Analysts’ recommendations and earnings forecasts have market impact. In general 
terms, the market reacts favourably (unfavourably) to recommendation upgrades 
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(downgrades) and reacts in the same way to upward (downward) earnings 
forecasts revisions. 
2. Analyst activity seems to facilitate market efficiency. There is evidence that analyst 
coverage reduces information uncertainty and has a positive impact on the speed 
with which the market assimilates new information in stock prices. 
3. There is also evidence that analysts are optimistic in their outputs, although the 
potential decrease in this bias more recently. Generally, analysts’ earnings 
forecasts are systematically higher than actual earnings outcomes and the number 
of “buy” recommendations is persistently higher than the number of “sell” 
recommendations. 
4. Research suggests that analyst optimism is not confined to healthy firms. Studies 
show that analysts underreact to negative information in a similar fashion to 
investors. Moreover, there is evidence that analysts are particularly optimistic 
when forecasting the earnings of distressed firms. 
5. The literature identifies two broad categories of explanation to help understand 
analyst optimism. First, economic incentives are believed to produce conflicts of 
interest between brokerage firms and their clients, reducing analysts’ objectivity 
and independence. Second, cognitive biases proposed by behavioural studies are 
believed to affect both sophisticated and non-sophisticated agents. 
6. Some studies argue that analysts are self-selective. In particular, there is evidence 
that analysts tend to report on companies for which their true expectations are 
favourable while avoiding reporting on those for which their true expectations are 
unfavourable. 
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7. Regulatory changes introduced in the beginning of this decade in an attempt to 
increase investors’ confidence in the integrity of financial markets and to provide 
them with better information to access analysts’ research have impacted on analyst 
behaviour and market reaction to their outputs. 
8. There are conflicting findings about the ability of analysts to anticipate non-
routine bad news events, and how they react to the announcement of such news. 
Specifically, analysts use two signals to communicate negative information: 
downgrade of stock recommendations and coverage cessation. 
9. Investors perceive the going-concern audit report as a clear signal of bad news. In 
particular, most studies show that the market responds negatively to this event, 
especially when the audit report is “unexpected”. 
10. There is clear evidence that the market does not immediately fully assimilate the 
information conveyed by the going-concern audit report, i.e., prices continue to 
drift down for an extended period of time following the event announcement. 
 
2.6. Research Framework 
My literature review has identified a number of important research gaps that I explore in 
my thesis. In broad terms, the main contribution of my research relates to the connection 
between two areas of the literature that have developed separately until now: the going-
concern audit report and security analyst behaviour. In fact, no study to date has 
addressed this issue. 
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There are different reasons that justify the importance of investigating how analysts deal 
with the GCM audit report. Firstly, Schipper (1991) highlights the importance of 
investigating how analysts behave in extreme situations since there is evidence that 
optimism is more pronounced in forecasts preceded by share price declines or earnings 
declines. Secondly, investors seem particularly slow in assimilating negative information 
(e.g., Bernard and Thomas, 1989; Michaely, Thaler, and Womack, 1995; Womack, 1996; 
Dichev and Piotroski, 2001), a phenomenon that also occurs with the disclosure of a GCM 
audit report (Taffler, Lu, and Kausar, 2004; Kausar, Taffler, and Tan, forthcoming). 
Thirdly, little is known about how analysts deal with non-routine bad news events.  
My thesis provides clear evidence on the role of security analysts in the market reaction to 
the publication of a GCM audit report and contributes to the accounting and finance 
literature in several ways. I now explicitly state the motivations and the research gaps that 
I cover in my thesis: 
1. Prior research finds conflicting evidence about the ability of analysts to anticipate 
non-routine bad news events. For instance, Griffin (2003) argues that analysts are 
not able to anticipate firms’ corrective restatements whereas Clarke et al. (2006) 
show that analysts respond to the financial deterioration of bankrupt firms before 
the event announcement. The comparison between stock recommendations for 
GCM and similar non-GCM firms before the publication of a GCM audit report 
provides a clean test to investigate the ability of analysts to anticipate non-routine 
bad news events. In fact, the GCM audit report provides a unique scenario to 
clarify this issue since it is perceived as a clear case of bad news that tends to 
follow a series of unfavourable economic events. 
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2. Existing studies suggest that analysts are reluctant to issue unfavourable 
recommendations (e.g., McNichols and O’Brien, 1997; Conrad et al., 2006). In 
addition, there is evidence that analysts are less interested in following firms 
associated with bad news (e.g., Griffin, 2003). As such, I provide original evidence 
on the nature of analyst reaction to the publication of a GCM audit report by 
investigating how they behave in the period surrounding the publication of a 
GCM audit report. In particular, I test if analysts downgrade stock 
recommendations for GCM firms and if they cease coverage of such stocks 
following the GCM announcement. 
3. Previous research finds that the short-term market reaction to the publication of a 
GCM audit report is significantly more adverse when the report is “unexpected”. 
In my thesis, I test whether analysts are providing investors with value-relevant 
information in this scenario of highly distressed firms allowing investors’ 
recognition of going-concern problems. Considering that analysts are seen as 
surrogates for market expectations, I investigate if the short-term market reaction 
to the GCM announcement critically depends on pre-GCM analyst coverage. 
4. The regulatory changes implemented at the beginning of this decade attempt to 
provide investors with better information to assess the quality of analyst research. 
Despite some evidence that these changes could represent an overreaction by 
regulatory authorities (e.g., Clarke et al., 2006), there is also indication of analyst 
optimism decrease following the implementation of such rules (e.g., Barber et al., 
2006; Madureira et al., 2008). My thesis contributes to the understanding of how 
these regulatory changes affected analyst optimism in the specific case of 
financially distressed firms and whether investors were being provided with more 
useful and material information to make their investment decisions as a result. 
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5. Studies show that security analysts reduce information uncertainty and facilitate 
the price-discovery process (e.g., Gleason and Lee, 2003; Zhang, 2006). However, 
evidence that analysts do not process information efficiently, particularly when 
dealing with negative news, suggests the need to investigate this hypothesis in the 
bad news domain. By studying post-GCM price formation, I contribute to the 
ongoing debate of how the market assimilates bad news. In particular, I provide 
clear evidence about the role of analysts in the price-discovery process of highly 
distressed firms. 
6. Prior studies show that security analysts are self-selective (e.g., McNichols and 
O’Brien, 1997; Das, Guo, and Zhang, 2006). In other words, analysts tend to cease 
(start) the coverage of companies about which they have unfavourable 
(favourable) views. In my thesis, I provide original evidence about analyst self-
selection of GCM firms following the GCM announcement depending on firms’ 
post-GCM return performance. 
In short, my original connection between analyst behaviour, GCM audit reports and 
market performance contributes to the accounting and finance literature in several ways. 










This chapter is divided into two parts. First, I describe my methodology to identify first-
time GCM firms. Second, I provide some descriptive statistics about my sampled firms. 
 
3.2. The first-time GCM sample 
In my thesis, I work exclusively with first-time GCM firms since the information value of a 
continuing going-concern report is less clear than that of a first-time report (Mutchler, 
Hopwood, and McKeown, 1997). In fact, the literature shows that a company with a going-
concern qualification in a given year is more likely to receive a qualification the next year 
(Mutchler, 1985). Moreover, the use of first-time GCM firms is consistent with more recent 
literature addressing going-concern issues (e.g., Blay and Geiger, 2001; Taffler, Lu, and 
Kausar, 2004; Ogneva and Subramanyam 2007; Kausar, Taffler, and Tan, forthcoming). 
The sample selection process is important for two reasons. Firstly, identifying a first-time 
GCM company is not a straightforward process. For instance, Butler, Leone, and 
Willenborg (2004) find that from 1994 to 1999, 16% of cases classified as “unqualified 
opinion with explanatory language” in the COMPUSTAT database are clean but coded 
incorrectly whereas only 36% of these cases have the “going-concern” mentioned in the 
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audit report.24 Using Butler’s, Leone, and Willenborg (2004) words, “it seems that 
COMPUSTAT simply flags all audit opinions as ‘modified’ if they deviate in any way from a 
standard ‘boiler plate’ clean opinion”.  
Secondly, the literature shows that contradictory results in some of the going-concern 
literature are due to the use of biased samples. For instance, Asare (1990) suggests that 
conflicting results about the value-relevance of audit qualifications are partially explained 
by the research methodologies employed to investigate the going-concern case. More 
recently, Kausar, Taffler and Tan (forthcoming) find that Ogneva’s and Subramanyam 
(2007) first-time GCM sample is highly biased due to inconsistencies in the Compact 
Disclose-SEC database, which partially explains their problematic results. 
Overall, the use of a clean sample is crucial to produce meaningful and robust results in 
the going-concern domain. 
 
3.2.1. Sample selection process 
Table 3.1. summarizes the sample construction process, which draws heavily on Kausar, 
Taffler, and Tan (forthcoming). I start by using 10k Wizard’s free text search tool to explore 
the information on the EDGAR database and identify firms with going-concern modified 
audit reports from 1994 to 2005. The combination of keywords used as search strings are 
“raise substantial doubt” and “ability to continue as a going concern”. This search 
identifies 29,102 audit reports and constitutes the starting point for the selection of a clean 
sample of first-time GCM firms between 01.01.1994 and 31.12.2005. 
                                                 
 
24 Cases containing no qualifying or explanatory language or containing trivial explanatory language 
fundamentally different from that contained in other collected opinions. 
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Investigating my research questions requires both accounting and market information 
about my sample firms. I exclude 16,866 cases where firms are not found in the 
CRSP/COMPUSTAT merged file. Following recent studies addressing GCM companies 
(e.g., Ogneva and Subramanyam, 2007; Kausar, Taffler, and Tan, forthcoming), I work 
exclusively with first-time GCM cases. In particular, I define a GCM audit report as first-
time if a firm has not received a GCM opinion in the previous fiscal year. Through the 
reading of the firms’ audit reports, I exclude a further 9,940 cases that were not first-time 
GCMs. 
Next, from my 2,296 remaining cases I delete firms with insufficient accounting or market 
data for my purpose in the COMPUSTAT and CRSP databases, respectively. This includes: 
1) companies not listed on the NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ during the 12-months 
previous to the GCM date; 2) companies not trading ordinary common stocks; 3) 
companies with unavailable accounting information for the 2-year period before the GCM 
year on COMPUSTAT. After considering all these restrictions, I delete a total of 1,017 
cases. 
In step 4 and following Kausar, Taffler, and Tan (forthcoming), I delete cases that could 
potentially bias my results due to their specific characteristics. In particular, I remove 
companies classified as “utilities” or “financials” according to the 49 industry portfolios 
defined by Kenneth French. Academic studies usually exclude “utility” companies because 
their financial decisions are affected by specific regulations and “financial” firms since 
their accounting information is not comparable to that of the remaining firms. Companies 
classified as foreign are also deleted to ensure a consistent legal framework. Moreover, I 
exclude companies classified as in a “development stage” since these companies have 
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unique characteristics and have a considerable chance of failure.25 Lastly, I delete 
companies that file Chapter 11 before the audit report publication date since this filing 
cancels the impact of a first-time GCM audit report on market prices. 
It is possible that the reporting lag between financial year end and the GCM publication 
date influences analyst knowledge about the going-concern status of a firm. However, for 
the large majority of my sample cases (95%), the GCM audit report is disclosed through 
the 10-K annual report, which ensures that the auditor report is released together with 
firm’s financial statements. The only exception is when the audit opinion was amended 
with a going-concern modification and reported in the subsequent 10-K/A filing. For those 
cases, I use the 10-K/A report date as my event date. Therefore, the potential problem 
arising from the lag between financial year end and the GCM publication date is confined 
to only 5% of my sample firms. This procedure is consistent with prior research defining 
the GCM announcement date as the first date of publication of the audit report taken from 
the SEC-EDGAR database (10-K or 10-K/A filing date). Moreover, since going-concern 
evaluations are partly forward-looking, I use the probability of a forthcoming GCM audit 
report (PREDGC) computed as Mutchler (1985) as a proxy for market expectation about 
the going-concern status of a firm. 
In the end, I identify 924 non-finance, non-utility, industry firms with first-time going-
concern modified audit reports published between 01.01.1994 and 31.12.2005 with stocks 
listed on the NYSE, AMEX or NASDAQ and with sufficient data on COMPUSTAT.26 
 
                                                 
 
25 The Statements of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) define a development stage enterprise as a company 
that: 1) devotes substantially all its efforts to establishing a new business and has not begun planned operations 
or 2) has begun operations, but has not generated significant revenue. 
26 These 924 cases represent 871 companies. 
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Table 3.1. 
Sample Selection Process for the First-Time GCM Audit Report 
 
This table shows how my population of 924 non-finance, non-utility industry firms listed on the 
NYSE, AMEX or NASDAQ, for which the auditors disclosed a going-concern modified audit report 
for the first-time between 01.01.1994 and 31.12.2005 is derived. 
The sample is obtained by using the 10k Wizard free search tool facility. The combination of 
keywords used for identifying my GCM cases is “raise substantial doubt” and “ability to continue as 
a going-concern”. Conditional on a firm having data in the CRSP/COMPUSTAT merged database, I 
manually verify if the company has a GCM audit report in that fiscal year and if the previous fiscal 
year is clean in order to identify the first-time GCM companies. I then exclude all cases that filed 
Chapter 11 before the audit report publication date, all cases classified as development stage 




Firm-year observations identified through 10k wizard 29.102
Firm-year observations not found in CRSP/Compustat merged -16.866
Firm-year observations that do not constitute First-time GCM -9.940
Firm-year observations with insufficient CRSP/COMPUSTAT data -1.017
Firm-year observations classified as utilities or financials -142
Firm-year observations classified as foreign -56
Firm-year observations classified as development stage enterprise -112
Firm-year observations filing Chapter 11 before audit report publication date -45




3.2.2. Sample Description 
I now present some descriptive statistics for my sample. I find that, from my 924 first-time 
GCM cases, 84 traded on the NYSE, 149 on the AMEX and 691 on the NASDAQ at the time 
the GCM audit report was disclosed. Table 3.2. presents the annual distribution of the 
GCM cases. As can be seen, there are some differences in the number of first-time GCM 
cases per year in my sample. However, the annual number of first-time GCM audit reports 
disclosed is, for most of the years, between 60 and 100 cases. The exceptions are the years 
of 1994, 1995, 2004 and 2005, for which the number of cases is below 60 and the years of 
2001 and 2002 for which the number of cases is above 100. 
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Table 3.2. 
Annual Distribution of the GCM cases 
 
This table presents the distribution of going-concern modified audit reports disclosed for the first-
time between 01.01.1994 and 31.12.2005 for my sample of 924 non-finance, non-utility industry firms 
listed on the NYSE, AMEX or NASDAQ. 
 
















Table 3.3. presents other characteristics of my 924 GCM firms. Panel A shows that my 
sample is typically composed of small companies. For instance, firms have low market 
capitalization (mean size = $89.6m; median size = $33.6m), low net sales (mean sales = 
$103.7m; median sales = $21.55m) and low total assets (mean total assets = $120.7m; 
median total assets = $25.34m). Not surprisingly, I find that my sample firms are highly 
financially distressed. In particular, the firms are highly loss making (mean return on 
assets = -63%; median return on assets = -37%), have low ability to meet short-term debt 
obligations (mean current ratio = 1.72; median current ratio = 1.16), and are highly 
leveraged, with leverage defined as total debt/total assets (mean leverage ratio = 38%; 
median leverage ratio = 32%). Additionally, the mean (median) Altman (1968) z-score is 
1.15 (0.93), well below the reference cut-off score of 1.81, indicating a high probability of 
failure in the near future. The mean (median) score of the discriminant model that predicts 
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a forthcoming GCM audit report (PREDGC) is 0.20 (0.01), suggesting that my GCM firms 
are close to the cut off score of 0.01 that I use to distinguish “expected” from “unexpected” 
events.27 The mean (median) book-to-market ratio (BM) is 0.77 (0.40), showing that book 
value per share is low relative to the stock price. Finally, momentum indicates that mean 
(median) monthly past returns is -4% (-4%). 
Panel B of table 3.3. indicates that almost 85% of my GCM firms have positive book value 
of equity. In addition, I find that only 7.8% of them report positive earnings in the year 
preceding the publication of a GCM audit report and that only 2.5% pay dividends. 
Importantly, 45.7% of my companies are delisted within the one-year period subsequent to 
the GCM announcement date. From these 422 cases, I find that 43 cases (10.2% of the total 
delisted firms) enter into bankruptcy/liquidation (delisting codes: 400, 572, 574) within the 
same period.28 The data analysis also reveals that 67.5% of firms are audited by the one of 
the five audit companies that dominate the supply of audit services worldwide (BIG5). 
Finally, I find 171 firms that do not receive a GCM audit report in the following fiscal year. 
Overall, consistent with prior studies (e.g., Ogneva and Subramanyan, 2007; Kausar, 
Taffler, and Tan, forthcoming) my 924 sample firms are characterized mainly by small 
market capitalization and by high levels of distress risk. The next chapter initiates the 
empirical analysis to investigate how analysts deal with the GCM event. 
                                                 
 
27 The probability of a GCM audit report (PREDGC) is based on the multiple discriminant model used by 
Mutchler (1985), Fleak and Wilson (1994) and Blay and Geiger (2001). The discriminant model typically 
minimizes the classification error based on an auditor’s decision of issuing/not issuing a GCM audit report. 
However, since I work exclusively with GCM firms, I follow Blay and Geiger (2001) and use Fleak’s and Wilson 
(1994) minimum cut off score of 0.01 to distinguish “expected” from “unexpected” reports. 
28 Besides bankruptcy/liquidation, firms delisted within the one year-period subsequent to the GCM date are 
associated with 1) mergers (13.7% of the total delisted firms); 2) price below acceptable level  to maintain listing 
(18.5% of the total delisted firms); 3) insufficient capital/equity (7.3% of the total delisted firms); 4) insufficient 
float or assets (16.6% of the total delisted firms); 5) violation of stock exchange financial guidelines for continued 
listing (18.0% of the total delisted firms). The remaining cases relate to other performance reasons. 
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Table 3.3. 
Descriptive Statistics – Sample Firms 
 
This table presents the descriptive statistics of my sample of 924 non-finance, non-utility industry 
firms listed on the NYSE, AMEX or NASDAQ, for which the auditors disclosed a going-concern 
modified audit report for the first-time between 01.01.1994 and 31.12.2005. Panel A reports 
continuous financial variables and Panel B other firms characteristics. 
 
Panel A: Continuous variables 
Variable Mean Median St. Deviation
SIZE 89.57 33.66 167.08
SALES 103.68 21.55 227.20
TA 120.68 25.34 283.01
ROA -0.63 -0.37 0.76
CR 1.72 1.16 1.71
LEV 0.38 0.32 0.31
ZSCORE 1.15 0.93 1.10
PREDGC 0.20 0.01 2.84
BM 0.77 0.40 1.23
MOM -0.04 -0.04 0.07
 
SIZE = market value of equity measured by market capitalization in $ million; SALES = sales in $ 
million; TA = total assets in $ million; ROA=return on assets (net income/total assets); CR = current 
ratio (current assets/current liabilities); LEV=total debt/total assets; ZSCORE=financial distress 
measure computed as Altman (1968); PREDGC=probability of a forthcoming GCM audit report 
disclosure computed as Mutchler (1985). All variables are computed with data taken from the last 
annual financial accounts reported before the GCM date. BM= book value of equity divided by 
market capitalization, where book value of equity is taken from the last annual accounts reported 
prior to the date used to calculate the market capitalization at one year before the GCM 
announcement date; MOM = momentum, defined as the monthly average of prior 11 months (t-12 to 
t-2) raw returns.  
 
 
Panel B: Other characteristics 

















EQUITY = book value of equity dummy (1 if positive, 0 othewise); EPS = earnings per share dummy 
(1 if positive EPS, 0 othewise); DIVID = dividend paid (1 if dividend paid, 0 othewise). All variables 
are computed with data taken from the last annual financial accounts reported before the GCM date. 
DEAD = bankruptcy dummy (1 if the firm enters into Chapter 7, Chapter 11, voluntary liquidation or 
is wound up within one year of the audit report date, 0 otherwise); DELIST = delist dummy (1 if the 
firm is delisted due to any reason within one year of the audit report date, 0 otherwise); AUDITOR = 
audit quality proxy dummy (1 if BIG5, 0 otherwise); GCMW = going-concern withdrawn dummy (1 
if the firm receives a non-GCM opinion within one year, 0 otherwise). 
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CHAPTER 4 
ANALYSTS’ ANTICIPATION AND REACTION TO THE 
PUBLICATION OF A GCM AUDIT REPORT 
 
4.1. Introduction 
Security analysts have long been seen as sophisticated processors of financial information 
who are less likely to misunderstand the implications of such information when compared 
to naïve investors (Ramnath, Rock, and Shane, 2008). Analyst activity aims primarily at 
anticipating changes in companies’ fundamentals and reacting to news or/and companies’ 
reports (Michaely and Womack, 2005). As such, analyst activity is vital for the average 
investor given his/her limited time, skill and resources to analyse and interpret financial 
information (Beaver, 2002). 
Despite the importance of security analysts to the functioning of financial markets, there is 
evidence that they do not process information efficiently, a phenomenon that is 
particularly evident in the bad news domain. For instance, analysts seem to underreact to 
negative information (e.g., Amir and Ganzach, 1992; Easterwood and Nutt, 1999) and are 
likely to be optimistic when forecasting earnings of distressed firms (e.g., Moses, 1990; 
Brown, 1997; Das, Guo, and Zhang, 1998; Lim, 2001; Espahbodi, Dugar, and Tehranian, 
2001; Ding, Charoenwong, and Seethoh, 2004). This chapter investigates whether security 
analysts are efficient processors of information related to going-concern problems. More 
specifically, I test if security analysts anticipate the publication of a GCM audit report and 
whether or not they react to such an event. 
This is important because the evidence about the ability of analysts to anticipate bad news 
is mixed. On the one hand, studies suggest that analysts fail to anticipate earnings declines 
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associated with high accruals, and that they do not revise their forecasts in anticipation of 
predictable accrual reversals (Bradshaw, Richardson, and Sloan, 2001; Teoh and Wong, 
2002; Barth and Hutton, 2004). In addition, Griffin (2003) fails to find a significant 
downward revision in analyst forecasts before a corrective restatement. On the other hand, 
studies suggest that analysts are able to anticipate some types of accounting fraud before 
they become publicly known (e.g., Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney, 1996; Cotter and Young, 
2007). In a recent study, Clarke et al. (2006) show that analysts downgrade more 
aggressively the stock recommendations for bankrupt firms than similar non-bankrupt 
firms, prior to the bankruptcy announcement date.  
Investigating the ability of analysts to anticipate the publication of a GCM audit report 
offers a powerful context in which to explore the bad news issue since: 1) going-concern 
qualifications tend to follow a series of unfavourable economic events, such as sales 
declines, failures to make payments on debt, dividend reductions, production problems, 
lost contracts and quarterly losses (Elliot, 1982); 2) there is evidence that the GCM audit 
opinion can be predicted, to some extent, using accounting information (e.g., Mutchler, 
1985; Dopuch, Holthause, and Leftwich, 1987); 3) there is evidence that the impact of the 
GCM announcement depends on the extent to which the GCM audit report was expected 
(e.g., Fleak and Wilson, 1994; Jones, 1996). Investigating whether or not analysts react to 
the publication of a GCM audit report provides a comprehensive overview of analyst 
behaviour about GCM firms. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: section 2 describes the data and the 
methodology of the chapter. Section 3 provides the results and section 4 summarizes and 
discusses the results of the chapter. 
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4.2. Data and methodology 
4.2.1. Data 
I study analyst anticipation and reaction to the announcement of a GCM audit report using 
one of their most important information transmission vehicles: analysts’ 
recommendations. In fact, analysts’ recommendations have unique characteristics since: 1) 
they represent a clear and unequivocal course of action to investors (Elton, Gruber, and 
Grossman, 1986); 2) they are viewed as the bottom line of the research report (e.g., Shipper, 
1991); 3) they are reported on a simple and finite scale common to all stocks, avoiding 
ambiguous interpretations of information (McNichols and O’Brien, 1997). In the words of 
Jegadeesh et al. (2004), “recommendations offer a unique opportunity to study analyst judgment 
and preferences across large samples of stocks”.  
I collect analyst recommendations from the Institutional Broker Estimates System (I/B/E/S) 
database and accounting and market data from COMPUSTAT and CRSP, respectively. The 
I/B/E/S Recommendations database starts in October 1993 and contains, among other 
information, recommendations from a wide range of brokerage firms.29 I follow the I/B/E/S 
recommendations ranking scheme, which codes recommendations on a five-point scale: (1) 
“strong buy”; (2) “buy”; (3) “hold”; (4) “underperform”; (5) “sell”.30 It should be noted that 
the I/B/E/S codification maps each broker’s recommendation into one of their standard 
ratings using an assigned numerical value, mitigating the problem of different ratings 
provided by different brokers. 
                                                 
 
29 I/B/E/S provides consensus and detail forecasts from security analysts, including earnings per share, revenue, 
cash flow, long-term growth projections and stock recommendations. 
30 Because I/B/E/S codes “strong buy” recommendations as 1 and “sell” as 5, more optimistic recommendations 
have lower numerical values. 
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Stock recommendations for my sample firms are obtained through the intersection of my 
924 first-time GCM companies with those firms included on the I/B/E/S database. I obtain 
the following information for each analyst stock recommendation: recommendation date; 
broker identification; analyst identification and I/B/E/S recommendation code. Following 
Zhang (forthcoming), I delete observations with zero analyst-specific identification code.31 
My final data consists of 3,395 recommendations issued by 1,289 different security analysts 
for 463 sample firms from event-quarter -8 to event quarter +4. Event-quarters are defined 
as periods of 90 calendar days relative to the GCM announcement date as illustrated in 
figure 4.1. For example, event-quarter -1 is the period between the calendar day -1 and 
calendar day -90 relative to the GCM date and event-quarter -2 is the period between the 





This figure graphs the definition of event-quarters relative to the GCM announcement date taken 
from the SEC-EDGAR database. Event-quarters are defined as a period of 90 calendar days relative 
to the GCM announcement date (day 0). 
 
-1 1






Event-Quarter -1Event-Quarter -2 ... Event-Quarter +4
90 270 360
 
                                                 
 
31 I/B/E/S assigns a zero identification code if the broker did not provide an analyst name to be associated with the 
recommendation. 
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4.2.2. Methodology 
In this section, I describe how the three different recommendation categories used in my 
analysis are defined. In addition, I describe the tests used to investigate whether analysts 
anticipate and react to the publication of a GCM audit report.  
 
4.2.2.1. Recommendation categories 
Following Clarke et al. (2006), I use different categories of recommendations to test the 
robustness of my results. In fact, working exclusively with recommendations readily 
obtained from the I/B/E/S database ignores analyst opinions when no recommendations 
are available for a specific time period. There are two reasons for a missing 
recommendation: 1) the analyst did not issue a recommendation or 2) the analyst decided 
to cease coverage of the company. These reasons are fundamentally different and have 
distinct interpretations. Accordingly, I use three recommendation categories to mitigate 
this problem: a) reported recommendations; b) current recommendations; c) inferred 
recommendations.  
Next, I describe how I compute each recommendation category on an event-quarterly 
basis. 
 
a) Reported recommendations 
Reported recommendations are those made and issued by the analyst and are readily 
available on the I/B/E/S Recommendations – Detail File. I define analyst i reported 
recommendation for firm j at event-quarter q (REPRECi,j,q) as: 1) the last recommendation 
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issued by analyst i within event-quarter q, if he/she does not drop the coverage of firm j 
after the last recommendation date; 2) no recommendation, if analyst i does not issue a 
new recommendation within event-quarter q or if analyst i decides to drop the coverage of 
firm j after the last recommendation date within event-quarter q. 
The reported recommendation for firm j at event-quarter q (REPRECj,q) is then calculated 











where N is the number of analysts with available reported recommendations at event-
quarter q for firm j.  







= ∑  (4.2) 
 
 
where M is the number of firms with available reported recommendations in event-quarter 
q. 
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b) Current recommendations 
Current recommendations are similar to reported recommendations but with a major 
difference. In particular, for those cases where a missing recommendation for a given 
event-quarter is not due to the analyst decision to drop coverage,32 I assume that the last 
reported recommendation still applies to the current event-quarter. Specifically, I define 
analyst i’s current recommendation for firm j at event-quarter q (CURRECi,j,q) as: 1) the last 
reported recommendation issued by analyst i if he/she does not decide to drop the 
coverage of firm j after the last recommendation date; 2) no recommendation, if analyst i 
decides to drop the coverage of firm j after the last recommendation date. 
The current recommendation for firm j at event-quarter q (CURRECj,q) is then calculated as 












where N is the number of analysts with available current recommendations at event-
quarter q for firm j. 
Finally, I define firms’ average current recommendations in event-quarter q as follows: 
 
                                                 
 
32 The date on which a particular analyst stopped coverage for a particular firm is taken from the I/B/E/S 
Recommendations – Stopped Estimates File. 






= ∑  (4.4) 
 
 
where M is the number of firms with available current recommendations at event-quarter 
q. 
 
c) Inferred recommendations 
Analysts generally remain at the same brokerage company after deciding to stop covering 
a given firm (Clarke et al., 2006). Additionally, we know that they are reluctant to issue 
unfavourable investment advice (McNichols and O’Brien, 1997). As such, the decision to 
cease coverage of a firm is likely to be associated with unfavourable information available 
to the analyst about the firm’s future prospects. Inferred recommendations are estimated 
in my study with the objective of capturing this phenomenon. In particular, inferred 
recommendations are similar to current recommendations with one difference. When an 
analyst ceases coverage of a firm, I infer an unfavourable recommendation for that event-
quarter and for the subsequent two event-quarters.33 
Drawing on Clarke et al. (2006), I define analyst i’s inferred recommendation for firm j at 
event-quarter q (INFRECi,j,q) as: 1) the last current recommendation issued by analyst i if 
he/she does not decide to drop the coverage of firm j after the last recommendation date; 2) 
an “underperform” recommendation if analyst i decides to drop the coverage of firm j 
within event-quarter q or the last two event-quarters and if the last recommendation 
issued by the analyst prior to coverage cessation is a “strong buy” or a “buy”; 3) a “sell” 
                                                 
 
33 I limit the inferring of the unfavourable recommendation to the two event-quarters following coverage cease 
given the evidence that the impact of a recommendation change may last 6-month (Womack, 1996). 
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recommendation if analyst i decides to drop the coverage of firm j within event-quarter q 
or the last two event-quarters and if the last recommendation issued by the analyst prior to 
the coverage cessation is a “hold”, “underperform” or “sell”; 4) no recommendation, if 
analyst i decided to drop the coverage of firm j for more than two event-quarters. 
The inferred recommendation for firm j at event-quarter q (INFRECj,q) is then calculated as 











where N is the number of analysts with available inferred recommendations at event-
quarter q for firm j. 








= ∑  (4.6) 
 
 
where M is the number of firms with available inferred recommendations at event-quarter 
q. 
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4.2.2.2. Testing analyst anticipation and reaction to the GCM audit report 
I investigate analyst anticipation of the GCM audit report by comparing analyst 
recommendations for GCM and similar non-GCM firms over the 8 event-quarters 
preceding the GCM date in a similar fashion to Clarke et al. (2006). In particular, I test the 
significance of the differences in analyst mean and median recommendations and 
percentage of “buy” recommendations between sample and control firms using the two-
tailed t-test, the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test and the binomial test, respectively. 
Analyst reaction to the publication of a GCM audit report is investigated through the 
comparison of analyst recommendations for my sample firms before and after the GCM 
date. Specifically, I compare analyst stock recommendations for GCM firms between 
event-quarter -1 and event-quarter +1. I focus my attention on a shorter period 
surrounding the GCM announcement date since analyst reaction (if any) should occur 
shortly after the event becomes publicly known. Similarly as above, I test the significance 
of the differences in analyst mean and median recommendations and percentage of “buy” 
recommendations for GCM firms in event-quarter -1 and event-quarter +1 using the two-






- 85 - 
4.3. Results 
4.3.1. Initial evidence 
Table 4.1. presents the quarterly trend for stock recommendations of GCM firms from 
event-quarter -8 to event-quarter +4. Panel A summarizes analyst coverage over this 
period, where firms are classified as covered in event-quarter q if there is at least one 
recommendation available within that period. To provide robust results, I use the three 
recommendation categories mentioned above. Broadly, reported recommendations 
assume the last recommendation issued by the analyst within each event-quarter. Current 
recommendations assume the last recommendation issued by the analyst if he/she does 
not decide to cease coverage of the company whereas inferred recommendations also 
assume an unfavourable recommendation when the analyst decides to cease coverage of 
the company. 
My results show that the number of GCM firms with analyst coverage remains stable until 
the event-quarter preceding the GCM announcement date. In this particular event-quarter, 
there is a sharp decrease in the number of firms with analyst coverage and in the number 
of recommendations available. For instance, the number of reported (current) 
recommendations decreases from 349 (1,147) in the event-quarter -2 to 208 (966) in the 
event-quarter -1 whereas the number of firms with available reported (current) 
recommendations decreases from 159 (371) to 118 (353) in the same period. Moreover, the 
comparison between firms with available current recommendations in event-quarter -4 
and event-quarter -1 reveals that 52 companies stopped being covered. Not surprisingly, 
panel A also shows that coverage cessation is more frequent after the GCM announcement 
date, a result that is partially explained by the number of firms delisted in that period. 
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Panel B of table 4.1. reports event-quarter mean and median recommendations for GCM 
firms and the percentage of firms with “buy” and “sell” recommendations around the 
GCM date. As can be seen, analysts downgrade the stock recommendations for GCM firms 
as the GCM date approaches. For instance, the mean (median) reported recommendation 
for GCM firms increases from 1.99 (2.00) to 2.70 (3.00) from event-quarter -8 to event-
quarter -1. Moreover, the percentage of firms for which their average reported 
recommendation is classified as “buy” (“sell”) decreases (increases) from 69% (3%) to 33% 
(17%) over the same period. The analysis of current and inferred recommendations shows 
that this pattern is robust. 
Taken together, the results in table 4.1. suggest that security analysts do not ignore the 
going-concern problems of GCM firms and adjust their recommendations and their 
decision to cover such firms accordingly. 
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TABLE 4.1. 
Quarterly Trend in Analyst stock Recommendations – Sample Firms 
 
This table presents the event-quarter trend in analyst recommendations from event-quarter -8 to event-quarter +4 for my sample of 924 non-finance, non-utility industry 
firms listed on the NYSE, AMEX or NASDAQ, for which their auditors disclose a going-concern modified audit report for the first-time between 01.01.1994 and 31.12.2005.  
Average reported recommendation for firm j at event-quarter q (REPRECj,q) is the average of the last recommendation issued by each analyst within that period. Firms’ 
reported recommendation at event-quarter q (REPRECq) is then calculated as the average of (REPRECj,q). Average current recommendation for firm j at event-quarter q 
(CURRECj,q) is the average of the last recommendation issued by each analyst when he/she does not cease coverage of the firm before the end of that period. Firms’ current 
recommendation at event-quarter q (CURRECq) is then calculated as the average of (CURRECj,q). Average inferred recommendation for firm j at event-quarter q (INFRECj,q) 
is similar to the average current recommendation with one difference. When an analyst ceases coverage of a company within event-quarter q after the last recommendation 
date, I infer an unfavourable recommendation for event-quarter q and for the subsequent two event-quarters. Firms’ inferred recommendation at event-quarter q (INFRECq) 
is then calculated as the average of (INFRECj,q). Section 4.2.2.1. provides detailed explanation about the estimation of the recommendation categories. Event-quarters are 
defined as periods of 90 calendar days relative to the GCM announcement date. Recommendations are coded as 1 (strong buy), 2 (buy), 3 (hold), 4 (underperform) and 5 
(sell). 
Panel A summarizes analyst coverage. Number of recommendations provides the total number of estimated recommendations available over the event-quarters. Number of 
firms provides the number of GCM companies with available recommendations over the event-quarters. The number of recommendations per firm is computed as the 
number of recommendations to the number of firms. Panel B summarizes analyst recommendations for GCM firms. The percentage of “buy” (“sell”) recommendations is 
computed as the number of firms whose average recommendation is classified as a “buy” (“sell”) divided by the total number of firms with available recommendations. 
Specifically, firms are classified as “buy” (“sell”) if the average numerical recommendation is below (above) 2.5 (3.5). 
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Panel A: Analyst coverage summary 
Reported Current Inferred Reported Current Inferred Reported Current Inferred
-8 380 1,025 1,025 180 347 347 2.11 2.95 2.95
-7 453 1,199 1,287 211 385 397 2.15 3.11 3.24
-6 427 1,298 1,520 204 404 434 2.09 3.21 3.50
-5 418 1,343 1,709 194 407 458 2.15 3.30 3.73
-4 377 1,350 1,785 189 405 462 1.99 3.33 3.86
-3 359 1,277 1,794 158 391 464 2.27 3.27 3.87
-2 349 1,147 1,754 159 371 460 2.19 3.09 3.81
-1 208 966 1,666 118 353 446 1.76 2.74 3.74
1 140 780 1,538 85 310 429 1.65 2.52 3.59
2 108 665 1,341 67 277 398 1.61 2.40 3.37
3 87 593 1,145 56 256 379 1.55 2.32 3.02
4 89 526 952 55 227 337 1.62 2.32 2.82
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Panel B: Analyst recommendations summary 
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median % Buy % Sell % Buy % Sell % Buy % Sell
-8 1.99 2.00 2.05 2.00 2.05 2.00 0.69 0.03 0.69 0.05 0.69 0.05
-7 2.16 2.00 2.09 2.00 2.22 2.00 0.64 0.03 0.68 0.04 0.62 0.09
-6 2.09 2.00 2.10 2.00 2.39 2.33 0.67 0.03 0.67 0.04 0.54 0.13
-5 2.20 2.00 2.15 2.00 2.57 2.50 0.61 0.06 0.65 0.04 0.46 0.19
-4 2.32 2.00 2.20 2.00 2.66 2.67 0.55 0.06 0.62 0.04 0.41 0.21
-3 2.63 2.79 2.31 2.25 2.81 3.00 0.39 0.15 0.57 0.06 0.34 0.28
-2 2.68 3.00 2.37 2.40 2.95 3.00 0.32 0.15 0.51 0.07 0.28 0.35
-1 2.70 3.00 2.44 2.50 3.09 3.21 0.33 0.17 0.44 0.09 0.22 0.41
1 2.68 3.00 2.44 2.50 3.18 3.43 0.39 0.17 0.45 0.10 0.21 0.49
2 2.52 2.00 2.44 2.50 3.21 3.50 0.54 0.19 0.49 0.11 0.22 0.52
3 2.45 2.27 2.46 2.33 3.21 3.40 0.52 0.12 0.51 0.11 0.23 0.50
4 2.21 2.00 2.38 2.25 3.14 3.33 0.62 0.15 0.53 0.09 0.27 0.47
Inferred (INFRECq)Reported (REPRECq) Current (CURRECq)Event-Quarter
% BUY and % SELL recommendations
Reported (REPRECq) Current (CURRECq) Inferred (INFRECq)
GCM firm recommendation rating
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4.3.2. Analyst anticipation of the GCM audit report 
Table 4.1. shows the analysts become more pessimistic about GCM firms as the GCM event 
date approaches. However, investigating the ability of these market participants to 
anticipate the GCM audit report by solely studying stock recommendations for GCM firms 
might introduce a selection bias since security analysts cannot know ex-ante which firms 
will receive a GCM audit report. Drawing on Clarke et al. (2006), I mitigate this problem 
by comparing analyst stock recommendations across GCM and similar non-GCM firms. 
As Clarke et al. (2006) argue, “This comparison of recommendations for sample firms against 
their matched firm counterparts allows us to control any possible selection bias and permits useful 
conclusions regarding the nature of analyst recommendations for financially distressed firms”. 
In my main results, I identify my control firms by matching each of my sample firms with 
the firm with most similar size and book-to-market (BM) ratio at one year period before 
the GCM announcement. This procedure is commonly used in the literature (e.g., Fama 
and French, 1992) and aims at matching each sample firm with a “similar” control firm in 
terms of risk/return at a specific date. It is arguable that in my case, the introduction of an 
additional matching distress factor would be also appropriate given my focus on an 
unusually bad news situation. However, most of the studies addressing similar issues in 
the financial distress domain use size and BM as their main control firm selection criteria 
(Dichev and Piotroski, 2001; Taffler, Lu, and Kausar, 2004; Ogneva and Subramanyam, 
2007; Kausar, Taffler, and Tan, forthcoming). As such, although I use size and BM ratios as 
my main benchmark firm matching criteria, I also provide extensive robustness tests re-
running my analysis using variables that account specifically for distress risk as control 
measures. 
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Moreover, there are other reasons justifying the importance matching my sample firms 
with similar firms in terms of size and BM ratio. For instance, size is one of the most 
important variables associated with stock returns (e.g., Banz, 1981; Keim, 1983, Fama and 
French, 1992; Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1994). Generally, research suggests that 
small firm stocks experience different returns from large firm stocks, a phenomenon that is 
particularly important in my setting since my sample firms usually have a small market 
value. In addition, the literature suggests that analyst coverage is strongly correlated with 
firm size (e.g., Bhushan, 1989; Hong, Lim, and Stein, 2000), highlighting that size proxies 
for level of analyst coverage. BM ratio has also demonstrated ability to predict stock 
returns. For instance, Fama and French (1992) find a significant positive correlation 
between the expected return of a firm and its BM ratio. These findings are further 
supported by Rosenberg, Reid, and Lanstein (1985) and Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny 
(1994). In addition, Jegadeesh et al. (2004) show that analysts tend to favour “growth” 
stocks compared to “value” stocks, which again highlights the importance of 
benchmarking my GCM firms with non-GCM firms sharing a similar BM ratio. 
I identify my 924 non-GCM control firms by matching each of my sample firms with the 
company with most similar size and BM ratio. This process is as follows. First, for each 
sample firm, I identify all non-financial, non-utility and non-GCM firms listed on the 
NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ at the GCM announcement date. Sample and match 
candidate size is defined as market capitalization (shares outstanding times price) at one 
year before the GCM announcement.34 Subsequently, among the match candidates for each 
sample firm, I identify those with a market value between 70% and 130% of the sample 
firm. Finally, from this list of candidates, I choose as a control firm the firm which has the 
                                                 
 
34 I also measure the market value o for sample and control firms six and one month before the GCM 
announcement date to ensure the robustness of my results. Results are materially the same. 
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closest BM ratio to that of my GCM firm. Fama and French (1992, 1993) argue that it is 
important to ensure that accounting variables are known before the market variables they 
are paired to. As such, the book-value of equity is that taken from the last annual accounts 
reported before the date used to calculate the market value of equity. 
Table 4.2. compares the descriptive statistics between my 924 GCM firms and their control 
firms. As expected, there are no significant differences between the mean and median size 
and BM ratio, which are the criteria used to match each of my GCM firms. However, there 
are significant differences in the other variables presented in table 4.2. For instance, GCM 
firms have a significant more negative return on assets (mean ROAGCM=-0.63; mean 
ROACONTROL=-0.17, p<0.0001 and median ROAGCM=-0.37; median ROACONTROL=-0.01, 
p<0.0001). Not surprisingly, GCM firms are associated with greater bankruptcy risk (mean 
ZSCOREGCM=1.15; mean ZSCORECONTROL=1.52, p<0.0001 and median ZSCOREGCM=0.93; 
median ZSCORECONTROL=1.22, p<0.0001) and greater ex-ante GCM probability (mean 
PREDGCGCM=0.20; mean PREDGCCONTROL=2.08, p<0.0001 and median PREDGCGCM=0.01; 
median PREDGCCONTROL=0.57, p<0.0001). Importantly, my GCM firms have significantly 
more negative past raw returns than control firms (mean MOMGCM=-0.04; mean 
MOMCONTROL=0.02, p<0.0001 and median MOMGCM=-0.04; median MOMCONTROL=0.01, 
p<0.0001). These results show that my GCM firms are associated with higher levels of 
financial distress and have worst past return performance, highlighting the need to control 
my results for these variables.35  
I now empirically test if there are significant differences between my GCM firms and non-
GCM firms sharing similar size and BT ratio. The formal null hypothesis to test is as 
follows: 
                                                 
 
35 Chapter 5 addresses these issues. 
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H1: In the pre-event period, there is no difference in analyst mean and median 
recommendations and percentage of “buy” recommendations between firms that 
receive a GCM audit report and similar firms that do not receive a GCM audit report. 
 
Table 4.3. summarizes my results. I find no significant differences between mean and 
median stock recommendations for GCM and non-GCM firms from event-quarter -8 to 
event-quarter -5. Moreover, the difference between the percentage of sample and control 
firms for which the average recommendation is classified as “buy” is not significant at 
conventional levels. Importantly, these findings are consistent across all three different 
recommendation categories I consider. These results suggest that analysts are advising 
investors to buy both GCM and non-GCM firm stocks in the most distant event-quarters, a 
fact emphasised by the high percentage of firms for which their average recommendation 
is “buy” (above 60% for the large majority of quarters). As such, I conclude that 
approximately two years before the event, analysts do not distinguish GCM from control 
firms, sharing similar expectations for both types of firms. 
The analysis of the most recent event-quarters reveals a different pattern. Table 4.2. shows 
that starting from event-quarter -4, the average stock recommendation for GCM firms 
becomes significantly more unfavourable than that of non-GCM firms. Broadly, analysts 
downgrade their stock recommendations for GCM firms from “buy” to “hold” while 
maintaining their recommendations for the control firms. More importantly, the 
differences in the mean and median stock recommendations between groups are now 
statistically significant at the 0.1% level in most cases. Once again, the results are 
materially the same for all the three different recommendation categories I consider. As an 
example, consider the reported recommendations for quarter -1. The mean (median) 
recommendation for GCM firms is 2.70 (3.00) whereas the mean (median) 
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recommendation for non-GCM firms is 1.90 (2.00), with these differences both significant 
at the 0.1% level. In addition, only 33% of GCM firms have their average recommendation 
classified as “buy” in contrast with the 75% for the control firms (difference significant at 
the 0.1% level). These results suggest that analysts recognize the going-concern problems 
as the GCM date approaches and downgrade their recommendations for GCM firms more 
aggressively than the recommendations of control firms. 
Overall, my results show that the growing pessimism of analysts as the event date 
approaches is an exclusive phenomenon of my sample firms. As such, I conclude that 
analysts anticipate the publication of a GCM audit report and reject null hypothesis H1. 
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TABLE 4.2. 
Descriptive Statistics – Sample Firms vs. Control Firms 
 
This table presents descriptive statistics for my sample of 924 non-finance, non-utility industry firms listed on the NYSE, AMEX or NASDAQ, for which their auditors disclose 
a going-concern modified audit report for the first-time between 01.01.1994 and 31.12.2005 and for control firms. Control firms are selected employing the control firm 
approach based on size and BM. Specifically, each of my 924 first-time GCM companies is matched with that non-finance, non-utility, non-GCM firm listed on the NYSE, 
AMEX or NASDAQ with market value of equity between 70% and 130% of that of the sample firm. The control firm is then selected as that firm with BM ratio closest to that of 
the sample firm. Results are reported separately. The last four columns report the mean and median differences between the variables of each portfolio. The significance of the 
t-test (Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test) is showed in brackets on the right of the mean (median) differences. 
 
Mean Median St. Deviation Mean Median St. Deviation
SIZE 89.57 33.66 167.08 90.88 33.62 184.36 -1.31 (0.8727) 0.04 (0.6924)
SALES 103.68 21.55 227.20 144.14 30.58 330.11 -40.46 (0.0022) -9.03 (<0.0001)
TA 120.68 25.34 283.01 119.74 30.65 255.18 0.94 (0.9404) -5.31 (0.0095)
ROA -0.63 -0.37 0.76 -0.17 -0.01 0.43 -0.46 (<0.0001) -0.36 (<0.0001)
CR 1.72 1.16 1.71 3.07 2.07 3.33 -1.35 (<0.0001) -0.91 (<0.0001)
LEV 0.38 0.32 0.31 0.28 0.22 0.25 0.10 (<0.0001) 0.10 (<0.0001)
ZSCORE 1.15 0.93 1.10 1.52 1.22 1.46 -0.37 (<0.0001) -0.29 (<0.0001)
PREDGC 0.20 0.01 2.84 2.08 0.57 6.76 -1.88 (<0.0001) -0.56 (<0.0001)
BM 0.77 0.40 1.23 0.77 0.40 1.14 0.00 (0.9825) 0.00 (0.8670)
MOM -0.04 -0.04 0.07 0.02 0.01 0.07 -0.06 (<0.0001) -0.05 (<0.0001)
Variable
GCM FIRMS CONTROL FIRMS








SIZE = market value of equity measured by market capitalization in $ million; SALES = sales in $ million; TA = total assets in $ million; ROA=return on assets (net income/total 
assets); CR = current ratio (current assets/current liabilities); LEV=total debt/total assets; ZSCORE=financial distress measure computed as Altman (1968); PREDGC=probability 
of a forthcoming GCM audit report disclosure computed as Mutchler (1985). All variables are computed with data taken from the last annual financial accounts reported before 
the GCM date. BM= book value of equity divided by market capitalization, where book value of equity is taken from the last annual accounts reported prior to the date used to 
calculate the market capitalization at one year before the GCM announcement date; MOM = momentum, defined as the monthly average of prior 11 months (t-12 to t-2) raw 
returns. 
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TABLE 4.3. 
Quarterly Trend in Analyst stock Recommendations – Sample Firms vs. Control Firms 
 
This table presents the event-quarter trend in analyst stock recommendations from event-quarter -8 to event-quarter -1 for my population of 924 non-finance, non-utility 
industry firms listed on the NYSE, AMEX or NASDAQ, for which their auditors disclose a going-concern modified audit report for the first-time between 01.01.1994 and 
31.12.2005 and for control firms. Control firms are selected employing the control firm approach based on size and BM. Specifically, each of my 924 first-time GCM 
companies is matched with that non-finance, non-utility, non-GCM firm listed on the NYSE, AMEX or NASDAQ with market value of equity between 70% and 130% of that 
of the sample firm. The control firm is then selected as that firm with BM ratio closest to that of the sample firm. 
Average reported recommendation for firm j at event-quarter q (REPRECj,q) is the average of the last recommendation issued by each analyst within that period. Firms’ 
reported recommendation at event-quarter q (REPRECq) is then calculated as the average of (REPRECj,q). Average current recommendation for firm j at event-quarter q 
(CURRECj,q) is the average of the last recommendation issued by each analyst when he/she does not cease coverage of the firm before the end of that period. Firms’ current 
recommendation at event-quarter q (CURRECq) is then calculated as the average of (CURRECj,q). Average inferred recommendation for firm j at event-quarter q (INFRECj,q) 
is similar to the average current recommendation with one difference. When an analyst ceases coverage of a company within event-quarter q after the last recommendation 
date, I infer an unfavourable recommendation for event-quarter q and for the subsequent two event-quarters. Firms’ inferred recommendation at event-quarter q (INFRECq) 
is then calculated as the average of (INFRECj,q). Section 4.2.2.1. provides detailed explanation about the estimation of the recommendation categories. Event-quarters are 
defined as a period of 90 calendar days relative to the GCM announcement date. Recommendations are coded as 1 (strong buy), 2 (buy), 3 (hold), 4 (underperform) and 5 
(sell). 
The percentage of “buy” recommendations is computed as the number of firms whose average recommendation is classified as a “buy” divided by the total number of 
firms with available recommendations. Specifically, firms are classified as “buy” if the average numerical recommendation is below 2.5. For each event-quarter, the “N” 
column indicates the number of firms with available recommendations. The last two columns in each recommendation category indicate the difference between the mean 
and median recommendation and percentage of “buy” recommendations as well as its significance. In particular, the two-tailed significance of the t-test (Wilcoxon-Mann-
Whitney test) is reported in parentheses for the mean (median) recommendation difference, whereas the significance of the binomial test is used for the difference between 























Mean 1.99 2.04 -0.05 (0.5510) 2.05 2.04 0.01 (0.7554) 2.05 2.04 0.01 (0.7554)
Median 2.00 2.00 0.00 (0.5222) 2.00 2.00 0.00 (0.6466) 2.00 2.00 0.00 (0.6466)
% Buy 0.69 0.71 -0.02 (0.6164) 0.69 0.69 0.00 (0.9633) 0.69 0.69 0.00 (0.9633)
Mean 2.16 2.07 0.09 (0.2554) 2.09 2.05 0.04 (0.4546) 2.22 2.23 -0.01 (0.8804)
Median 2.00 2.00 0.00 (0.5365) 2.00 2.00 0.00 (0.9667) 2.00 2.00 0.00 (0.5562)
% Buy 0.64 0.65 -0.01 (0.8923) 0.68 0.68 0.00 (0.8309) 0.62 0.60 0.02 (0.2991)
Mean 2.09 2.11 -0.02 (0.7462) 2.10 2.07 0.03 (0.5822) 2.39 2.39 0.00 (0.9612)
Median 2.00 2.00 0.00 (0.7610) 2.00 2.00 0.00 (0.9499) 2.33 2.33 0.00 (0.7751)
% Buy 0.67 0.61 0.06 (0.1287) 0.67 0.67 0.00 (0.8387) 0.54 0.53 0.01 (0.7649)
Mean 2.20 2.06 0.14 (0.7852) 2.15 2.07 0.08 (0.1551) 2.57 2.52 0.05 (0.4059)
Median 2.00 2.00 0.00 (0.0801) 2.00 2.00 0.00 (0.2096) 2.50 2.50 0.00 (0.4327)
% Buy 0.61 0.69 -0.08 (0.0165) 0.64 0.68 -0.04 (0.1056) 0.46 0.46 0.00 (0.9423)
Mean 2.32 2.00 0.32 (0.0001) 2.20 2.05 0.15 (0.0061) 2.66 2.49 0.17 (0.0065)
Median 2.00 2.00 0.00 (0.0004) 2.00 2.00 0.00 (0.0123) 2.67 2.50 0.17 (0.0063)
% Buy 0.55 0.70 -0.15 (<0.0001) 0.62 0.68 -0.06 (0.0166) 0.41 0.47 -0.06 (0.0037)
Mean 2.63 2.14 0.49 (<0.0001) 2.31 2.06 0.25 (0.0588) 2.81 2.52 0.29 (<0.0001)
Median 2.79 2.00 0.79 (<0.0001) 2.25 2.00 0.25 (<0.0001) 3.00 2.50 0.50 (<0.0001)
% Buy 0.39 0.68 -0.29 (<0.0001) 0.57 0.67 -0.10 (<0.0001) 0.34 0.45 -0.11 (<0.0001)
Mean 2.68 2.18 0.50 (<0.0001) 2.37 2.12 0.25 (<0.0001) 2.95 2.56 0.39 (<0.0001)
Median 3.00 2.00 1.00 (<0.0001) 2.40 2.00 0.40 (<0.0001) 3.00 2.50 0.50 (<0.0001)
% Buy 0.32 0.63 -0.31 (<0.0001) 0.51 0.63 -0.12 (<0.0001) 0.28 0.42 -0.14 (<0.0001)
Mean 2.70 1.90 0.80 (<0.0001) 2.44 2.03 0.41 (<0.0001) 3.09 2.56 0.53 (<0.0001)
Median 3.00 2.00 1.00 (<0.0001) 2.50 2.00 0.50 (<0.0001) 3.21 2.50 0.71 (<0.0001)
% Buy 0.33 0.75 -0.42 (<0.0001) 0.44 0.69 -0.25 (<0.0001) 0.22 0.45 -0.23 (<0.0001)
-1 118 173 353
377 460 417
380 446 431
-2 159 173 371
369 462 409
-3 158 165 391 369 464 414
-4 189 168 405
356 434 387
-5 194 153 407 357 458 402
-6 204 174 404





Current (CURRECq) Inferred (INFRECq)
-8 180 170 347 336 347 336
Reported (REPRECq)
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Figure 4.2. graphs the quarterly trend of firms’ average reported recommendation from 
event-quarter -8 to event-quarter -1 for both GCM and control firms. This figure illustrates 
my main conclusion so far. Analyst recommendations for sample and control firms are 
very similar from event-quarter -8 to event-quarter -5. As the event date approaches, stock 
recommendations for GCM firms become significantly more unfavourable than matched 
firms, confirming that analysts are responsive to the financial deterioration of the sample 
firms. 
 
Figure 4.2.  
Quarterly Trend in Mean Reported Recommendation – Sample Firms vs. Control 
Firms 
 
This figure graphs the quarterly trend in mean inferred recommendation from event-quarter -8 to 
event-quarter -1 for my sample of 924 non-finance, non-utility industry firms listed on the NYSE, 
AMEX or NASDAQ, for which their auditors disclose a going-concern modified audit report for the 
first-time between 01.01.1994 and 31.12.2005 and for control firms. Control firms are selected 
employing the control firm approach based on size and BM. Specifically, each of my 924 first-time 
GCM companies is matched with that non-finance, non-utility, non-GCM firm listed on the NYSE, 
AMEX or NASDAQ with market value of equity between 70% and 130% of that of the sample firm. 
The control firm is then selected as that firm with BM ratio closest to that of the sample firm.  
Average reported recommendation for firm j at event-quarter q (REPRECj,q) is the average of the last 
recommendation issued by each analyst within that period. Firms’ reported recommendation at 
event-quarter q (REPRECq) is then calculated as the average of (REPRECj,q). Section 4.2.2.1. provides 
detailed explanation about the estimation of the recommendation categories. Event-quarters are 
defined as a period of 90 calendar days relative to the GCM announcement date. Recommendations 
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4.3.3. Analyst reaction to the GCM audit report 
In this subsection, I investigate whether or not analysts react to the publication of a GCM 
audit report by adjusting their recommendations following the disclosure of such an event. 
More specifically, I compare the mean and median recommendations and the percentage 
of “buy” recommendations for GCM firms between event-quarter -1 and event-quarter +1. 
As discussed previously, I assume that analyst reaction (if any) to the publication of a 
GCM audit report should occur shortly after the event becomes publicly known. 
The formal null hypothesis is as follows: 
H2.: There is no difference in analyst mean and median recommendation and 
percentage of “buy” recommendations for firms that receive a GCM audit report 
between event-quarter -1 and event-quarter +1. 
 
 
Table 4.4. summarizes my results. In panel A (panel B), I present the results for reported 
(current) recommendations, whereas panel C shows the results for inferred 
recommendations. As can be seen, there is no apparent difference in analyst 
recommendations following the publication of a GCM audit report. For instance, the mean 
(median) reported recommendation in event-quarter -1 is 2.70 (3.00) and 2.68 (3.00) in 
event-quarter +1, with no significant differences between them. Moreover, I find that, 
generally, the differences between current and inferred recommendations from event-
quarter -1 to event-quarter +1 are not significant at conventional levels. 
Overall, I conclude that analysts do not react to the publication of a GCM audit report by 
changing their stock recommendations of firms for which their auditors disclose a going-
concern modified audit report for the first-time following the disclosure date. Hence, I do 
not reject null hypothesis H2.  
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TABLE 4.4. 
Analyst Recommendation around the GCM Audit Report - Sample Firms 
 
This table presents a comparison between quarter -1 and quarter +1 analyst stock recommendations 
for my sample of 924 non-finance, non-utility industry firms listed on the NYSE, AMEX or 
NASDAQ, for which their auditors disclose a going-concern modified audit report for the first-time 
between 01.01.1994 and 31.12.2005. 
Average reported recommendation for firm j at event-quarter q (REPRECj,q) is the average of the last 
recommendation issued by each analyst within that period. Firms’ reported recommendation at 
event-quarter q (REPRECq) is then calculated as the average of (REPRECj,q). Average current 
recommendation for firm j at event-quarter q (CURRECj,q) is the average of the last recommendation 
issued by each analyst when he/she does not cease coverage of the firm before the end of that period. 
Firms’ current recommendation at event-quarter q (CURRECq) is then calculated as the average of 
(CURRECj,q). Average inferred recommendation for firm j at event-quarter q (INFRECj,q) is similar 
to the average current recommendation with one difference. When an analyst ceases coverage of a 
company within event-quarter q after the last recommendation date, I infer an unfavourable 
recommendation for event-quarter q and for the subsequent two event-quarters. Firms’ inferred 
recommendation at event-quarter q (INFRECq) is then calculated as the average of (INFRECj,q). 
Section 4.2.2.1. provides detailed explanation about the estimation of the recommendation 
categories. Event-quarters are defined as a period of 90 calendar days relative to the GCM 
announcement date. Recommendations are coded as 1 (strong buy), 2 (buy), 3 (hold), 4 
(underperform) and 5 (sell). 
The percentage of “buy” recommendations is computed as the number of firms with “buy” 
recommendations divided by the total number of firms with available recommendations. 
Specifically, “buy” recommendations are those with ratings below 2.5. For each quarter, the “N” 
column indicates the number of companies with available recommendations. The last two columns 
in each recommendation category indicate the difference between the mean and median 
recommendation and percentage of “buy” recommendations as well as their significance. In 
particular, the two-tailed significance of the t-test (Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test) is reported in 
parentheses for the mean (median) recommendation difference, whereas the binomial test is used to 
test for the significance in the differences between the percentages of “buy” recommendations. 
 
Panel A: Reported recommendation comparison 
Q-1 N Q+1 N Difference p-value
Mean 2.70 2.68 0.02 (0.8712)
Median 3.00 3.00 0.00 (0.7929)






Panel B: Current recommendations comparison 
Q-1 N Q+1 N Difference p-value
Mean 2.44 2.44 0.00 (0.9325)
Median 2.50 2.50 0.00 (0.8950)






Panel C: Inferred recommendations comparison 
Q-1 N Q+1 N Difference p-value
Mean 3.09 3.18 -0.09 (0.1766)
Median 3.21 3.43 -0.22 (0.0499)
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4.4. Summary and discussion 
This chapter examines whether or not security analysts anticipate and react to the 
publication of a GCM audit report by changing their recommendations. My results 
provide original evidence that security analysts are able to anticipate one of the most acute 
accounting bad news events: the going-concern audit report. I find that they anticipate the 
publication of a GCM audit report by downgrading more aggressively stock 
recommendations of GCM firms than stock recommendations of control firms. In 
particular, analysts downgrade their recommendations for GCM firms from “buy” to 
“hold” from event-quarter -4 to event-quarter -1 whereas their recommendations for non-
GCM firms maintain an average “buy” rating. Conversely, I fail to find significant changes 
in stock recommendations for GCM firms following the GCM date. To be precise, there are 
no statistical differences in stock recommendations for my sample firms in event-quarter -1 
and event-quarter +1, suggesting that analysts do not react to the announcement of a GCM 
audit report by reporting negatively on firms following the disclosure date. 
Overall, I provide further evidence that analysts anticipate extreme negative non-routine 
bad news events (e.g., Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney, 1996; Clarke at al. 2006; Cotter and 
Young, 2007) by downgrading their stock recommendations but fail to find similar 
behaviour following the event announcement. However, despite analyst recommendations 
becoming relatively more pessimistic for GCM firms than control firms as the GCM event 
approaches, it is hard to believe that common investors recognize an average “hold” 
recommendation as an unfavourable message for firms immediately before the 
announcement of such an extreme bad news event, even considering that it represents a 
downgrade from a previous “buy”. This is particularly important in the GCM context 
since we know that retail investors hold 74% of these stocks right before the GCM date 
(Kausar, Taffler, and Tan, forthcoming). In fact, there is evidence that small investors 
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follow analyst stock recommendations literally. For instance, Malmendier and 
Shanthikumar (2007) show that large investors react negatively to a “hold” 
recommendation whereas small investors display no significant trade reaction. As Shefrin 
(2002) mentions, “investors are slow to learn that security analysts do not always mean what they 
say. (…) They frequently say ‘hold’ but mean ‘sell’, or say ‘buy’ when they mean ‘hold’.”  
The conclusions of this chapter are mainly based on the comparison between stock 
recommendations for my GCM firms and control sharing similar size and BT ratio. 
However, as reported in table 4.2., control firms share higher distress risk and have worst 
past return performance, which might be driving analyst decision to downgrade my 
sample firms. As such, in chapter 5, I conduct additional tests to ensure the robustness of 
my conclusions and explore whether analyst decision to cease coverage of firms is related 
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CHAPTER 5 
RE-EXAMINING ANALYSTS’ ANTICIPATION AND 




My previous chapter shows that analysts anticipate the publication of a GCM audit report 
by downgrading more aggressively stock recommendations of GCM firms than control 
firms of similar size and BM ratio. However, I acknowledge that control firms have other 
characteristics that are significantly different from those of sample firms, which might 
drive analyst recommendations, thus contaminating my conclusions. 
This chapter aims primarily at ensuring that my prior results are not due to analysts’ 
preferences for certain stocks nor are they a mere statistical artefact. In effect, analyst stock 
recommendations for GCM firms might be related to other firm characteristics than size 
and BM ratio, which seem to have the ability to predict returns (e.g., Fama and French, 
1992; Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993; Dichev, 1998). As Jegadeesh et al. (2004) state, “Analysts 
may be explicitly or intuitively aware of the ability of these variables to predict future returns. If so, 
we would expect the variables to be correlated with analyst recommendations in the same way they 
are correlated with future returns”. As such, I test the robustness of my results by using 
alternative control firm sets that account for different firms’ characteristics. 
In addition, I supplement my previous analysis by focusing on another key signal used by 
analysts to communicate negative information: coverage cessation. Investigating analysts’ 
decision to cease coverage of GCM firms before and after the GCM date provides further 
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evidence on the ability of security analysts to anticipate and react to the publication of 
such bad news. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: section 2 revisits analyst anticipation 
of a GCM audit report, section 3 revisits analyst reaction to the publication of a GCM audit 
report and section 4 summarizes and discusses the results of the chapter. 
 
5.2. Revisiting analyst anticipation of the GCM audit report 
In this subsection, I test the robustness of my prior results relating to the ability of security 
analysts to anticipate a GCM audit report. In particular, I employ alternative sets of control 
firms using different matching procedures for GCM firm characteristics. I also examine to 
what extent the regulatory changes introduced in 2002 impact on my results. Finally, I 
provide a multivariate analysis that investigates if analysts are more likely to cease 
coverage of GCM firms than control firms prior to the GCM date. 
 
5.2.1. Controlling for alternative benchmarks 
I now re-run my previous research framework testing analyst anticipation of the GCM 
audit report using three different control-firm benchmarks based on alternative firm 
characteristics. As discussed in section 4.3.2., size is related to both future stock returns 
and level of analyst coverage. For this reason, all benchmarks use size as a variable to 
identify my control firms.  
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5.2.1.1. Matching on size and momentum 
Prior stock performance is described as an important predictor of future returns. For 
instance, De Bondt and Thaler (1985; 1987) find that portfolios of past losers outperform 
past winners over the subsequent 3- to 5-years. In addition, Jegadeesh and Titman (1993; 
2001) find that firms with higher (lower) short-term price momentum earn higher (lower) 
returns over the subsequent 12 months. Importantly, Jegadeesh et al. (2004) find a positive 
association between analysts’ recommendations and stock momentum, suggesting that 
analysts are aware of this relationship. 
To investigate if the more aggressive downgrade of stock recommendations for GCM firms 
is related to firm momentum, I identify a new set of control firms by matching each of my 
sample firms with the firm with most similar size and momentum. Control firms are 
identified as follows. First, for each sample firm, I identify all non-financial, non-utility and 
non-GCM firms listed on the NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ at the GCM announcement 
date. Sample and match candidate size is defined as market capitalization (shares 
outstanding times price) at one year before the GCM announcement.36 Subsequently, 
among the match candidates for each sample firm, I identify those with a market value 
between 70% and 130% of the sample firm. Finally, from this list of candidates, I choose a 
control firm with the closest momentum to that of my GCM firm. Momentum is defined as 
the average monthly raw returns for the prior 11-month period (t-12 to t-2) relative to the 
GCM announcement month. 
Panel A of Table 5.1. summarizes my results. As can be seen, results confirm my previous 
findings that analysts anticipate the disclosure of a GCM audit report by downgrading 
                                                 
 
36 I also measure the market value for sample and control firms six and one month before the GCM 
announcement date to ensure the robustness of my results. Results are materially the same. 
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more aggressively the stock recommendations for GCM firms. However, it should be 
noted that the size and momentum-based results are weaker than those obtained matching 
on size and BM. In particular, the differences in analyst stock recommendation between 
GCM and control firms become significant only after event-quarter -3. In addition, the 
significance of the results is now lower. These weaker results are consistent with those of 
Jegadeesh et al. (2004) who uncover an analyst predisposition to rate more unfavourably 
companies with negative momentum. However, my results still show that for the event-
quarter immediately before the GCM date, stock recommendations for GCM firms are 
significantly more unfavourable than for control firms across all the recommendation 
categories I consider. 
To sum up, I conclude that, although analysts downgrade also stock recommendations for 
firms with lower momentum, their downgrade is more aggressive for GCM firms than for 
non-GCM firms with similar size and momentum. 
 
5.2.1.2. Matching on industry, size and BM 
Industry affiliation is also perceived as a characteristic that might explain returns (e.g., 
Lyon, Barber, and Tsai, 1999). To mitigate the potential problem arising from the 
association between industry affiliation and analyst recommendations, I identify a new set 
of control firms by matching each of my sample firms with firms of the same industry. 
More specifically, for each sample firm, I identify all non-financial, non-utility and non-
GCM firms listed in on the NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ at the GCM announcement date 
with the same two-digit SIC code. Next, among these companies, I identify those with a 
market value between 70% and 130% of the market value of the sample firm. Once again, 
sample and match candidate size is defined as market capitalization (shares outstanding 
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times price) one year before the GCM announcement date.37 Finally, from this list of 
candidates, I choose as a control firm the firm which has the closest BM ratio to that of my 
GCM firm. The BM ratio is defined as in section 4.3.2. 
Panel B of table 5.1. shows that my results are very similar to those reported when I use 
size and BM as matching criteria. In particular, I find that stock recommendations for 
GCM firms become significantly more unfavourable than non-GCM firms after event-
quarter -5 and that my results are consistent over the three different recommendation 
categories I consider. Hence, I conclude that analyst ability to anticipate the publication of 
a GCM audit report is not driven by an industry bias. 
 
5.2.1.3. Matching on size and distress risk 
Existing research suggests that highly distressed firms tend to underperform less 
distressed firms (e.g., Dichev, 1998; Griffin and Lemmon, 2002). As such, analysts may be 
more prone to downgrade their recommendation for firms with high distress risk, a fact 
that is particularly important for my research since table 3.3. shows that my sample firms 
are highly financially distressed.38 
To investigate if the more aggressive downgrade of stock recommendations for GCM firms 
is related to their distress risk, I identify control firms by matching each of my sample 
firms with the firm with most similar size and z-score. Control firms are identified as 
follows. First, for each  sample firm, I identify all non-financial, non-utility and non-GCM 
                                                 
 
37 I also measure the market value for sample and control firms six and one month before the GCM 
announcement date to ensure the robustness of my results. Results are materially the same. 
38 In particular, it shows that mean (median) Altman z-score is 1.15 (0.93). Moreover, Altman (1968) suggests that 
firm for which z-score is inferior to 1.8 clearly fall into the bankruptcy category. 
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firms listed on the NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ at the GCM announcement date. Sample 
and match candidate size is defined as market capitalization (shares outstanding times 
price) one year before the GCM announcement.39 Subsequently, among the match 
candidates for each sample firm, I identify those with a market value between 70% and 
130% of the sample firm. Finally, from this list of candidates, I choose a control firm with 
the closest z-score to that of each GCM sample firm. The z-score is used as a proxy for 
distress risk and is computed following Altman’s (1968) model. The accounting 
information from the fiscal year ending one year before the GCM announcement date is 
employed to compute each firm’s z-score. 
Panel C of table 5.1. summarizes my results. Consistent with my previous findings, I show 
that stock recommendations for GCM firms become significantly more unfavourable than 
for non-GCM firms with similar levels of financial distress after event-quarter -5. As such, I 
conclude that my previous conclusion about the ability of analysts to anticipate the GCM 
audit report is not driven by firms’ distress risk. 
 
                                                 
 
39 I also measure the market value for sample and control firms six and one month before the GCM 
announcement date to ensure the robustness of my results. Results are materially the same. 
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TABLE 5.1. 
Quarterly Trend in Analyst Stock Recommendations – Sample Firms vs. Control Firms (Alternative Benchmarks) 
 
This table presents the event-quarter trend in analyst stock recommendations from event-quarter -8 to event-quarter -1 for my sample of 924 non-finance, non-utility industry 
firms listed on the NYSE, AMEX or NASDAQ, for which the auditors disclose a going-concern modified audit report for the first-time between 01.01.1994 and 31.12.2005 and 
for control firms. Control firms are selected employing the control firm approach based on three different criteria. In panel A, each of my 924 first-time GCM companies is 
matched with that non-finance, non-utility, non-GCM firm listed on the NYSE, AMEX or NASDAQ with market value of equity between 70% and 130% of that of the sample 
firm. The control firm is then selected as that firm with the closest momentum to that of the sample firm. In panel B, each of my 924 first-time GCM companies is matched with 
that non-finance, non-utility, non-GCM firm listed on the NYSE, AMEX or NASDAQ with the same two-digit SIC code at the GCM announcement date of the sample firm. I 
then identify those firms with market value of equity between 70% and 130% of the market value of equity of the sample firm and choose that firm from this set with the closest 
BM ratio to that of the GCM firm. In panel C, each of my 924 first-time GCM companies is matched with that non-finance, non-utility, non-GCM firm listed on the NYSE, 
AMEX or NASDAQ with market value of equity between 70% and 130% of that of the sample firm. The control firm is then selected as that firm with the closest z-score to that 
of the sample firm. 
Average reported recommendation for firm j at event-quarter q (REPRECj,q) is the average of the last recommendation issued by each analyst within that period. Firms’ 
reported recommendation at event-quarter q (REPRECq) is then calculated as the average of (REPRECj,q). Average current recommendation for firm j at event-quarter q 
(CURRECj,q) is the average of the last recommendation issued by each analyst when he/she does not cease coverage of the firm before the end of that period. Firms’ current 
recommendation at event-quarter q (CURRECq) is then calculated as the average of (CURRECj,q). Average inferred recommendation for firm j at event-quarter q (INFRECj,q) 
is similar to the average current recommendation with one difference. When an analyst ceases coverage of a company within event-quarter q after the last recommendation 
date, I infer an unfavourable recommendation for event-quarter q and for the subsequent two event-quarters. Firms’ inferred recommendation at event-quarter q (INFRECq) is 
then calculated as the average of (INFRECj,q). Section 4.2.2.1. provides detailed explanation about the estimation of the recommendation categories. Event-quarters are defined 
as a period of 90 calendar days relative to the GCM announcement date. Recommendations are coded as 1 (strong buy), 2 (buy), 3 (hold), 4 (underperform) and 5 (sell). 
The percentage of “buy” recommendations is computed as the number of firms whose average recommendation is classified as a “buy” divided by the total number of firms 
with available recommendations. Specifically, firms are classified as “buy” if the average numerical recommendation is below 2.5. For each event-quarter, the “N” column 
indicates the number of firms with available recommendations. The last two columns in each recommendation category indicate the difference between the mean and median 
recommendation and percentage of “buy” recommendations as well as its significance. In particular, the two-tailed significance of the t-test (Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test) is 
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Mean 1.99 2.07 -0.08 (0.3766) 2.05 2.01 0.04 (0.4975) 2.05 2.01 0.04 (0.4975)
Median 2.00 2.00 0.00 (0.3858) 2.00 2.00 0.00 (0.9495) 2.00 2.00 0.00 (0.9495)
% Buy 0.69 0.66 0.03 (0.4277) 0.69 0.72 -0.03 (0.2771) 0.69 0.72 -0.03 (0.2771)
Mean 2.16 1.92 0.24 (0.0028) 2.09 1.99 0.10 (0.0674) 2.22 2.17 0.05 (0.4058)
Median 2.00 2.00 0.00 (0.0020) 2.00 2.00 0.00 (0.1553) 2.00 2.00 0.00 (0.5441)
% Buy 0.64 0.74 -0.10 0.0010) 0.68 0.74 -0.06 (0.0039) 0.62 0.65 -0.03 (0.1867)
Mean 2.09 2.05 0.04 (0.6142) 2.10 2.00 0.10 (0.0435) 2.39 2.29 0.10 (0.1196)
Median 2.00 2.00 0.00 (0.6871) 2.00 2.00 0.00 (0.1323) 2.33 2.06 0.27 (0.1873)
% Buy 0.67 0.66 0.01 (0.8761) 0.67 0.73 -0.06 (0.0056) 0.54 0.57 -0.03 (0.1128)
Mean 2.20 1.98 0.22 (0.0075) 2.15 2.03 0.12 (0.0351) 2.57 2.45 0.12 (0.0624)
Median 2.00 2.00 0.00 (0.0153) 2.00 2.00 0.00 (0.0914) 2.50 2.50 0.00 (0.1016)
% Buy 0.61 0.68 -0.07 (0.0387) 0.64 0.70 -0.06 (0.0157) 0.46 0.50 -0.04 (0.0839)
Mean 2.32 2.20 0.12 (0.1774) 2.20 2.11 0.09 (0.0817) 2.66 2.56 0.10 (0.1239)
Median 2.00 2.00 0.00 (0.1709) 2.00 2.00 0.00 (0.1130) 2.67 2.50 0.17 (0.1450)
% Buy 0.55 0.59 -0.04 (0.2430) 0.62 0.64 -0.02 (0.4002) 0.41 0.44 -0.03 (0.1116)
Mean 2.63 2.38 0.25 (0.0059) 2.31 2.21 0.10 (0.0898) 2.81 2.71 0.10 (0.1165)
Median 2.79 2.33 0.46 (0.0143) 2.25 2.11 0.14 (0.1253) 3.00 2.75 0.25 (0.0887)
% Buy 0.39 0.51 -0.12 0.0023) 0.57 0.61 -0.04 (0.0949) 0.34 0.39 -0.05 (0.0510)
Mean 2.68 2.53 0.15 (0.1318) 2.37 2.29 0.08 (0.1511) 2.95 2.79 0.16 (0.0113)
Median 3.00 2.73 0.27 (0.0496) 2.40 2.31 0.09 (0.1547) 3.00 3.00 0.00 (0.0045)
% Buy 0.32 0.43 -0.11 (0.0060) 0.51 0.54 -0.03 (0.3009) 0.28 0.34 -0.06 (0.0212)
Mean 2.70 2.47 0.23 (0.0389) 2.44 2.34 0.10 (0.0952) 3.09 2.86 0.23 (0.0003)
Median 3.00 2.50 0.50 (0.0220) 2.50 2.44 0.06 (0.0874) 3.21 3.00 0.21 (<0.0001)
% Buy 0.33 0.46 -0.13 (0.0040) 0.44 0.50 -0.06 (0.0336) 0.22 0.30 -0.08 (0.0003)
Current (CURRECq) Inferred (INFRECq)





385 373 397 387
-6 204 195 404 395 434 423
-5 194 211 407 408 458 453
-4 189 174 405 394 462 453
-3 158 185 391 381 464 455
-2 159 161 371 386 460 456
373 446 445-1 118 147 353
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Mean 1.99 1.99 0.00 (0.9804) 2.05 1.96 0.09 (0.0919) 2.05 1.96 0.09 (0.0919)
Median 2.00 2.00 0.00 (0.9615) 2.00 2.00 0.00 (0.2772) 2.00 2.00 0.00 (0.2772)
% Buy 0.69 0.70 -0.01 (0.8174) 0.69 0.75 -0.06 (0.0090) 0.69 0.75 -0.06 (0.0090)
Mean 2.16 2.18 -0.02 (0.8563) 2.09 2.05 0.04 (0.4809) 2.22 2.23 -0.01 (0.8198)
Median 2.00 2.00 0.00 (0.8502) 2.00 2.00 0.00 (0.7368) 2.00 2.00 0.00 (0.6809)
% Buy 0.64 0.59 0.05 (0.0802) 0.68 0.68 0.00 (0.9373) 0.62 0.60 0.02 (0.3124)
Mean 2.09 2.12 -0.03 (0.6467) 2.10 2.06 0.04 (0.4412) 2.39 2.35 0.04 (0.4865)
Median 2.00 2.00 0.00 (0.4450) 2.00 2.00 0.00 (0.8744) 2.33 2.29 0.04 (0.7640)
% Buy 0.67 0.65 0.02 (0.6537) 0.67 0.68 -0.01 (0.7950) 0.54 0.54 0.00 (0.7495)
Mean 2.20 2.09 0.11 (0.1867) 2.15 2.06 0.09 (0.1286) 2.57 2.44 0.13 (0.0402)
Median 2.00 2.00 0.00 (0.1891) 2.00 2.00 0.00 (0.3076) 2.50 2.47 0.03 (0.0703)
% Buy 0.61 0.67 -0.06 (0.0784) 0.64 0.68 -0.04 (0.0990) 0.46 0.50 -0.04 (0.0677)
Mean 2.32 2.08 0.24 (0.0055) 2.20 2.08 0.12 (0.0239) 2.66 2.52 0.14 (0.0255)
Median 2.00 2.00 0.00 (0.0096) 2.00 2.00 0.00 (0.0631) 2.67 2.50 0.17 (0.0289)
% Buy 0.55 0.64 -0.09 (0.0066) 0.62 0.68 -0.06 (0.0095) 0.41 0.47 -0.06 (0.0058)
Mean 2.63 2.13 0.50 (<0.0001) 2.31 2.13 0.18 (0.0024) 2.81 2.55 0.26 (<0.0001)
Median 2.79 2.00 0.79 (<0.0001) 2.25 2.00 0.25 (0.0038) 3.00 2.50 0.50 (<0.0001)
% Buy 0.39 0.66 -0.27 (<0.0001) 0.57 0.65 -0.08 (0.0008) 0.34 0.46 -0.12 (<0.0001)
Mean 2.68 2.04 0.64 (<0.0001) 2.37 2.12 0.25 (<0.0001) 2.95 2.61 0.34 (<0.0001)
Median 3.00 2.00 1.00 (<0.0001) 2.40 2.00 0.40 (<0.0001) 3.00 2.65 0.35 (<0.0001)
% Buy 0.32 0.70 -0.38 (<0.0001) 0.51 0.66 -0.15 (<0.0001) 0.28 0.45 -0.17 (<0.0001)
Mean 2.70 2.09 0.61 (<0.0001) 2.44 2.05 0.39 (<0.0001) 3.09 2.60 0.49 (<0.0001)
Median 3.00 2.00 1.00 (<0.0001) 2.50 2.00 0.50 (<0.0001) 3.21 2.50 0.71 (<0.0001)
% Buy 0.33 0.68 -0.35 (<0.0001) 0.44 0.70 -0.26 (<0.0001) 0.22 0.46 -0.24 (<0.0001)
-1 118 185 353
392 460 444
383 446 447
-2 159 181 371
371 462 414
-3 158 207 391 390 464 431
-4 189 183 405
368 434 393
-5 194 165 407 380 458 411
-6 204 178 404





Current (CURRECq) Inferred (INFRECq)




- 112 - 



















Mean 1.99 1.94 0.05 (0.5257) 2.05 2.01 0.04 (0.5149) 2.05 2.01 0.04 (0.5149)
Median 2.00 2.00 0.00 (0.5603) 2.00 2.00 0.00 (0.6353) 2.00 2.00 0.00 (0.6353)
% Buy 0.69 0.70 -0.01 (0.6505) 0.69 0.70 -0.01 (0.8855) 0.69 0.70 -0.01 (0.8855)
Mean 2.16 2.12 0.04 (0.6534) 2.09 2.02 0.07 (0.2113) 2.22 2.15 0.07 (0.2663)
Median 2.00 2.00 0.00 (0.7452) 2.00 2.00 0.00 (0.2399) 2.00 2.00 0.00 (0.3367)
% Buy 0.64 0.66 -0.02 (0.6534) 0.68 0.69 -0.01 (0.5855) 0.62 0.64 -0.02 (0.4074)
Mean 2.09 2.18 -0.09 (0.2774) 2.10 2.05 0.05 (0.3713) 2.39 2.32 0.07 (0.3062)
Median 2.00 2.00 0.00 (0.3827) 2.00 2.00 0.00 (0.3814) 2.33 2.23 0.10 (0.2769)
% Buy 0.67 0.59 0.08 (0.0327) 0.67 0.69 -0.02 (0.4917) 0.54 0.57 -0.03 (0.2288)
Mean 2.20 2.09 0.11 (0.2129) 2.15 2.02 0.13 (0.0228) 2.57 2.44 0.13 (0.0358)
Median 2.00 2.00 0.00 (0.2033) 2.00 2.00 0.00 (0.0496) 2.50 2.44 0.06 (0.0415)
% Buy 0.61 0.65 -0.04 (0.2540) 0.64 0.70 -0.06 (0.0257) 0.46 0.50 -0.04 (0.0547)
Mean 2.32 2.07 0.25 (0.0068) 2.20 2.06 0.14 (0.0090) 2.66 2.52 0.14 (0.0382)
Median 2.00 2.00 0.00 (0.0025) 2.00 2.00 0.00 (0.0087) 2.67 2.50 0.17 (0.0302)
% Buy 0.55 0.67 -0.12 (0.0003) 0.62 0.68 -0.06 (0.0138) 0.41 0.48 -0.07 (0.0011)
Mean 2.63 2.19 0.44 (<0.0001) 2.31 2.12 0.19 (0.0011) 2.81 2.59 0.22 (0.0005)
Median 2.79 2.00 0.79 (<0.0001) 2.25 2.00 0.25 (0.0005) 3.00 2.58 0.42 (0.0002)
% Buy 0.39 0.64 -0.25 (<0.0001) 0.57 0.69 -0.12 (<0.0001) 0.34 0.45 -0.11 (<0.0001)
Mean 2.68 2.03 0.65 (<0.0001) 2.37 2.08 0.29 (<0.0001) 2.95 2.56 0.39 (<0.0001)
Median 3.00 2.00 1.00 (<0.0001) 2.40 2.00 0.40 (<0.0001) 3.00 2.50 0.50 (<0.0001)
% Buy 0.32 0.70 -0.38 (<0.0001) 0.51 0.70 -0.19 (<0.0001) 0.28 0.46 -0.18 (<0.0001)
Mean 2.70 2.07 0.63 (<0.0001) 2.44 2.06 0.38 (<0.0001) 3.09 2.55 0.54 (<0.0001)
Median 3.00 2.00 1.00 (<0.0001) 2.50 2.00 0.50 (<0.0001) 3.21 2.48 0.73 (<0.0001)
% Buy 0.33 0.71 -0.38 (<0.0001) 0.44 0.72 -0.28 (<0.0001) 0.22 0.50 -0.28 (<0.0001)
-1 118 186 353
399 460 448
399 446 452
-2 159 164 371
399 462 445
-3 158 154 391 394 464 437
-4 189 172 405
386 434 412
-5 194 187 407 396 458 435
-6 204 177 404





Current (CURRECq) Inferred (INFRECq)
-8 180 186 347 351 347 351
Reported (REPRECq)
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5.2.2. Controlling for GCM firm characteristics 
My previous results indicate that the ability of analysts to anticipate the publication of a 
GCM audit report is a robust conclusion. In this subsection, I revisit this result in more 
detail by investigating if such a phenomenon is particularly clear for specific groups of 
sample firms. Specifically, I investigate whether the growing pessimism on analysts’ 
inferred recommendations40 varies systematically with the following characteristics related 
to future returns: size, BM ratio, momentum and distress risk. Size and BM ratio are 
defined as in section 4.3.2., momentum is defined as in section 5.2.1.1. and distress risk (z-
score) is computed as in section 5.2.1.3.  
Table 5.2. summarizes my results. Panel A of table 5.2. compares pre-GCM stock 
recommendations between small and large GCM firms. Firms are allocated to the “small 
size” (“large size”) portfolio if their market value of equity is below (above) the total 
sample’s median value ($33.7 million). I find that stock recommendations for small GCM 
firms are significantly more unfavourable than stock recommendations for larger GCM 
firms for the more distant event-quarters. However, these differences become statistically 
insignificant as the GCM date approaches. These results suggest that analyst recognition of 
going-concern problems occurs later for larger firms than for small firms. 
In panel B of table 5.2., the analysis controls for the impact of the BM ratio. Firms with a 
BM ratio lower (higher) than that of the total sample’s median BM ratio (0.40) are allocated 
to the low (high) BM portfolio. I find that stock recommendations for GCM firms with low 
BM ratio are significantly more favourable than those for GCM firms with high BM ratio. 
As an example, consider the results in event-quarter -1. Mean (median) stock 
recommendations for firms with high BM ratio is 3.21 (3.30) whereas for firms with low 
                                                 
 
40 Conclusions are very similar when I use reported and current recommendations. 
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BM ratio is 2.97 (3.00). In addition, the percentage of GCM firms with high BM ratio for 
which their average recommendation is classified as “buy” is 18% whilst for GCM firms 
with low BM ratio is 26%. Importantly, all differences between groups are significant at the 
1% level. Overall, I conclude that analysts are relatively more pessimistic about GCM firms 
with high BM ratio than GCM firms with low BM ratio, consistent with the notion that 
analysts tend to favour “growth” stocks (Jegadeesh et al., 2004). 
Panel C of table 5.2. compares pre-GCM stock recommendations for my sample firms 
conditional on their pre-event momentum. Firms with negative (positive) prior 11-month 
period (t-12 to t-2) raw returns are assigned to the “negative momentum” (“positive 
momentum”) portfolio. I find that stock recommendations for firms with negative 
momentum become significantly more unfavourable than for firms with positive 
momentum immediately before the GCM announcement date. In fact, for event-quarter -1, 
the mean (median) recommendation for firms with positive momentum is 2.87 (3.00) and 
3.14 (3.30) for firms with negative momentum. Moreover, the percentage of GCM firms 
with positive momentum for which their average recommendation is classified as “buy” is 
30% whilst for GCM firms with negative momentum it is 20%. All differences are highly 
significant, suggesting that negative momentum is related to the decision of downgrade, 
consistent with the notion that analysts prefer positive momentum companies (Jegadeesh 
et al., 2004). 
In Panel D of table 5.2., I present stock recommendations for GCM firms conditional on 
their pre-event distress risk. Companies with z-score <= 1.81 (> 1.81) are allocated to the 
“High Distress Risk” (“Low Distress Risk”) portfolio. I find that, generally, there are no 
significant differences in stock recommendations for GCM firms with high distress risk 
and GCM firms with low distress risk. As such, I conclude that distress risk does not 
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impact significantly on the analyst opinion about GCM firms or the z-score model does not 
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TABLE 5.2. 
Quarterly Trend in Analyst Stock Recommendations – Controlling for Firm 
Characteristics 
 
This table presents the event-quarter trend in analysts’ recommendations from event-quarter -8 to 
event-quarter -1 for my sample of 924 non-finance, non-utility industry firms listed on the NYSE, 
AMEX or NASDAQ, for which their auditors disclose a going-concern modified audit report for the 
first-time between 01.01.1994 and 31.12.2005. 
Average inferred recommendation for firm j at event-quarter q (INFRECq) is the average of the last 
recommendation issued by each analyst when he/she does not cease coverage of the firm before the 
end of that period. When an analyst ceases coverage of a company within event-quarter q after the 
last recommendation date, I infer an unfavourable recommendation for event-quarter q and for the 
subsequent two event-quarters. Firms’ inferred recommendation at event-quarter q (INFRECq) is 
then calculated as the average of (INFRECj,q). Section 4.2.2.1 provides detailed explanation about the 
estimation of this recommendation category. Event-quarters are defined as periods of 90 calendar 
days relative to the GCM announcement date. Recommendations are coded as 1 (strong buy), 2 
(buy), 3 (hold), 4 (underperform) and 5 (sell). 
The percentage of “buy” recommendations is computed as the number of firms whose average 
recommendation is classified as a “buy” divided by the total number of firms with available 
recommendations. Specifically, firms are classified as “buy” if the average numerical 
recommendation is below 2.5. For each event-quarter, the “N” column indicates the number of firms 
with available recommendations. The last two columns indicate the difference between the mean 
and median recommendation and percentage of “buy” recommendations as well as its significance. 
In particular, the two-tailed significance of the t-test (Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test) is reported in 
parentheses for the mean (median) recommendation difference, whereas the significance of the 
binomial test is used for the difference between the percentages of “buy” recommendations. 
Panel A provides separate results for the portfolio of 462 (462) GCM companies with market 
capitalization below (above) the sample median ($33.7m). Market capitalization is calculated one 
year before the GCM date. Panel B reports separate results for the portfolio of 462 (462) GCM 
companies with a BM ratio lower (higher) than that of the total sample’s median BM ratio (0.40). BM 
ratio is defined as the ratio of book value to market value of equity, where book value of equity is 
taken from the last annual accounts reported prior to the date used to calculate the market 
capitalization at one year before the GCM announcement date. Panel C reports separate results for 
the portfolio of 235 (689) GCM companies with positive (negative) pre-event momentum. 
Momentum is defined as the average monthly raw returns for the prior 11-month period (t-12 to t-2) 
relative to the GCM announcement month. Panel D provides separate results for the portfolio of 775 
(149) GCM companies with z-score <=1.81 (>1.81). Z-score is computed following Altman’s (1968) 
model using the accounting information from the fiscal year ending one year before the GCM 
announcement date. 
 
Panel A: Inferred recommendations conditional on firm size 
Small Size N Large Size N Difference p-value
Mean 2.37 2.15 0.22 (0.0162)
Median 2.25 2.00 0.25 (0.0101)
% Buy 0.54 0.65 -0.11 (0.0106)
Mean 2.86 2.45 0.41 (<0.0001)
Median 3.00 2.44 0.56 (<0.0001)
% Buy 0.36 0.50 -0.14 (0.0007)
Mean 2.92 2.77 0.15 (0.1695)
Median 3.00 3.00 0.00 (0.1463)
% Buy 0.32 0.36 -0.04 (0.3751)
Mean 3.09 3.09 0.00 (0.9666)
Median 3.33 3.17 0.16 (0.5618)
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Panel B: Inferred recommendations conditional on firm BM ratio 
High BM ratio N Low BM ratio N Difference p-value
Mean 2.33 2.09 0.24 (0.0048)
Median 2.25 2.00 0.25 (0.0029)
% Buy 0.54 0.71 -0.17 (<0.0001)
Mean 2.77 2.37 0.40 (<0.0001)
Median 3.00 2.20 0.80 (<0.0001)
% Buy 0.34 0.59 -0.25 (<0.0001)
Mean 2.95 2.67 0.28 (0.0020)
Median 3.00 2.70 0.30 (0.0034)
% Buy 0.27 0.42 -0.15 (<0.0001)
Mean 3.21 2.97 0.24 (0.0071)
Median 3.33 3.00 0.33 (0.0041)










Inferred (INFREC q )
 
 







Mean 2.18 2.34 -0.16 (0.1889)
Median 2.00 2.00 0.00 (0.3403)
% Buy 0.64 0.57 0.07 (0.0172)
Mean 2.52 2.77 -0.25 (0.0348)
Median 2.50 2.86 -0.36 (0.0475)
% Buy 0.47 0.42 0.05 (0.0684)
Mean 2.79 2.87 -0.08 (0.5117)
Median 3.00 3.00 0.00 (0.5402)
% Buy 0.35 0.34 0.01 (0.6900)
Mean 3.14 2.87 0.27 (0.0161)
Median 3.30 3.00 0.30 (0.0122)






















Mean 2.21 2.26 -0.05 (0.7037)
Median 2.00 2.15 -0.15 (0.5711)
% Buy 0.63 0.56 0.07 (0.0055)
Mean 2.55 2.71 -0.16 (0.2581)
Median 2.50 3.00 -0.50 (0.2200)
% Buy 0.47 0.39 0.08 (0.0007)
Mean 2.79 2.91 -0.12 (0.3733)
Median 3.00 3.00 0.00 (0.3641)
% Buy 0.34 0.35 -0.01 (0.8317)
Mean 3.07 3.19 -0.12 (0.4094)
Median 3.20 3.33 -0.13 (0.2788)
% Buy 0.22 0.21 0.01 (0.5246)
Recommendation
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5.2.3. Controlling for regulatory regime 
NASD Rule 2711 and the NYSE Rule 472 were introduced in 2002 with the objective of 
increasing investor confidence in the integrity of financial markets and providing investors 
with better information to assess their research. Barber et al. (2006) and Madureira et al. 
(2008) show that following the implementation of these regulatory changes, “buy” 
recommendations become less frequent whereas “sell” recommendations become more 
frequent. This suggests that the reporting environment explains, at least partially, the 
recent decrease in analyst optimism. 
In this context, it is important to investigate the impact of these regulatory changes on 
analyst recommendations for GCM firms to understand if the documented decrease in 
analyst optimism holds for a specific group of financially distressed firms. If analysts 
become more pessimistic for GCM firms due to the implementation such regulatory 
changes, I expect their stock recommendations for my sample firms to be significantly 
more unfavourable after that period. I test the following hypothesis: 
H3: In the pre-event period, there is no difference in analyst mean and median 
recommendation and percentage of “buy” recommendations between firms that 




I formally test this null hypothesis by separating my sample firms conditional on the 
regulatory regime existing at their GCM announcement date. Considering that the NASD 
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Rule 2711 was implemented on the 9th of September 2002,41 I allocate a company to the 
“Pre-NASD 2711” portfolio whenever the GCM audit report is published before that date. 
All remaining companies are allocated to the “Post-NASD 2711” portfolio. I then compare 
pre-GCM stock recommendations between “Pre-NASD 2711” and “Post-NASD 2711” 
portfolios using the two-tailed t-test, the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test and the binomial 
test to investigate the differences in analyst mean and median recommendations and 
percentage of “buy” recommendations, respectively. 
Table 5.3. summarizes my results. I find that the implementation of NASD Rule 2711 
appears to have been effective in adjusting analyst pre-GCM recommendations. In effect, 
stock recommendations for my sample firms became significantly more unfavourable 
following the implementation of NASD Rule 2711. For instance, the mean (median) 
inferred recommendation for the “Pre-NASD 2711” portfolio immediately before the GCM 
announcement date is 3.05 (3.11) whereas for the “Post-NASD 2711” portfolio it is 3.23 
(3.50). Moreover, the percentage of GCM firms for which their average recommendation is 
classified as “buy” decreases from 23% to 19% following NASD Rule 2711. Importantly, all 
these differences across groups are highly significant in most of the event-quarters I 
consider. 
These results suggest that analysts are relatively more pessimistic about the future 
prospects of GCM firms following the implementation of NASD Rule 2711 than before that 
period. This relative pessimism might also be explained by the softening in economic 
conditions and the market crash that occurred at this point in time. However, Barber et al. 
(2006) claim that the new regulatory regime is, at least, a partial explanation for the 
                                                 
 
41 I concentrate my discussion on NASD Rule 2711 since it was implemented before the NYSE Rule 472. However, 
my conclusions apply for both rules since the regulatory changes share the same goals. 
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adjustment on analyst expectations and consequently, their recommendations. In fact, they 
show that the reduction in percentage of “buy” recommendations is more pronounced in 
the period that coincides with the implementation of the regulatory changes. As such, I 
conclude that constraints on analyst optimism following NASD Rule 2711 are also 
manifested for firms experiencing high levels of financial distress. This evidence leads me 
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TABLE 5.3. 
Quarterly Trend in Analysts Recommendations – Controlling for GCM 
Announcement Date 
 
This table presents the event-quarter trend in analysts’ recommendations from event-quarter -8 to 
event-quarter -1 for my sample of 924 non-finance, non-utility industry firms listed on the NYSE, 
AMEX or NASDAQ, for which their auditors disclose a going-concern modified audit report for the 
first-time between 01.01.1994 and 31.12.2005.  
Average inferred recommendation for firm j at event-quarter q (INFRECq) is the average of the last 
recommendation issued by each analyst when he/she does not cease coverage of the firm before the 
end of that period. When an analyst ceases coverage of a company within event-quarter q after the 
last recommendation date, I infer an unfavourable recommendation for event-quarter q and for the 
subsequent two event-quarters. Firms’ inferred recommendation at event-quarter q (INFRECq) is 
then calculated as the average of (INFRECj,q). Section 4.2.2.1 provides detailed explanation about the 
estimation of this recommendation category. Event-quarters are defined as a period of 90 calendar 
days relative to the GCM announcement date. Recommendations are coded as 1 (strong buy), 2 
(buy), 3 (hold), 4 (underperform) and 5 (sell). 
The percentage of “buy” recommendations is computed as the number of firms whose average 
recommendation is classified as a “buy” divided by the total number of firms with available 
recommendations. Specifically, firms are classified as “buy” if the average numerical 
recommendation is below 2.5. For each event-quarter, the “N” column indicates the number of firms 
with available recommendations. The last two columns indicate the difference between the mean 
and median recommendation and percentage of “buy” recommendations as well as its significance. 
In particular, the two-tailed significance of the t-test (Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test) is reported in 
parentheses for the mean (median) recommendation difference, whereas the significance of the 
binomial test is used for the difference between the percentages of “buy” recommendations. 
Results are presented separately conditional on the existing regulatory regime at the GCM 
announcement date. Companies are allocated to the “Pre-NASD 2711” portfolio if the GCM 
announcement date is before the 9th of September 2002. All the remaining cases are allocated in the 










Mean 2.59 2.90 -0.31 (0.0034)
Median 2.58 2.82 -0.24 (0.0047)
% Buy 0.45 0.25 0.20 (<0.0001)
Mean 2.69 3.20 -0.51 (<0.0001)
Median 2.78 3.27 -0.49 (<0.0001)
% Buy 0.40 0.17 0.23 (<0.0001)
Mean 2.87 3.23 -0.36 (0.0021)
Median 3.00 3.50 -0.50 (0.0003)
% Buy 0.31 0.20 0.09 (<0.0001)
Mean 3.05 3.23 -0.18 (0.1196)
Median 3.11 3.50 -0.39 (0.0236)
% Buy 0.23 0.19 0.04 (0.0895)
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5.2.4. Analyst coverage cessation before the GCM announcement 
Up until now, my results demonstrate that the more aggressive downgrade on stock 
recommendations for GCM firms than control firms is a robust phenomenon and that 
analysts became more pessimistic about GCM firms following the implementation of the 
new regulatory regime. I now focus my attention on an alternative signal that is associated 
with negative information: coverage cessation. 
I investigate to what extent, in the pre-event period, analysts are more likely to cease 
coverage of a GCM firm than a similar non-GCM firm using a binary logistic regression 










where Pr(CEASEi =1) is the probability of analyst i ceasing coverage of firm j from event-
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42 Non-GCM firms share similar size and BM ratio and are selected as in section 4.3.2. Test results are materially 
the same when I match my GCM firms on size and momentum (as in section 5.2.1.1.), industry, size and BM (as in 
section 5.2.1.2.) and size and financial distress (as in section 5.2.1.3.) 
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I employ 9 independent variables to estimate equation 5.1., all of which are expected to be 
related to the probability of analyst coverage cessation. The variables are as follows: 
1. Going-concern modified group (GCMG): This is the key independent variable and 
is defined as a binary variable that equals 1 when the company receives a first-
time GCM audit report, 0 otherwise. As such, observations for my sample firms 
assume 1 whereas observations for control firms sharing similar size and BM ratio 
assume 0. A positive (negative) and significant coefficient suggests that analysts 
are more (less) likely to cease coverage of a GCM firm than a control firm; 
2. Market capitalization (LOGSIZE): This explanatory variable proxies for the 
information environment and is defined as the natural log of the firms’ market 
value computed as in section 4.3.2. Given that analysts tend to follow larger firms 
(e.g., Bhushan, 1989; Hong, Lim, and Stein, 2000), I assume that they are more 
likely to cease coverage of small firms than large firms; 
3. Number of analysts following the firm (ANALY): This variable, directly related to 
the analyst information environment, is used as proxy for the level of information 
available about a firm (e.g., Hong, Lim, and Stein, 2000; Jiang, Lee, and Zhang, 
2005; Zhang, 2006). Specifically, I define ANALY as the number of analysts 
following the firm at the end of event-quarter -4. Similarly to LOGSIZE, I expect 
analysts to be more likely to cease coverage of firms associated with higher levels 
of information uncertainty (lower number of analysts following) than firms 
associated with lower levels of information uncertainty  (higher number of 
analysts following); 
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4. Book-to-market ratio (BM): This explanatory variable is used as proxy for the 
market’s expectations about the firm’s future prospects and it is defined as in 
section 4.3.2. The inclusion of this variable is justified by the relationship between 
BM ratio, stock returns and analyst preferences (e.g., Fama and French, 1992; 
Jegadeesh et al., 2004). Considering that analysts prefer growth stocks, I expect 
that they are more likely to cease coverage of GCM stocks with high BM ratios 
(value stocks) than stocks with low BM ratios (growth stocks); 
5. Momentum (MOM): this independent variable proxies for pre-event stock 
performance and is defined as in section 5.2.1.1. The inclusion of this variable is 
justified by evidence that momentum is able to predict future returns (e.g., De 
Bondt and Thaler, 1985; 1987; Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993; 2001) and that analysts 
prefer firms associated with positive momentum (Jegadeesh et al., 2004). As such, I 
expect analysts to be more likely to cease coverage of stocks with negative 
momentum than stocks with positive momentum; 
6. Return on assets ratio (ROA): this variable is used as a proxy for firm economic 
performance and is computed as the ratio of net income to the value of total assets 
using data from the last annual financial accounts reported before the GCM date. 
Given the evidence that analysts are self-selective (e.g., McNichols and O’Brien, 
1997; Das, Guo, and Zhang, 2006), I assume that they are more likely to cease 
coverage of firm stocks with lower profitability than firm stocks with higher 
profitability; 
7. Altman’s (1968) z-score (ZSCORE): This independent variable proxies for 
bankruptcy risk and is computed as in Altman (1968) using data from the last 
annual financial accounts reported before the GCM date. Considering that firms 
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with high distress risk tend to underperform firms with low distress risk (e.g., 
Dichev, 1998; Griffin and Lemmon, 2002), I expect that analysts are more likely to 
cease coverage of stocks with low z-scores (more distressed firms) than stocks with 
higher z-scores (less distressed stocks); 
8. Probability of a GCM audit report (PREDGC): This variable proxies for the ex-ante 
probability of a GCM disclosure using accounting information from the last 
annual financial accounts reported before the GCM date as in Mutchler (1985). I 
expect that analysts are more likely to cease coverage of stocks with low PREDGC 
scores (more likely to receive a GCM audit report) than stocks with higher 
PREDGC scores (less likely to receive a GCM audit report); 
9. Leverage (LEV): This proxy controls for default risk and is defined as total debt to 
total assets using data from the last annual financial accounts reported before the 
GCM date. Once again, I expect that analysts will be more likely to cease coverage 
of stocks with higher LEV ratios (higher distress risk) than stocks with low LEV 
ratios (lower distress risk); 
 
Table 5.4. provides the correlation between all variables. As can be seen, correlation 
between my dependent variable (CEASE) and independent variables is significant in all 
cases and consistent with my predictions. The independent variables for which the 
correlation is strongest with CEASE are GCMG (Pearson correlation= 0.155; Spearman 
rank correlation = -0.155, p-value<0.0001), BM (Pearson correlation= 0.092; Spearman rank 
correlation = 0.103, p-value<0.0001) and MOM (Pearson correlation= -0.117; Spearman rank 
correlation = -0.125, p-value<0.0001). This suggests that the analyst decision to cease 
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coverage of firms is associated with firms receiving a GCM audit report, value firms and 
firms with negative momentum. 
Moreover, for the majority of cases, the correlation between my independent variables is 
lower than 20% suggesting that the variables are not strongly correlated. There are some 
exceptions like LOGSIZE and ANALY (Pearson correlation= 0.563; Spearman rank 
correlation = 0.606, p-value<0.0001), which is consistent with the previous findings of 
Bhushan (1989), Hong, Lim, and Stein (2000), etc. Moreover, there is also a considerable 
degree of association between ZSCORE, PREDGC and LEV and between GCMG and some 
other firm characteristics. In order to ensure that my results are not contaminated by 
correlation between my independent variables, I re-run my logistic regression using 
alternative sets of data. Specifically, I use alternative sets of control firms matched on 
different characteristics, I exclude the variables that are highly correlated with the 
significant ones and I use a stepwise technique to estimate the regression.  
The null hypothesis to test is as follows: 
H4: In the pre-event period, analysts do not cease coverage of a firm that receives a 
GCM audit report more often than a firm that does not receive a GCM audit report. 
 
 
Table 5.5. summarizes the results for my logistic regression model, which are highly 
significant (Wald x2 = 107.11, p-value<0.0001). As can be seen, the GCMG variable 
coefficient is positive and highly significant, suggesting that, ceteris paribus, analysts are 
more prone to cease coverage of GCM firms than control firms. Importantly, this 
conclusion does not change when I use different sets of control firms matched based on 
momentum, industry or z-score as in section 5.2.1. Hence, I reject null hypothesis H4. 
- 127 - 
Besides GCMG, I also find three significant independent variables, for which coefficients 
are consistent with my predictions. For instance, LOGSIZE is negatively related to the 
analyst decision to cease coverage of firms, suggesting that analysts are more prone to 
cease coverage of small firms. This finding is consistent with previous research showing 
that analyst coverage is strongly related to firms’ size (e.g., Bhushan, 1989; Hong, Lim, and 
Stein, 2000). Similar to that earlier literature (e.g., Jegadeesh et al., 2004), which shows 
analyst preference for growth stocks and stocks associated with positive momentum, the 
coefficients of BM and MOM suggest that the analyst’s decision to cease coverage of firms 
is facilitated in the case of value firms and firms with negative momentum. Importantly, I 
find that these conclusions are robust when I re-run the model excluding the independent 
variables that are highly correlated with the significant ones. In addition, the sign and 
significance of these coefficients does not change when I use a stepwise technique to 
estimate the logistic regression model. 
Overall, I show that analysts also anticipate the publication of a GCM audit report by 
ceasing coverage of sample firms more aggressively than match firms over the one-year 
period before the GCM date. As such, investors should be particularly aware that analyst 
decision to cease coverage of a firm is likely to be associated with unfavourable 
information about the future prospects of such firm. 
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TABLE 5.4. 
Pearson and Spearman correlations: Equation 5.1. Variables 
 
This table provides the Pearson (Spearman rank) correlation above (below) the diagonal between all variables used to estimate equation 5.1. for both GCM and control firms 
receiving stock recommendations before the GCM date. The two-tailed p-value is provided in parenthesis below the correlation. GCM companies are my sample of 924 non-
finance, non-utility industry firms listed on the NYSE, AMEX or NASDAQ, for which their auditors disclose a going-concern modified audit report for the first-time between 
01.01.1994 and 31.12.2005. Control firms are selected employing the control firm approach based on size and BM. Specifically, each of my 924 first-time GCM companies is 
matched with that non-finance, non-utility, non-GCM firm listed on the NYSE, AMEX or NASDAQ with market value of equity between 70% and 130% of that of the sample 
firm. The control firm is then selected as that firm with BM ratio closest to that of the sample firm. 
Dummy variable CEASE=1 if analyst i decides to drop the coverage of firm j between event-quarter -4 and event-quarter -1; Dummy variable GCMG=1 if the company receives 
a GCM audit report, and 0 otherwise; LOGSIZE=natural log of market capitalization measured one year before the GCM announcement date; ANALY=number of analysts 
following the firm in quarter -4; BM= book value of equity divided by market capitalization, where book value of equity is taken from the last annual accounts reported prior to 
the date used to calculate the market capitalization at one year before the GCM announcement date; MOM=monthly average of prior 11 month (t-12 to t-2) raw returns; 
ROA=return on assets (net income/total assets); CR=current ratio (current assets/current liabilities); ZSCORE=financial distress measure computed as Altman (1968); 
PREDGC=probability of a forthcoming GCM audit report disclosure computed as Mutchler (1985); LEV=total debt/total assets. All variables are computed with data taken from 
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CEASE GCMG LOGSIZE ANALY BM MOM ROA ZSCORE PREDGC LEV
CEASE 0.155 -0.071 -0.036 0.092 -0.117 -0.088 -0.062 -0.052 0.046
(<0.0001) (0.0004) (0.0735) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.0017) (0.0090) (0.0206)
GCMG 0.155 0.015 0.062 0.079 -0.547 -0.253 -0.192 -0.067 0.168
(<0.0001) (0.4387) (0.0019) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.0007) (<0.0001)
LOGSIZE -0.070 0.020 0.563 -0.251 -0.229 0.092 0.038 0.054 0.143
(0.0005) (0.3213) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.0536) (0.0064) (<0.0001)
ANALY -0.053 0.063 0.606 -0.030 -0.118 -0.074 -0.047 0.066 0.168
(0.0082) (0.0015) (<0.0001) (0.1313) (<0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0194) (0.0010) (<0.0001)
BM 0.103 0.099 -0.334 -0.016 0.037 -0.161 -0.046 -0.000 -0.151
(<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.4334) (0.064) (<0.0001) (0.0221) (0.9995) (<0.0001)
MOM -0.125 -0.588 -0.162 -0.098 -0.055 0.179 0.207 0.037 -0.147
(<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.0062) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.0160) (<0.0001)
ROA -0.118 -0.509 0.190 0.063 -0.077 0.392 0.040 -0.054 0.080
(<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.0015) (0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.0472) (0.0070) (<0.0001)
ZSCORE -0.089 -0.305 -0.036 -0.059 -0.009 0.323 0.365 0.521 -0.186
(<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.0731) (0.0320) (0.6620) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001)
PREDGC -0.061 -0.374 -0.025 -0.041 0.121 0.237 0.361 0.470 -0.153
(0.0021) (<0.0001) (0.2027) (0.0403) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001)
LEV 0.050 0.196 0.109 0.105 -0.080 -0.161 0.031 -0.383 -0.746
(0.0123) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.1168) (<0.0001) (<0.0001)  
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TABLE 5.5. 
Logistic Regression Model Estimating the Probability of Cessation of Analyst 
Coverage before the GCM announcement  
 
This table presents the results of a binary logistic regression model estimating the probability of 
cessation of analyst coverage of a firm from event-quarter -4 to event-quarter -1 using both GCM and 
control firms. GCM companies are my sample of 924 non-finance, non-utility industry firms listed on 
the NYSE, AMEX or NASDAQ, for which their auditors disclose a going-concern modified audit 
report for the first-time between 01.01.1994 and 31.12.2005. Control firms are selected employing the 
control firm approach based on size and BM. Specifically, each of my 924 first-time GCM companies 
is matched with that non-finance, non-utility, non-GCM firm listed on the NYSE, AMEX or 
NASDAQ with market value of equity between 70% and 130% of that of the sample firm. The control 
firm is then selected as that firm with BM ratio closest to that of the sample firm. 
The binary logistic regression model is defined in equation 5.1. The binary dependent variable 
(CEASE) assumes 1 if analyst i decides to drop the coverage of firm j between event-quarter -4 and 
event-quarter -1. Nine independent variables are employed to estimate equation 5.1: Dummy 
variable GCMG=1 if the company receives a GCM audit report, and 0 otherwise; LOGSIZE=natural 
log of market capitalization measured one year before the GCM announcement date; 
ANALY=number of analysts following the firm in quarter -4; BM= book value of equity divided by 
market capitalization, where book value of equity is taken from the last annual accounts reported 
prior to the date used to calculate the market capitalization at one year before the GCM 
announcement date; MOM=monthly average of prior 11 month (t-12 to t-2) raw returns; ROA=return 
on assets (net income/total assets); CR=current ratio (current assets/current liabilities); 
ZSCORE=financial distress measure computed as Altman (1968); PREDGC=probability of a 
forthcoming GCM audit report disclosure computed as Mutchler (1985); LEV=total debt/total assets. 
All variables are computed with data taken from the last annual financial accounts reported before 
the GCM date. 
 
 
Independent variable Expected sign Coefficient Wald p-value
Intercept N.A. -0.59 9.42 0.0021
GCMG + 0.41 14.94 0.0001
LOGSIZE - -0.08 4.42 0.0354
ANALY - -0.01 0.85 0.3554
BM + 0.09 9.91 0.0016
MOM - -1.81 7.79 0.0052
ROA - -0.09 3.73 0.0536
ZSCORE - -0.00 0.05 0.8154
PREDGC - -0.00 2.25 0.1340
LEV + 0.24 3.12 0.0685
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5.3. Revisiting analyst reaction to the GCM audit report 
5.3.1. Analyst coverage cessation after the GCM announcement 
Similarly to the previous subsection, I employ a multivariate analysis to investigate if 
analysts are more prone to cease coverage of GCM firms immediately after the GCM 
announcement. This is particularly important since my previous chapter indicates that 
analysts do not change their recommendations from event-quarter -1 to event-quarter +1 
relative to the GCM announcement. As such, I now investigate if analysts simply ignore 
such a bad news announcement or if their reaction is related to their decision to cease 
coverage of firms receiving a GCM audit report. 
To be precise, I run a similar binary logistic regression model as in equation 5.1. to 
investigate to what extent, following the disclosure of a GCM audit report, analysts are 
more likely to cease coverage of a GCM firm than a similar non-GCM.43 To avoid the 
potential problem arising from the relationship between delisting firms and analyst 
decision to drop the coverage of such firms, I exclude all recommendations of firms 
delisted within event-quarter +1. 










                                                 
 
43 Once again, non-GCM firms share similar size and BM ratio and are selected as in section 4.3.2. Test results are 
materially the same when I match my GCM firms on size and momentum (as in section 5.2.1.1.), industry, size 
and BM (as in section 5.2.1.2.) and size and financial distress (as in section 5.2.1.3.) 
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where Pr(CEASEi =1) is the probability of analyst i ceasing coverage of firm j’s from event-
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Equation 5.4. uses 8 of the same 9 explanatory variables defined in equation 5.2.: GCMG, 
LOGSIZE, BM, MOM, ROA, ZSCORE, PREDGC and LEV together with ANALY defined 
slightly differently. In particular, ANALY is now defined as the number of analysts 
following the company at the end of the event-quarter -1. 
The null hypothesis to test is as follows: 
H5: : Analysts do not cease coverage of a firm that receives a GCM audit report more 




Table 5.6. shows the results of my logistic regression model, which are highly significant 
(Wald x2 = 97.87, p-value<0.0001). The key finding relates to the positive and highly 
significant coefficient associated with the GCMG variable (p<0.0001). This suggests that 
analysts are more prone to cease coverage of GCM firms than control firms within the first 
event-quarter following the disclosure of a GCM audit report. One again, I find similar 
conclusions when using the alternative sets of control firms as in section 5.2.1. As such, I 
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conclude that analyst react to the publication of a GCM audit report by ceasing coverage of 
my sample firms and reject null hypothesis H5. 
I also find an additional significant independent variable in my model. Interpreting the 
negative and significant coefficient associated with MOM suggests that, ceteris paribus, the 
analyst’s decision to cease coverage of a firm is facilitated when firms have negative 
momentum. Importantly, I find that my conclusions are robust when I re-run the model 
excluding the independent variables that are highly correlated with GCMG and MOM. 
Moreover, the signal and significance of GCMG and MOM coefficients do not change 
when I use a stepwise technique to estimate the regression model. 
Overall, I show that analysts do not ignore the publication of a GCM audit report. 
Together with the results of the previous chapter, I find that analyst reaction to the GCM 
event is not related to their decision to downgrade such firms. Instead, I demonstrate that 
analysts prefer to cease coverage of GCM firms avoiding the need to report negatively on 
them. Once again, this suggests that investors should be particularly aware that analysts 
avoid to issue unfavourable recommendations following the GCM announcement and that 
a coverage cessation is likely to be associated with unfavourable information about the 
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TABLE 5.6. 
Logistic Regression Model Estimating the Probability of Cessation of Analyst 
Coverage after the GCM Announcement 
 
This table presents the results of a binary logistic regression model estimating the probability of 
cessation of analyst coverage of a firm from event-quarter -1 to event-quarter +1 using both GCM 
and control firms. The GCM companies are my population of 924 non-finance, non-utility industry 
firms listed on the NYSE, AMEX or NASDAQ, for which their auditors disclose a going-concern 
modified audit report for the first-time between 01.01.1994. Control firms are selected employing the 
control firm approach based on size and BM. Specifically, each of my 924 first-time GCM companies 
is matched with that non-finance, non-utility, non-GCM firm listed on the NYSE, AMEX or 
NASDAQ with market value of equity between 70% and 130% of that of the sample firm. The control 
firm is then selected as that firm with BM ratio closest to that of the sample firm. 
The binary regression model is defined in equation 5.3. The binary dependent variable (CEASE) 
assumes 1 if analyst i decides to drop the coverage of firm j from event-quarter -1 to event-quarter 
+1. Nine independent variables are employed to estimate equation 5.1: Dummy variable GCMG=1 if 
the company receives a GCM audit report, and 0 otherwise; LOGSIZE=natural log of market 
capitalization measured one year before the GCM announcement date; ANALY=number of analysts 
following the firm in quarter -1; BM= book value of equity divided by market capitalization, where 
book value of equity is taken from the last annual accounts reported prior to the date used to 
calculate the market capitalization at one year before the GCM announcement date; MOM=monthly 
average of prior 11 month (t-12 to t-2) raw returns; ROA=return on assets (net income/total assets); 
CR=current ratio (current assets/current liabilities); ZSCORE=financial distress measure computed as 
Altman (1968); PREDGC=probability of a forthcoming GCM audit report disclosure computed as 
Mutchler (1985); LEV=total debt/total assets. All variables are computed with data taken from the 




Independent variable Expected sign Coefficient Wald p-value
Intercept N.A. -2.37 55.52 <0.0001
GCMG + 0.91 29.65 <0.0001
LOGSIZE - -0.00 0.00 0.9488
ANALY - -0.02 0.70 0.4016
BM + 0.03 0.32 0.5687
MOM - -1.94 3.74 0.0531
ROA - -0.06 0.47 0.4945
ZSCORE - -0.03 0.67 0.4127
PREDGC - 0.00 0.02 0.8853
LEV + 0.21 1.17 0.2786
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5.4. Summary and discussion 
This chapter provides further evidence about whether security analysts anticipate and 
react to the publication of a GCM audit report. I find the previous conclusion that analysts 
anticipate the publication of a GCM audit report by downgrading more aggressively their 
recommendations for GCM firms than control firms is robust after controlling for 
confounding factors like size, BM ratio, momentum, industry and distress risk. In addition, 
I show that stock recommendations for GCM firms with high BM ratio and lower 
momentum are significantly more pessimistic than for GCM firms with low BM ratio and 
higher momentum. This suggests that analyst recognition of going-concern problems is 
facilitated for value firms and firms with negative momentum, consistent with the findings 
of Jegadeesh et al. (2004). Importantly, I find that pre-GCM stock recommendations 
become significantly more unfavourable after the implementation of regulatory changes in 
2002, suggesting that the decrease in analyst optimism (e.g., Barber et al., 2006, Madureira 
et al., 2008) is also manifested for firms experiencing high levels of financial distress. 
This chapter shows that analysts also anticipate the publication of a GCM audit report by 
ceasing coverage of such firms within the one-year period before the GCM date. In 
addition, since we know that analysts do not downgrade stock recommendations when 
they cease coverage (e.g., McNichols and O’Brien, 1997), leading the lower tail of the 
recommendation distribution to be censored, the average observed recommendation will 
be more favourable than the true unobservable average recommendation. This can explain, 
at least partially, why the average analyst recommendation for GCM firms immediately 
before the event is a “hold” and not an “underperform” or “sell” rating. This is 
particularly important in this context since, as discussed in the previous chapter, there is 
evidence that small investors do not perceive a “hold” recommendation as an 
unfavourable message (Malmendier and Shanthikumar, 2007).  
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Finally, I find that analysts react to the GCM audit report by ceasing coverage of GCM 
firms following the disclosure of such an event. Together with the results of chapter 4, in 
which I show that analysts do not change their recommendations after the disclosure of 
the GCM audit report, this provides further evidence that analysts are less interested in 
following companies associated with bad news (e.g., Griffin, 2003) and that they are 
reluctant to issue unfavourable recommendations (e.g., McNichols and O’Brien, 1997; 
Conrad et al., 2006). This is also consistent with the notion that analysts have finite 
resources and tend to replace coverage of firms associated with bad news with firms 
associated with good news (e.g., McNichols and O’Brien, 1997; Kecskés and Womack, 
2007). This has important implications for investorsʹ understanding of analyst value-
relevance in bad news scenarios. In fact, despite a prior expectation that the marginal 
contribution of the security analysts to investors may be greater in the case of 
dissemination of bad news to investors (e.g., Hong, Lim, and Stein, 2000), investors should 
not rely on analysts as messengers of bad news and should be particularly aware that the 
analyst decision to cease coverage is associated with negative information in this context. 
The evidence in this chapter supplements my previous findings that analysts anticipate the 
publication of a GCM audit report. More specifically, I show that analysts use two 
different signs to communicate negative information about GCM firms. First, they 
downgrade the stock recommendations for GCM firms more aggressively than for similar 
non-GCM firms as the event approaches. Second, they tend to cease coverage of such firms 
within the one-year period before the GCM announcement. Whether or not analyst 
message is clearly understood by investors as negative information remains an open 
question. The next chapter answers this question. 
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CHAPTER 6 
ANALYST COVERAGE AND SHORT-TERM MARKET 
REACTION TO THE GCM ANNOUNCEMENT 
 
6.1. Introduction 
Extant literature provides conflicting results about the short-term market reaction to the 
publication of a GCM audit report. On the one hand, studies find no evidence of an 
abnormal reaction surrounding the GCM announcement date (e.g., Elliott, 1982, Dodd et 
al., 1984; Herbohn, Ragunathan, and Gardsen, 2007). On the other hand, other studies 
show a significant adverse market reaction to such an event (e.g., Firth, 1978; Fleak and 
Wilson, 1994; Jones, 1996; Carlson, Glezen, and Benefield, 1998; Citron, Taffler, and Uang, 
2008). These conflicting results are explained by a number of factors, such as 
inconsistencies in the definition of the GCM announcement date, sample selection biases, 
inadequate control for prior and concurrent disclosures or the inability to distinguish 
“unexpected” from “expected” audit reports (e.g., Craswell, 1985; Asare, 1990). 
This chapter revisits the short-term market reaction to the publication of a GCM audit 
report and introduces a new variable in the discussion: security analyst activity. 
Investigating the role of security analysts in the short-term market reaction to such a 
negative event provides further evidence on the usefulness of analyst opinions in this 
particular scenario of highly distressed firms. There are reasons to believe that analyst 
activity impacts positively on the efficiency with which the market assimilates going 
concern problems. 
First, the literature provides evidence that the GCM audit report can be predicted with a 
high level of accuracy using publicly available information (e.g., Mutchler, 1985; Dopuch, 
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Holthause, and Leftwich, 1987) and that the market reaction to such a negative event 
depends on market expectations of a forthcoming audit opinion (e.g., Fleak and Wilson, 
1994; Jones, 1996). Because security analysts are sophisticated users of financial statements 
who use fundamental analysis of accounting numbers (Block, 1999) as well as a variety of 
information not readily available to investors (Ivkovic and Jegadeesh, 2004), I expect their 
activities to enhance the market’s awareness of a potential forthcoming GCM 
announcement. As such, analyst coverage should reduce the “surprise” associated with 
the publication of a GCM audit report. 
Second, there is evidence that investors are particularly inefficient in dealing with negative 
information (e.g., Bernard and Thomas, 1989; Womack, 1996; Dichev and Piotroski, 2001; 
Taffler, Lu, and Kausar, 2004) and that the marginal contribution of security analysts may 
be greater in the bad news domain (e.g., Hong, Lim, and Stein, 2000). As such, analyst 
opinions may help investors to incorporate negative information related to going-concern 
problems in stock prices of firms. Investigating this particular issue adds to the evidence of 
chapter 4 where I show that analysts downgrade and cease the coverage of GCM firms 
more aggressively than similar non-GCM firms over the year preceding the GCM 
announcement date. However, it is hard to believe that an average “hold” 
recommendation is a fair assessment for these firms, even considering that it represents a 
downgrade from a previous “buy” rating. Whether or not investors recognize analyst 
relative pessimism about GCM firms remains an open question.  
To sum up, if security analysts are providing investors with value-relevant information 
before the disclosure of a GCM audit report, I expect them to facilitate the incorporation of 
other pre-GCM negative signals in stock prices thus reducing the “surprise” associated 
with the publication of such an event. It follows that the short-term market reaction to the 
GCM announcement should be less negative for companies with analyst coverage. 
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The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows: section 2 describes the data and 
methodology. Section 3 presents the results. Section 4 summarizes and discusses the 
results of the chapter. 
 
6.2. Data and Methodology 
The main purpose of this chapter is to evaluate the role of security analysts in the short-
term market reaction to the publication of a GCM audit report. My research design is 
based on the comparison between the short-term market reaction of firms with pre-GCM 
analyst coverage and firms with no pre-GCM analyst coverage. As such, the definition of 
analyst coverage and the computation of abnormal returns assume particular relevance. 
The data used in this chapter is collected from three different sources: security analyst data 
is from I/B/E/S/ Recommendations – Detailed File whereas market and accounting data are 
provided by CRSP and COMPUSTAT respectively. 
 
6.2.1. Defining analyst coverage 
The definition of analyst coverage is one of the key issues in this chapter. Unless otherwise 
stated, firms are allocated to the “analyst coverage” portfolio if there is at least one new 
recommendation or one new EPS forecast available within the 6-month window prior to 
their GCM announcement date. The 6-month window used to define analyst coverage is 
consistent with Das, Guo, and Zhang (2006), who estimate the level of analyst coverage 
based on a similar period. In order to provide robust results, I use the three 
recommendation categories defined in section 4.2.2.1.: reported recommendations, current 
recommendations and inferred recommendations. 
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As discussed in section 4.2.2.1., reported recommendations are those made and issued by 
analysts in each event-quarter. Current recommendations are similar to reported 
recommendations with one difference: they assume that the last available recommendation 
still applies for the current event-quarter in those cases where a missing recommendation 
is not related to analyst coverage cessation. Finally, inferred recommendations are used to 
deal with those cases where the analyst ceases the coverage of firms by inferring an 
unfavourable recommendation in such cases. I assume that coverage cessation is likely to 
be associated with analyst negative expectations about the prospects of a firm given that 
analysts are reluctant to issue unfavourable investment advice (McNichols and O’Brien, 
1997) and because they generally remain at the same brokerage company following the 
coverage cessation decision (Clarke et al., 2006). Therefore, and drawing on Clarke et al. 
(2006), all inferred recommendations of firms associated with coverage cessation are 
classified as “underperform” or “sell” depending on the previous recommendation. 
 
6.2.2. Computing short-term abnormal returns 
As Kothari and Warner (2007) state, short-horizon methods are “relatively straightforward 
and trouble-free”. I investigate the short-term market reaction to the publication of a first-
time GCM audit report using the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) methodology.44 In 
particular, I study three different trading windows centred on the GCM announcement 
date: (-1, +1), (-2, +2) and (-3, +3). Identifying the exact going-concern disclosure date is a 
crucial issue. In efficient capital markets, price adjustments to new information are 
expected to occur as soon as the new value-relevant information becomes available to 
                                                 
 
44 Results using buy-and-hold abnormal returns are very similar to those reported here. 
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investors.45 Drawing on Kausar, Taffler, and Tan (forthcoming), I define trading day 0 as 
the GCM announcement date taken from the SEC-EDGAR database.46 The market-adjusted 
model is employed to measure the abnormal returns (AR) for each sample firm and is 
computed as follows: 
 
ARit = Rit - Rmt 
(6.1) 
 
where Rit is the return of firm i on day t and Rmt is the return of the smallest decile of the 
NASDAQ index on day t. I use this index since my sample firms usually have small size 
and the majority of them trade in the NASDAQ at the GCM announcement date.47 The 










                                                 
 
45 Dodd et al. (1984) show that a qualified opinion can occur at any one of the following moments: i) when the 
annual earnings are first publicly announced; ii) when the annual report is made publicly available; iii) when the 
10-k report is made publicly available, or iv) when the firm announces the qualification in a press release. As 
such, prior conflicting results about the value of the GCM may be explained, at least partially, by the use of 
different announcement dates. For instance, Firth (1978) defines the publication date of the annual report as the 
event date, Elliott (1982) uses the release date of earnings in the Wall Street Journal whereas Dodd et al. (1984) 
and Carlson, Glezen, and Benefield (1998) use the earlier of the receipt date of the 10-k or the annual report. 
46 Kausar, Taffler, and Tan (forthcoming) reveal that textual search of press articles using Factiva uncovers less 
than 1% of cases associated with prior publication of news of the forthcoming GCM opinion in their sample. 
47 From my 924 first-time GCM cases, 691 trade on the NASDAQ at their GCM announcement date. I also use the 
other deciles to compute the abnormal returns as well as the NASDAQ index. However, my results are not 
sensitive to the index used to compute the abnormal returns. 
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where ARit is defined as above. The cumulative abnormal returns are then averaged across 
the number of firms in the sample (n) to provide an average abnormal return for each 










where CARit is defined as above. In order to properly deal with the problems resulting 
from extreme outliers that affect CARs, I winzorize the extreme values at the first (99th) 
percentile of both tails of the distribution as in Kausar, Taffler, and Tan (forthcoming).48 
The parametric t-test is employed to examine the significance of the mean CARs whereas 
the non-parametric Wilcoxon signed rank-test is used to examine the significance of the 
median abnormal returns. The Fisher sign-test is also presented below. When I split my 
sample in two portfolios, I use the two-tailed t-test and the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test 







                                                 
 
48 The non-winsorized results are not significantly different from the winsorized results. 
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6.3. Results 
6.3.1. Short-term market reaction to the first-time GCM audit report 
In this subsection, I investigate the short-term market reaction to the announcement of a 
first-time GCM audit report and control my results for different GCM firm characteristics. 
This analysis aims at clarifying if investors find this accounting event value-relevant in 
terms of the prospects of my GCM firms. 
 
6.3.1.1. Initial evidence 
The short-term abnormal returns are presented in table 6.1. I find a highly negative and 
significant market reaction to the publication of a GCM audit report on a risk-adjusted 
basis. For instance, the 3-day, 5-day and 7-day mean (median) CARs are -4.2%, -5.4% and -
4.9% (-3.2%, -4.2% and -4.7%) respectively, all significant at the 0.01% level. Moreover, the 
number of negative abnormal returns is significantly greater than the number of positive 
abnormal returns for all the event windows considered. As such, my results indicate that 
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Table 6.1. 
Short-term Market Reaction to the First-Time GCM Audit Report 
 
This table presents the cumulative abnormal returns for my sample of 924 non-finance, non-utility 
industry firms listed on the NYSE, AMEX or NASDAQ, for which their auditors disclose a going-
concern modified audit report for the first-time between 01.01.1994 and 31.12.2005. Abnormal 
returns are market-adjusted returns, where trading day t=0 is the GCM announcement day taken 
from the SEC-EDGAR database. The smallest decile of the NASDAQ index is used as benchmark 
index. The two-tailed significance of the t-test (Wilcoxon signed rank-test) is reported in parentheses 
below the mean (median) CAR. The percentage of positive (negative) CARs is shown in the positive 
(negative) column, whereas the significance of the sign test is reported in parentheses. 
 
Period







(-1, +1) 39% 61% (<0.0001)
CAR
Sign test
(-2, +2) 37% 63% (<0.0001)




6.3.1.2. Controlling for GCM firm characteristics 
I now explore the short-term market reaction to the GCM audit report conditional on firm 
characteristics. This procedure helps us understand if the adverse market reaction is more 
severe for specific groups of GCM firms. I focus my attention on three variables that the 
literature has shown to have ability to predict cross-sectional returns: size (e.g., Banz, 1981; 
Keim, 1983; Fama and French, 1992; Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1994), momentum 
(e.g., DeBondt and Thaler, 1985; 1987; Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993; 2001) and earnings 
surprise (e.g., Ball and Brown, 1968; Bernard and Thomas, 1989; 1990). In addition, I 
control my results for two variables that are proxy for distress risk (z-score, Altman, 1968) 
and GCM probability (PREDGC, Mutchler, 1985), which are important dimensions to 
consider given the nature of my sample firms. 
Table 6.2. reports the results. Panel A provides the abnormal returns for my GCM 
companies conditional on size. Companies for which the market value of equity is below 
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the sample median ($33.7m) are classified as “small size” (n=462) whereas companies for 
which the market value of equity is above the median are classified as “large size” 
(n=462).49 I find that the reaction to the publication of a GCM audit report is generally 
significantly more negative for large GCM firms than small GCM firms. For instance, for 
the (-1,+1) trading period, mean (median) abnormal reaction for the “small size” portfolio 
is -2.9% (-2.7%) and for the “large size” portfolio it is -5.7% (-3.8%), all significant at the 
0.1% level. More importantly, both parametric and nonparametric tests show that, 
generally, the differences in the abnormal returns are significant at conventional levels. As 
such, I conclude that the market is more surprised by the publication of a GCM audit 
report in the case of larger firms. 
CARs for GCM companies conditional on pre-event momentum are presented in panel B 
of table 6.2, with momentum defined as in section 5.2.1.1. Companies with negative 
momentum are assigned to the “negative momentum” portfolio (n=689) whilst companies 
with positive momentum are assigned to the “positive momentum” portfolio (n=235). 
Generally, my results show a significant negative market reaction to the GCM 
announcement for both “negative momentum” and “positive momentum” portfolios, with 
no significant differences in mean and median CARs. As such, I conclude that the short-
term market reaction to the publication of a GCM audit report does not depend on pre-
event stock performance. 
Panel C of table 6.2. reports the short-term market reaction to the announcement of a GCM 
audit report depending on firm z-score (Altman, 1968), computed as in section 5.2.1.3. 
Companies with z-score <= 1.81 are allocated to the “high distress risk” portfolio (n=775) 
whilst all others are allocated to the “low distress risk” portfolio (n=149). My results show 
                                                 
 
49 Market value of equity is defined as in section 4.3.2.1. 
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a negative and significant reaction to the publication of a GCM audit report for both “high 
distress risk” and “low distress risk” portfolios for the majority of the trading periods 
under scrutiny. More importantly, I find no significant differences in mean and median 
CARs between groups, suggesting that the market reaction to the publication of a GCM 
audit report does not depend on risk of bankruptcy. 
In Panel D of table 6.2., I report the short-term market reaction to the publication of a GCM 
audit report conditional on the firm’s likelihood of a forthcoming GCM audit report. The 
probability of a forthcoming GCM audit report (PREDGC) is estimated following 
Mutchler’s (1985) model using data taken from the last annual financial accounts reported 
before the GCM date. Given that my sample contains only firms that receive a GCM audit 
report, I use the Fleak and Wilson (1994) cut off score of 0.01 to distinguish firms 
depending on their PREDGC as in Blay and Greiger (2001). Companies with PREDGC <= 
0.01 are classified as “high GCM likelihood” whilst companies with PREDGC > 0.01 are 
classified as “low GCM likelihood”. Once again, I find a negative market reaction to both 
“high GCM probability” and “low GCM probability”, with no significant differences in 
mean and median CARs. As such, I conclude that the market reaction to the publication of 
a GCM audit report does not depend on the ex-ante probability of a forthcoming GCM 
audit report. 
Panel E provides separate results for the two portfolios of GCM firms conditional on the 
signal of standardized unexpected earnings (SUE). SUE is defined as follows. I start by 
calculating quarterly earnings change (ΔNIq) as the difference between the quarterly 
income before extraordinary items (NIq) and the quarterly income before extraordinary 
items in the previous year (NIq-4). Following Dichev and Piotroski (2001), I define quarter q 
as the most recent quarter preceding the GCM announcement date. Following Foster, 
Olsen, and Shevlin (1984), I then compute SUE=( ΔNIq / |NIq|). Companies with negative 
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SUE are allocated to the “Negative earnings surprise” portfolio (n=528) and companies 
with positive SUE are allocated to the “Positive earnings surprise” portfolio (n=396). I find 
a significant and negative market reaction to the GCM event both for firms with negative 
and positive earnings surprises. However, importantly, my results show that the negative 
reaction to the GCM event is significantly more pronounced for firms with negative 
earnings surprises. For instance, for the (-1,+1) trading period, mean (median) abnormal 
reaction for the “Negative earnings surprise” is –5.9% (-3.6%) and for the “Positive 
earnings surprise” portfolio it is -2.1% (-2.5%), all significant at the 5% level. Importantly, 
both parametric and nonparametric tests mean and median differences between portfolios 
are significant at conventional levels. Hence, I conclude that the adverse impact of a GCM 
audit report decreases when companies are associated with positive earnings surprises. 
Overall, I conclude that the negative reaction to the publication of a GCM audit report is a 
consistent phenomenon, affecting all groups of firms under analysis. Nevertheless, there is 
evidence that the adverse impact of such bad news is more severe for large firms and for 
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Table 6.2.  
Short-term Market Reaction to the First-Time GCM Audit Report  – Controlling 
for Firm Characteristics 
 
This table presents the cumulative abnormal returns for my sample of 924 non-finance, non-utility 
industry firms listed on the NYSE, AMEX or NASDAQ, for which their auditors disclose a going-
concern modified audit report for the first-time between 01.01.1994 and 31.12.2005. Abnormal 
returns are market-adjusted returns, where trading day t=0 is the GCM announcement day taken 
from the SEC-EDGAR database. The smallest decile of the NASDAQ index is used as benchmark 
index. The two-tailed significance of the t-test (Wilcoxon signed rank-test) is reported in parentheses 
below the mean (median) CAR. The last two columns report the mean and median differences 
between the CARs of the portfolios under analysis. The significance of the t-test (Wilcoxon-Mann-
Whitney test) is showed in brackets below the mean (median) differences. 
Panel A provides separate results for the portfolio of 462 (462) GCM companies with market 
capitalization below (above) the sample median ($33.7m). Market capitalization is calculated one 
year before the GCM date. Panel B reports separate results for the portfolio of 235 (689) GCM 
companies with positive (negative) pre-event momentum. Momentum is defined as the average 
monthly raw returns for the prior 11-month period (t-12 to t-2) relative to the GCM announcement 
month. Panel C provides separate results for the portfolio of 775 (149) GCM companies with z-score 
<=1.81 (>1.81). Z-score is computed following Altman’s (1968) model using the accounting 
information from the fiscal year ending one year before the GCM announcement date. Panel D 
reports separate results for the portfolio of 454 (470) GCM companies where PREDGC is <=0.01 
(>0.01), defined as minimum cut-off score by Fleak and Wilson (1994). Panel E provides separate 
results for the portfolio of 528 (396) GCM companies where SUE is negative (positive). SUE=( ΔNIq / 
|NIq|), where ΔNIq is the quarterly earnings change computed as the difference between the 
quarterly income before extraordinary items (NIq) and the quarterly income before extraordinary 
items in the previous year (NIq-4).  
 
 
Panel A: CARs conditional on firm size 
 Period  Mean   Median  Mean   Median  Mean   Median 
 (trading days)  CAR  CAR  CAR  CAR  CAR  CAR 
-0.029 -0.027 -0.057 -0.038 0.028 0.011
(0.0002) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.0125) (0.0421)
-0.041 -0.037 -0.067 -0.049 0.026 0.012
(<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.0733) (0.1247)
-0.027 -0.036 -0.073 -0.057 0.046 0.021
(0.0241) (0.0003) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.0048) (0.0109)




 ( n = 462)  ( n = 462) 
DIFERENCE (A - B)
 
Panel B: CARs conditional on firm momentum 
 Period  Mean   Median  Mean   Median  Mean   Median 
 (trading days)  CAR  CAR  CAR  CAR  CAR  CAR 
-0.043 -0.031 -0.040 -0.032 -0.003 0.001
(<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.0002) (<0.0001) (0.8158) (0.9329)
-0.057 -0.055 -0.043 -0.027 -0.014 -0.028
(<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.3383) (0.1251)
-0.054 -0.049 -0.037 -0.036 -0.017 -0.013
(<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.0084) (0.0025) (0.3257) (0.1264)
(-2, +2)
(-1, +1)
Negative Mom. (A) Positive Mom. (B) DIFERENCE (A - B)
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Panel C: CARs conditional on firm distress risk 
 Period  Mean   Median  Mean   Median  Mean   Median 
 (trading days)  CAR  CAR  CAR  CAR  CAR  CAR 
-0.042 -0.032 -0.050 -0.029 0.008 -0.003
(<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.0012) (0.0038) (0.6179) (0.9556)
-0.056 -0.047 -0.037 -0.031 -0.019 -0.016
(<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.0955) (0.0205) (0.4363) (0.4036)
-0.054 -0.048 -0.014 -0.038 -0.040 -0.010
(<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.662) (0.0224) (0.2287) (0.6361)
(-2, +2)
(-3, +3)
DIFERENCE (A - B)
 ( n = 775) ( n = 149) 
(-1, +1)
High Distress Risk (A) Low Distress Risk (B)
 
Panel D: CARs conditional on firm GCM probability 
Low GCM Probability (B)
 Period  Mean   Median  Mean   Median  Mean   Median 
 (trading days)  CAR  CAR  CAR  CAR  CAR  CAR 
-0.040 -0.025 -0.045 -0.036 0.005 0.011
(<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.7041) (0.5538)
-0.049 -0.036 -0.059 -0.049 0.010 0.013
(<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.4743) (0.3212)
-0.046 -0.048 -0.050 -0.046 0.004 -0.002
(0.0003) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.8324) (0.9274)
High GCM Probability (A) DIFERENCE (A - B)





Panel E: CARs conditional on firm SUE 
 Period  Mean   Median  Mean   Median  Mean   Median 
 (trading days)  CAR  CAR  CAR  CAR  CAR  CAR 
-0.059 -0.036 -0.021 -0.025 -0.038 -0.011
(<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.0142) (0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0118)
-0.070 -0.056 -0.031 -0.028 -0.039 -0.028
(<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.0029) (0.0006) (0.0052) (0.0064)
-0.066 -0.058 -0.027 -0.029 -0.039 -0.029
(<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.0435) (0.0012) (0.0239) (0.0264)
 Pos. Earnings Surp. (B)  Neg. Earnings Surp. (A) DIFERENCE (A - B)
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6.3.2. Short-term market reaction to the GCM announcement and analyst 
coverage 
This section investigates the relationship between the short-tem market reaction to the 
GCM announcement and analyst coverage. Considering the role of these sophisticated 
agents in the functioning of financial markets, I expect the announcement of a GCM audit 
report to be more “expected” for firms with analyst coverage than for firms with no 
analyst coverage. It follows that, in this context, the short-term market reaction to the GCM 
announcement should be less negative in the case of firms with analyst coverage. In 
addition, below I control my results for different firm characteristics, previous stock 
recommendations and reporting environment period. 
 
6.3.2.1. Descriptive statistics 
Table 6.3. presents descriptive statistics for my sample firms conditional on pre-event 
analyst coverage. I allocate firms to the “analyst coverage” portfolio if analysts report at 
least one new recommendation or issue one new annual EPS forecast within the 6-month 
period before the GCM announcement date. All the remaining firms are allocated to the 
“no analyst coverage” portfolio. 
I find that firms with analyst coverage are significantly larger than firms with no analyst 
coverage, which is consistent with Hong’s, Lim, and Stein (2000) finding that size is the 
most important variable to explain analyst coverage. This holds for three size proxies: 
market capitalization, sales and total assets. For instance, the mean (median) size 
measured as market capitalization one year before the GCM date is $219.8 million ($82.3 
million) for companies with analyst coverage and $37.6 million ($22.1 million) for 
companies with no analyst coverage (difference significant at the 0.1% level). I also observe 
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that covered companies have significantly higher distress risk (mean ZSCORECOVERED=0.99; 
mean ZSCORENON-COVERED=1.23, p=0.0009) and exhibit significantly stronger negative 
momentum (mean MOMCOVERED=-0.06; mean MOMNON-COVERED=-0.03, p<0.0001) relative to 
non-covered companies. There is also some evidence that the average BM ratio of covered 
firms is significantly lower than the average BM ratio of non-covered firms. Finally, I find 
no significant differences for return on assets, current ratio, leverage, and the likelihood of 
a forthcoming GCM audit report. 
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Table 6.3. 
Descriptive Statistics – Non-covered vs. Covered Firms 
 
This table presents descriptive statistics for my sample of 924 non-finance, non-utility industry firms listed on the NYSE, AMEX or NASDAQ, for which their auditors disclose 
a going-concern modified audit report for the first-time between 01.01.1994 and 31.12.2005. Each of my 924 companies is allocated to one of two portfolios conditional on the 
definition of “analyst coverage”. Companies are allocated to the “analyst coverage” portfolio if analysts report at least one new recommendation or issue one new annual EPS 
forecast within the 6-month period before the GCM announcement date. All the remaining firms are allocated to the “no analyst coverage” portfolio. Results are reported 
separately. The last four columns report the mean and median differences between the variables of each portfolio. The significance of the t-test (Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test) 
is showed in brackets on the right of the mean (median) differences. 
 
Mean Median St. Deviation Mean Median St. Deviation
SIZE 37.63 22.06 50.68 219.78 82.30 407.38 -182.15 (<0.0001) -60.24 (<0.0001)
SALES 55.95 14.48 102.47 211.86 50.29 416.17 -155.91 (<0.0001) -35.81 (<0.0001)
TA 50.97 16.07 98.17 270.12 60.61 540.48 -219.15 (<0.0001) -44.54 (<0.0001)
ROA -0.62 -0.35 0.76 -0.66 -0.41 0.78 0.04 (0.5434) 0.06 (0.5715)
CR 1.73 1.15 1.80 1.69 1.23 1.49 0.04 (0.7258) -0.08 (0.5800)
LEV 0.37 0.33 0.31 0.37 0.31 0.32 0.00 (0.9709) 0.02 (0.5238)
ZSCORE 1.23 0.98 1.14 0.99 0.76 1.02 0.24 (0.0009) 0.22 (0.0003)
PREDGC 0.03 0.01 2.04 0.16 -0.01 5.88 -0.13 (0.7103) 0.02 (0.9097)
BM 0.87 0.42 1.57 0.63 0.35 0.89 0.24 (0.0039) 0.07 (0.1664)







NO ANALYST COVERAGE ANALYST COVERAGE
 ( n = 607) ( n = 317) 
 
SIZE = market value of equity measured by market capitalization in $ million; SALES = sales in $ million; TA = total assets in $ million; ROA=return on assets (net income/total 
assets); CR = current ratio (current assets/current liabilities); LEV=total debt/total assets; ZSCORE=financial distress measure computed as Altman (1968); PREDGC=probability 
of a forthcoming GCM audit report disclosure computed as Mutchler (1985). All variables are computed with data taken from the last annual financial accounts reported before 
the GCM date. BM= book value of equity divided by market capitalization, where book value of equity is taken from the last annual accounts reported prior to the date used to 
calculate the market capitalization at one year before the GCM announcement date; MOM = momentum, defined as the monthly average of prior 11 months (t-12 to t-2) raw 
returns.
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6.3.2.2. Initial evidence 
I now empirically test if the short-term market reaction to the publication of a GCM audit 
report depends on pre-event analyst coverage. To ensure the robustness of my results, I 
use the three categories of recommendations as in section 4.2.2.1. As such, when using 
reported (current) recommendations to define analyst coverage, I allocate firms to the 
“analyst coverage” portfolio if there is at least one reported (current) recommendation or a 
new annual EPS forecast available within the 6-month period prior to the GCM date. In the 
case of inferred recommendations, firms are allocated to the “analyst coverage” portfolio if 
there is at least one inferred recommendation or a new EPS forecast available within the 
coverage definition window. All the remaining firms are allocated to the “no analyst 
coverage” portfolio.50 As previously discussed, I expect short-term market reaction to be 
less negative for covered companies as a result of prior price adjustments to analyst 
opinions. I formally test the following null hypothesis: 
H6.: There is no difference in the short-term market reaction to the GCM audit report 




Table 6.4. summarizes my results. In panel A (B), I present the short-term market reaction 
to the announcement of a GCM audit report using reported (current) recommendations to 
define analyst coverage. In panel C, I use inferred recommendations with the same 
purpose. 
                                                 
 
50 As can be seen in table 6.3., when I use reported recommendations to define analyst coverage, I allocate 317 
firms to the “analyst coverage” portfolio and the remaining 607 to the “no analyst coverage” portfolio. When I 
define a company as covered using current (inferred) recommendations, I classify 408 (474) firms to the “analyst 
coverage” portfolio. The remaining 516 (450) are allocated to the “no analyst coverage” portfolio. The 
characteristics of both “analyst coverage” and “no analyst coverage” firms do not differ very much from those 
shown in table 6.3. for alternative definitions of analyst coverage. 
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I find that the short-term market reaction to the publication of a GCM audit report 
depends on pre-event analyst coverage. However, contrary to my initial expectations, the 
short-term market reaction is significantly more negative for firms with analyst coverage 
than for firms with no analyst coverage. As an example consider the results in panel A. I 
find that the mean (median) CARs(-1,+1) are -2.9% (-2.7%) for non-covered firms and -6.9% (-
4-6%) for covered firms, all significant at the 0.1% level. More importantly, both parametric 
and nonparametric tests show that the return performance between the portfolios is 
significantly different. 
Results in panel B and panel C are consistent with my previous findings. In particular, I 
show that there is an adverse short-term market reaction to the GCM announcement for 
both covered and non-covered firms using alternative definitions of analyst coverage. 
Similarly to above, the market reaction to the GCM event is significantly more negative for 
firms with analyst coverage, suggesting that the differential short-term market reaction to 
the GCM announcement is robust to alternative definitions of analyst coverage. Hence, I 
reject null hypothesis H6. 
Overall, I show that the short-term market reaction to the publication of a GCM audit 
report is significantly more negative when firms are being followed by at least one analyst. 
The results in chapter 4, where I show that analysts slightly downgrade the 
recommendations for GCM stocks from “buy” to “hold” as the event date approaches, 
provide an appealing explanation for this result. In fact, it is possible that an average 
“hold” recommendation for firms immediately before the announcement of a GCM audit 
report does not provide a clear message to the investment community. Put differently, it is 
likely that investors do not perceive pre-GCM analyst opinions as “unfavourable”. As 
previously discussed, retail investors hold 74% of the GCM stocks right before the GCM 
date (Kausar, Taffler, and Tan, forthcoming). In addition, there is evidence that small 
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investors follow analyst recommendations literally and that, contrary to large investors, 
which react negatively to a “hold” recommendation, small investors do not display 
significant trade reaction to such a recommendation (Malmendier and Shanthikumar, 
2007). It follows that the average “hold” recommendation may contribute, in this context, 
to reduce the impact of other negative economic events in stock prices and fuelling an 
inaccurate expectation regarding GCM stocks in the pre-event period. This is consistent 
with the notion that analyst recommendations may temporarily delay the incorporation of 
negative information in stock prices (Jegadeesh et al., 2004). As such, this may explain why 
the market seems more “surprised” by the publication of a GCM audit report in the case of 
firms followed by analysts. 
Alternatively, it is possible that firms with analyst coverage are associated with more rapid 
assimilation of the information conveyed by a GCM audit report. The next subsections 
provide further evidence on these issues. 
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Table 6.4. 
Short-term Market Reaction to the First-Time GCM Audit Report Conditional on 
Analyst Coverage 
 
This table presents the cumulative abnormal returns for my sample of 924 non-finance, non-utility 
industry firms listed on the NYSE, AMEX or NASDAQ, for which their auditors disclose a going-
concern modified audit report for the first-time between 01.01.1994 and 31.12.2005. Abnormal 
returns are market-adjusted returns, where trading day t=0 is the GCM announcement day taken 
from the SEC-EDGAR database. The smallest decile of the NASDAQ index is used as the benchmark 
index. Two-tailed significance of the t-test (Wilcoxon signed rank-test) is reported in parentheses 
below the mean (median) CAR. The last two columns report the mean and median differences 
between the CARs of the portfolios under analysis. The significance of the t-test (Wilcoxon-Mann-
Whitney test) is showed in brackets below the mean (median) differences. 
In panel A (panel B), firms are allocated to the “analyst coverage” portfolio if there is at least one 
reported (current) recommendations available or one annual EPS forecast within the 6-month period 
prior to the GCM announcement date. In panel C, firms are allocated to the “analyst coverage” 
portfolio if there is at least one inferred recommendation available or one annual EPS forecast within 
the 6-month period prior to the GCM announcement date. All remaining firms are allocated to the 
“no analyst coverage” portfolio. Section 4.2.2.1 provides detailed explanation about the estimation of 
the recommendation categories. 
 
 
Panel A: Reported Recommendations 
 Period  Mean   Median  Mean   Median  Mean   Median 
 (trading days)  CAR  CAR  CAR  CAR  CAR  CAR 
-0.029 -0.027 -0.069 -0.046 0.040 0.019
(<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.0011) (0.0263)
-0.037 -0.034 -0.086 -0.065 0.049 0.031
(<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.0009) (0.0085)
-0.029 -0.038 -0.090 -0.067 0.061 0.029
(0.0060) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.0003) (00037)
NO ANALYST COVERAGE (A) ANALYST COVERAGE (B)
DIFERENCE (A - B)






Panel B: Current Recommendations 
 Period  Mean   Median  Mean   Median  Mean   Median 
 (trading days)  CAR  CAR  CAR  CAR  CAR  CAR 
-0.028 -0.027 -0.060 -0.042 0.032 0.015
(0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.0057) (0.0542)
-0.040 -0.036 -0.072 -0.057 0.032 0.021
(<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.0231) (0.0643)
-0.031 -0.036 -0.074 -0.058 0.043 0.022
(0.0052) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.0095) (0.0225)
NO ANALYST COVERAGE (A) ANALYST COVERAGE (B)
DIFERENCE (A - B)






Panel C: Inferred Recommendations 
 Period  Mean   Median  Mean   Median  Mean   Median 
 (trading days)  CAR  CAR  CAR  CAR  CAR  CAR 
-0.024 -0.023 -0.061 -0.041 0.037 0.018
(0.0024) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.0010) (0.0109)
-0.034 -0.033 -0.073 -0.057 0.039 0.024
(0.0008) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.0056) (0.0245)
-0.028 -0.039 -0.068 -0.050 0.040 0.011
(0.0208) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.0171) (0.0738)
(-2, +2)
(-3, +3)
DIFERENCE (A - B)
(n = 450) (n = 474)
(-1, +1)
NO ANALYST COVERAGE (A) ANALYST COVERAGE (B)
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6.3.2.2.1. Controlling for GCM firm characteristics 
Similarly to section 6.3.1.2., I now test the differential short-term market reaction to the 
GCM announcement between covered and non-covered firms conditional on firm 
characteristics. This analysis assumes particular relevance in the case of some firm 
characteristics that are correlated with analyst coverage. For instance, I have previously 
shown that the adverse short-term market reaction to the publication of a GCM audit 
report is more severe for large firms. As such, one can conjecture that pre-event analyst 
coverage is a mere proxy for size with no incremental explanation power. To properly deal 
with this issue, I control my results for the same characteristics as in section 6.3.1.2.  
Table 6.5. summarizes my results. Panel A presents the short-term market reaction 
conditional on firm size. From my 462 (462) companies allocated to the “small size” (“large 
size”) portfolio, I observe 98 (310) with analyst coverage and 364 (152) with no analyst 
coverage. I find a significant negative market reaction to the GCM announcement for all 
portfolios of firms based on firm size and analyst coverage. However, the differences in 
the mean and median CARs are only significant for small firms, suggesting that 
differential market reaction to the GCM announcement conditional on analyst coverage is 
concentrated in small firms. As such, I conclude that analyst opinion is particularly salient 
for firms with higher levels of information uncertainty. 
Panel B reports separate results conditional on firm pre-event momentum. From my 689 
(235) companies with negative (positive) momentum, I allocate 264 (53) to the “analyst 
coverage” portfolio and 425 (182) to the “no analyst coverage” portfolio. My results 
suggest that differences in the short-term market reaction to the publication of a GCM 
audit report conditional on analyst coverage are statistically significant only for the 
“negative momentum” portfolio. This suggests that the differential short-term market 
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reaction depending on analyst coverage is concentrated on firms where prior negative 
signals are particularly clear. As such, it seems that analyst opinions are disconfirming 
negative stock momentum and temporarily delaying the incorporation of this adverse 
information in stock prices in the pre-GCM period leading to a stronger reaction when the 
GCM audit report is announced. 
In Panel C of table 6.5., I distinguish GCM firms conditional on firm distress risk. 
Specifically, the high distress group allocates firms with z-score is <= 1.81 and the low 
distress group allocates firms with z-score > 1.81, where z-score is computed as in section 
5.2.1.3. I assign the 285 (32) high (low) distress firms to the “analyst coverage” portfolio 
and the remaining 490 (117) to the “no analyst coverage” portfolio. Similar to above, I find 
that differences in the short-term market reaction to the GCM announcement conditional 
on analyst coverage concentrated on firms where prior negative signals are particularly 
clear. In fact, both parametric and nonparametric tests show that mean and median 
differences in CARs are consistently significantly for firms with high distress risk. 
Panel D presents the results conditional on the probability of a forthcoming GCM audit 
report, where PREDGC is computed as in section 6.3.1.2. Specifically, the high GCM 
probability group allocates firms where PREDGC score is <= 0.01 and the low GCM 
probability group allocates firms where PREDGC score is > 0.01, where PREDGC is 
computed as in section 6.3.1.2. From the initial 464 (460) companies with high (low) GCM 
probability, I allocate 163 (154) to the “analyst coverage” portfolio and 301 (306) to the “no 
analyst coverage” portfolio. I find that the differences in the short-term market reaction 
between covered and non-covered firms are particularly evident for the group of firms 
with higher GCM probability. Once again, this indicates that differential market reaction 
conditional on analyst coverage is clearer for the group of firms where the pre-event 
negative signals are more acute. 
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Finally, in panel E, I report separate results conditional on the earnings surprise signal. For 
the 396 (528) companies with positive (negative) SUE, I assign 115 (202) to the “analyst 
coverage” portfolio and 281 (326) to the “no analyst coverage” portfolio, where SUE is 
defined as in section 6.3.1.2. In this particular case, I find that differences in the short-term 
market reaction between covered and non-covered firms are generally significant for both 
negative and positive earnings surprise portfolios, suggesting that differential market 
reaction to the GCM announcement depending on analyst coverage is not driven by 
earnings surprise. 
Overall, my results show that the differential market reaction to the GCM audit report 
conditional on analyst coverage is particularly evident for small firms and firms associated 
with other pre-GCM negative signals (negative momentum, high distress risk and high 
GCM probability). This is consistent with the idea that an average “hold” recommendation 
for GCM firms may delay the assimilation of other negative signals in stock prices and 
fuelling an inaccurate expectation regarding GCM stocks, leading to a stronger adjustment 
in the stocks of covered firms when the bad news is publicly disclosed. The next 
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Table 6.5. 
Short-term Market Reaction to the First-Time GCM Audit Report Conditional on 
Analyst Coverage – Controlling for Firm Characteristics 
 
This table presents the cumulative abnormal returns for my sample of 924 non-finance, non-utility 
industry firms listed on the NYSE, AMEX or NASDAQ, for which their auditors disclose a going-
concern modified audit report for the first-time between 01.01.1994 and 31.12.2005. Abnormal 
returns are market-adjusted returns, where trading day t=0 is the GCM announcement day taken 
from the SEC-EDGAR database. The smallest decile of the NASDAQ index is used as the benchmark 
index. Day t=0 is the GCM announcement day. The two-tailed significance of the t-test (Wilcoxon 
signed rank-test) is reported in parentheses below the mean (median) CAR. The last two columns 
report the mean and median differences between the CARs of the portfolios under analysis. The 
significance of the t-test (Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test) is shown in brackets below the mean 
(median) differences. 
Companies are allocated to the “analyst coverage” portfolio if analysts report at least one new 
recommendation or issue one new annual EPS forecast within the 6-month period before the GCM 
announcement date. All the remaining firms are allocated to the “no analyst coverage” portfolio. 
Panel A provides separate results for the portfolio of 462 (462) GCM companies with market 
capitalization below (above) the sample median ($33.7m). Market capitalization is calculated one 
year before the GCM date. Panel B reports separate results for the portfolio of 235 (689) GCM 
companies with positive (negative) pre-event momentum. Momentum is defined as the average 
monthly raw returns for the prior 11-month period (t-12 to t-2) relative to the GCM announcement 
month. Panel C provides separate results for the portfolio of 775 (149) GCM companies with z-score 
<=1.81 (>1.81). Z-score is computed following Altman’s (1968) model using the accounting 
information from the fiscal year ending one year before the GCM announcement date. Panel D 
reports separate results for the portfolio of 454 (470) GCM companies where PREDGC is <=0.01 
(>0.01), defined as minimum cut-off score by Fleak and Wilson (1994). Panel E provides separate 
results for the portfolio of 528 (396) GCM companies where SUE is negative (positive). SUE=( ΔNIq / 
|NIq|), where ΔNIq is the quarterly earnings change computed as the difference between the 
quarterly income before extraordinary items (NIq) and the quarterly income before extraordinary 
items in the previous year (NIq-4).  
 
 
Panel A: CARs conditional on firm size and analyst coverage 
 Period Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
 (trading days) CAR CAR CAR CAR CAR CAR
-0.017 -0.018 -0.074 -0.063 0.057 0.045
(0.0491) (0.0071) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.0040) (0.0070)
-0.030 -0.032 -0.087 -0.062 0.057 0.030
(0.0085) (0.0008) (0.0003) (<0.0001) (0.0261) (0.0491)
-0.012 -0.032 -0.075 -0.048 0.063 0.016
(0.3820) (0.0102) (0.0006) (0.0024) (0.0143) (0.1679)
-0.060 -0.040 -0.057 -0.033 -0.003 -0.007
(<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.8773) (0.3909)
-0.064 -0.045 -0.068 -0.054 0.004 0.009
(0.0002) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.8605) (0.9707)
-0.076 -0.044 -0.072 -0.065 -0.004 0.021
(<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.8721) (0.6192)
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Panel B: CARs conditional on firm momentum and analyst coverage 
 Period Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
 (trading days) CAR CAR CAR CAR CAR CAR
-0.032 -0.027 -0.071 -0.063 0.039 0.036
(0.0078) (0.0010) (0.0065) (0.0036) (0.1627) (0.1086)
-0.033 -0.026 -0.077 -0.033 0.044 0.007
(0.0209) (0.0109) (0.0093) (0.0148) (0.1646) (0.2253)
-0.022 -0.032 -0.081 -0.049 0.059 0.017
(0.1908) (0.0289) (0.0138) (0.0222) (0.1019) (0.2801)
-0.028 -0.027 -0.069 -0.042 0.041 0.015
(0.0010) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.0037) (0.0757)
-0.038 -0.043 -0.087 -0.065 0.049 0.022
(0.0008) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.0046) (0.0434)
-0.031 -0.040 -0.092 -0.069 0.061 0.029
(0.0189) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.0023) (0.0148)

















































Panel C: CARs conditional on firm distress risk and analyst coverage 
 Period Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
 (trading days) CAR CAR CAR CAR CAR CAR
-0.041 -0.032 -0.086 0.005 0.045 -0.037
(0.0135) (0.0119) (0.0373) (0.1642) (0.2992) (0.8917)
-0.019 -0.022 -0.103 -0.044 0.084 0.022
(0.4546) (0.1092) (0.0171) (0.0501) (0.0901) (0.3750)
0.009 -0.035 -0.098 -0.083 0.107 0.048
(0.8137) (0.1506) (0.0180) (0.0178) (0.0548) (0.2115)
-0.027 -0.026 -0.067 -0.047 0.040 0.021
(0.0004) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.0022) (0.0155)
-0.039 -0.040 -0.084 -0.065 0.045 0.025
(<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.0046) (0.0159)
-0.032 -0.040 -0.089 -0.067 0.057 0.027
(0.0035) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.0015) (0.0096)


















































Panel D: CARs conditional on firm GCM probability and analyst coverage 
 Period Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
 (trading days) CAR CAR CAR CAR CAR CAR
-0.040 -0.034 -0.061 -0.043 0.021 0.009
(<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.2172) (0.7906)
-0.050 -0.045 -0.083 -0.059 0.033 0.014
(<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.0885) (0.4441)
-0.032 -0.039 -0.093 -0.053 0.061 0.014
(0.0212) (0.0004) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.0081) (0.0281)
-0.019 -0.015 -0.075 -0.049 0.056 0.034
(0.0354) (0.0088) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.0022) (0.0047)
-0.025 -0.022 -0.088 -0.066 0.063 0.044
(0.0424) (0.0180) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.0041) (0.0046)
-0.022 -0.036 -0.086 -0.068 0.064 0.032
(0.1670) (0.0026) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.0134) (0.0535)
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Panel D: CARs conditional on firm SUE and analyst coverage 
 Period Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
 (trading days) CAR CAR CAR CAR CAR CAR
-0.012 -0.020 -0.048 -0.039 0.036 0.019
(0.2451) (0.0329) (0.0047) (0.0015) (0.0620) (0.1165)
-0.012 -0.021 -0.070 -0.048 0.058 0.027
(0.3759) (0.0812) (<0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0074) (0.0375)
0.001 -0.021 -0.075 -0.048 0.076 0.027
(0.9463) (0.0837) (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0085) (0.0530)
-0.044 -0.032 -0.080 -0.051 0.036 0.019
(<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.0278) (0.1764)
-0.056 -0.043 -0.094 -0.070 0.038 0.027
(<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.0599) (0.1698)
-0.047 -0.050 -0.097 -0.071 0.050 0.021
(0.0006) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.0193) (0.0538)























































6.3.2.2.2. Controlling for recommendations rating 
My previous results suggest that the market reacts negatively in the short-term to the 
publication of a GCM audit report, a phenomenon particularly severe in the case of 
companies followed by analysts. This result may be explained by analysts delaying the 
incorporation of pre-event negative information in stock prices through the issue of an 
average “hold” recommendation that is not perceived by investors as an unfavourable 
message. Alternatively, coverage may be associated with more rapid assimilation of the 
information conveyed by a GCM audit report. To investigate which of the hypothesis 
explain the phenomenon, I now provide a more detailed analysis based on analysts’ 
recommendation ratings. 
Analyst recommendations have a qualitative interpretation that offers a unique 
opportunity to test the importance of their message on the short-term market reaction to 
the announcement of a GCM audit report. Generally, brokerage firms (e.g., Credit Suisse, 
UBS Warburg, Salomon Smith Barney, Morgan Stanley, Merrill Lynch) issue a “buy” 
recommendation when a stock is perceived to be undervalued by at least 10% whereas a 
“sell” recommendation is issued when a stock is believed to be overvalued by at least 10%. 
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Companies rated with a “hold” recommendation are believed to be fairly priced. As such, 
it is reasonable to expect that a firm receiving a “buy” recommendation will perform 
differently from a firm receiving a “sell” rating. 
In this subsection, I separate firms receiving “conforming” average recommendations from 
those receiving “nonconforming” average recommendations before the GCM 
announcement date.51 Considering the above definition of recommendation ratings and 
the fact that, in the medium run, the GCM firms underperform by around -14% following 
the publication of a GCM audit report (Kausar, Taffler, and Tan, forthcoming), I assume 
that a “conforming” recommendation for a GCM firm immediately before receiving a 
GCM audit report is made through an “underperform” or “sell” rating. All the remaining 
stock recommendations for GCM firms are classified as “nonconforming”. 
More specifically, I argue that analysts are encouraging investors to sell the stock when 
their recommendation before the GCM announcement is classified as “conforming”, which 
should mitigate the impact of a GCM announcement. Conversely, I argue that analysts are 
encouraging investors to keep or add GCM firms to their portfolios when their average 
recommendation before the GCM announcement is “hold”, “buy” or “strong buy”, which 
should amplify the impact of a GCM audit report disclosure. In particular, I classify a case 
as “conforming” if the firm average numeric recommendation is above 3.5. All the 
remaining cases are classified as “nonconforming”. 
 
                                                 
 
51 In this particular case, I only consider analyst recommendations to distinguish “conforming” from 
“nonconforming” cases since, contrary to analyst forecasts, recommendations are disclosed on a simple and finite 
scale common to all stocks avoiding ambiguous interpretation of analyst message. For this reason, the number of 
GCM firms classified as covered is lower than that in my previous analyses. 
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I explore this issue allocating my 924 first-time GCM companies to three portfolios. The 
first portfolio includes firms with no recommendations available within the 6-month 
period prior to the GCM announcement date. The second (third) portfolio allocates firms 
with recommendations available within the same period for which their average 
recommendation is classified as “conforming” (“nonconforming”). If the differential short-
term market reaction to the GCM announcement conditional on analyst coverage is in fact 
due to more rapid assimilation of the information conveyed by a GCM audit report in the 
case of covered firms, there should be no differences in the conclusions after splitting 
covered firms between “conforming” and “nonconforming” cases. The hypotheses I test 
are as follows: 
H7: There is no difference in the short-term market reaction to the GCM 
announcement for companies with pre-event conforming recommendations compared 
to companies with no analyst coverage. 
 
H8: There is no difference in the short-term market reaction to the GCM 
announcement for companies with pre-event nonconforming recommendations 
compared to companies with no analyst coverage. 
 
 
Table 6.6. summarizes my results. Panel A (panel B) compares the short-term market 
reaction between non-covered firms and firms for which their average reported (current) 
recommendation prior to the GCM announcement is classified as 
“conforming”/“nonconforming”. Panel C uses inferred recommendations with the same 
purpose. I find that security analysts are reluctant to issue “conforming” recommendations 
for GCM firms. For instance, from the 196 (384) firms with reported (current) 
recommendations available within the 6-month period prior to the GCM announcement 
date, I find that only 24 (26) have an average “conforming” recommendation, representing 
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only 13% (7%) of the total firms. After inferring an unfavourable recommendation when 
analysts cease coverage of firms (panel C for inferred recommendations), the percentage of 
firms for which their average recommendation is classified as “conforming” increases to 
40% (187 in 466). 
I find that the short-term market reaction to the publication of a GCM audit report 
depends critically on the message conveyed by analysts. When firms’ average reported 
(current) recommendations are classified as “conforming”, there is no abnormal reaction to 
the announcement of a GCM audit report. Conversely, for all the remaining cases, there is 
a negative and significant short-term market reaction to the publication of a GCM audit 
report. In addition, the short-term market reaction to the event is significantly more 
negative for firms with analyst coverage only when their average recommendation is 
classified as “nonconforming”. 
As an example, consider panel A of table 6.6. Firms allocated to the “no analyst coverage” 
and “nonconforming stocks” portfolios face a significant negative short-term market 
reaction to the GCM announcement. Mean (median) CARs for the (-1, +1) period are -3.6% 
(-3.0%) for the “no analyst coverage” portfolio and -8.8% (-5.3%) for the “nonconforming 
stocks” portfolio, all significant at the 0.1% level. Importantly, both parametric and 
nonparametric tests show that mean and median differences are significant at 
conventional levels, suggesting that the short-term market reaction is more negative for 
firms receiving “nonconforming” recommendations than for firms with no analyst 
coverage. Interestingly, there are no significant differences in the short-term market 
reaction to the GCM announcement between firms receiving “conforming” 
recommendations and firms with no analyst coverage.  
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Panels B and C of table 6.6. show that my previous results do not change significantly 
when I use current and inferred recommendations to classify the average recommendation 
of a company as “conforming”, “nonconforming” or with no analyst coverage. Similar to 
panel A, I find that the abnormal reaction for firms with analyst coverage is significantly 
more negative than for firms with no analyst coverage only when their average 
recommendation is classified as “nonconforming”. Hence, I reject null hypothesis H7 and 
do not reject null hypothesis H8. 
However, panel C shows that, contrary to reported and current “conforming” portfolios, 
there is a significant adverse short-term market reaction for firms receiving average 
inferred “conforming” recommendations for most of the trading periods under scrutiny. 
This suggests that “conforming” recommendations are particularly useful to investors 
when disclosed through reported recommendations and less useful when investors have 
to infer that a drop in analyst coverage should be perceived as an unfavourable message. 
Overall, my results suggest that the possible association between coverage and more rapid 
assimilation of the information conveyed by a GCM audit report seems not a convincing 
explanation for the differential short-term market reaction to the GCM audit report 
conditional on analyst coverage. In fact, if this was the case, this phenomenon should not 
be sensitive to the distinction between “conforming” and “nonconforming” 
recommendations. As such, I conclude that analysts play an important role in the 
assimilation of pre-GCM negative information in stock prices. However, the usefulness of 
their recommendations to investors depends critically on the direction of such information. 
When analyst recommendations are consistent with the forthcoming GCM audit report 
(i.e., issuing “underperform” or “sell” recommendations), they facilitate the incorporation 
of other negative information in stock prices in the pre-GCM period, thus reduce the 
“surprise” associated with the publication of a GCM audit report. When analyst 
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recommendations are inconsistent with the forthcoming GCM audit report (i.e., by issuing 
“strong buy”, “buy” or “hold” recommendations), they obstruct the incorporation of other 
negative information, thus increase the “surprise” associated with the publication of a 
GCM audit report. Importantly, the percentage of firms where analyst average 
recommendation is classified as “conforming” is reduced explaining why the overall short-
term market reaction to the GCM announcement is significantly more negative for firms 
with analyst coverage than firms with no analyst coverage. 
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Table 6.6. 
Short-term Market Reaction to the First-Time GCM Audit Report Conditional on 
Analyst Coverage – Controlling for Recommendation Rating 
 
This table presents the cumulative abnormal returns for my sample of 924 non-finance, non-utility 
industry firms listed on the NYSE, AMEX or NASDAQ, for which their auditors disclose a going-
concern modified audit report for the first-time between 01.01.1994 and 31.12.2005. Abnormal 
returns are market-adjusted returns, where trading day t=0 is the GCM announcement day taken 
from the SEC-EDGAR database. The smallest decile of the NASDAQ index is used as the benchmark 
index. The two-tailed significance of the t-test (Wilcoxon signed rank-test) is reported in parentheses 
below the mean (median) CAR. The last two columns report the mean and median differences 
between the CARs of the portfolios under analysis. The significance of the t-test (Wilcoxon-Mann-
Whitney test) is showed in brackets below the mean (median) differences. 
In panel A (panel B), firms are allocated to the “conforming” portfolio if their average reported 
(current) recommendation is classified as “conforming”, i.e., if their average recommendation is 
numerically lower than 3.5. Firms are allocated to the “nonconforming” portfolio if their average 
reported (current) recommendation is classified as “nonconforming”, i.e., if their average 
recommendation is numerically higher than 3.5. All remaining firms for which there are no reported 
(current) recommendations available within that period are allocated to the “no coverage” portfolio. 
In panel C, I use exactly the same classification criterion based on inferred recommendations. Section 




Panel A: Reported recommendations 
 Period  Mean   Median  Mean   Median  Mean   Median 
 (trading days)  CAR  CAR  CAR  CAR  CAR  CAR 
-0.036 -0.030 0.044 0.013 -0.080 -0.043
(<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.2713) (0.1573) (0.0538) (0.0123)
-0.045 -0.039 -0.000 0.005 -0.045 -0.044
(<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.9973) (0.9559) (0.3341) (0.2087)
-0.041 -0.043 0.024 0.041 -0.065 -0.084
(<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.6360) (0.6175) (0.2078) (0.0957)
 Period  Mean   Median  Mean   Median  Mean   Median 
 (trading days)  CAR  CAR  CAR  CAR  CAR  CAR 
-0.036 -0.030 -0.088 -0.053 0.052 0.023
(<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.0019) (0.0134)
-0.045 -0.039 -0.099 -0.066 0.054 0.027
(<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.0046) (0.0133)
-0.041 -0.043 -0.093 -0.066 0.052 0.023
(<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.0180) (0.0367)
NO ANALYST COVERAGE (A) CONFORM. STOCKS (B)
NO ANALYST COVERAGE (A) NONCONFORM. STOCKS (B)
(-1,+1)
DIFERENCE (A - B)






DIFERENCE (A - B)
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Panel B: Current recommendations 
 Period  Mean   Median  Mean   Median  Mean   Median 
 (trading days)  CAR  CAR  CAR  CAR  CAR  CAR 
-0.031 -0.028 -0.007 -0.023 -0.024 -0.005
(<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.8373) (0.3509) (0.4642) (0.8386)
-0.042 -0.037 -0.042 -0.029 0.000 -0.008
(<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.2880) (0.2665) (0.9919) (0.9379)
-0.035 -0.036 -0.013 0.041 -0.022 -0.077
(0.0017) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.6404) (0.2157)
 Period  Mean   Median  Mean   Median  Mean   Median 
 (trading days)  CAR  CAR  CAR  CAR  CAR  CAR 
-0.031 -0.028 -0.064 -0.042 0.033 0.014
(<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.0068) (0.0758)
-0.042 -0.037 -0.073 -0.059 0.031 0.022
(<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.0382) (0.0627)
-0.035 -0.036 -0.075 -0.068 0.040 0.032
(0.0017) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.0175) (0.0113)
NO ANALYST COVERAGE (A) NONCONFORM. STOCKS (B)
DIFERENCE (A - B)
(n = 540) (n = 26)
(-2,+2)
NO ANALYST COVERAGE (A) CONFORM. STOCKS (B)
(+3,+3)
DIFERENCE (A - B)








Panel C: Inferred recommendations 
 Period  Mean   Median  Mean   Median  Mean   Median 
 (trading days)  CAR  CAR  CAR  CAR  CAR  CAR 
-0.025 -0.024 -0.050 -0.038 0.025 0.014
(0.0011) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.0803) (0.0920)
-0.036 -0.035 -0.039 -0.047 0.003 0.012
(0.0003) (<0.0001) (0.0828) (<0.0001) (0.9010) (0.3395)
-0.032 -0.039 -0.031 -0.030 -0.001 -0.009
(0.0092) (<0.0001) (0.1812) (0.0060) (0.9597) (0.9412)
 Period  Mean   Median  Mean   Median  Mean   Median 
 (trading days)  CAR  CAR  CAR  CAR  CAR  CAR 
-0.025 -0.024 -0.068 -0.043 0.043 0.019
(0.0011) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.0024) (0.0495)
-0.036 -0.035 -0.081 -0.059 0.045 0.024
(0.0003) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.0065) (0.0433)
-0.032 -0.039 -0.082 -0.068 0.050 0.029
(0.0092) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.0094) (0.0341)
NO ANALYST COVERAGE (A) NONCONFORM. STOCKS (B)
NO ANALYST COVERAGE (A) CONFORM. STOCKS (B)
DIFERENCE (A - B)




DIFERENCE (A - B)
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Figure 6.1. graphs mean daily CARs computed from trading day -3 to trading day +3 
relative to the GCM announcement date for the three portfolios of stocks: firms with no 
reported recommendations, firms for which their average reported recommendation is 
classified as “conforming” and firms for which their average reported recommendation is 
classified as “nonconforming”. This graph clearly illustrates the main conclusion of this 
subsection: when analyst recommendations operate in the right direction consistent with 
other negative signals, they decrease the “surprise” associated with the publication of a 
GCM audit report. As a result, the short-term market reaction to the GCM announcement 
for “conforming” stock firms is less negative in comparison with non-covered firms. 
Conversely, when analyst recommendations are in the opposite direction to other negative 
signals, they increase the “surprise” associated with the publication of a GCM audit report. 
As such, the short-term market reaction to the GCM announcement for “nonconforming” 
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Figure 6.1.  
Short-term Market Reaction to the GCM Announcement – Controlling for 
Recommendation Rating 
 
This figure graphs the mean cumulative abnormal returns from event-trading-day -3 to event-
trading-day +3 for my population of 924 non-finance, non-utility industry firms listed on the NYSE, 
AMEX or NASDAQ, for which their auditors disclose a going-concern modified audit report for the 
first-time between 01.01.1994 and 31.12.2005. Abnormal returns are market-adjusted returns, where 
trading day t=0 is the GCM announcement day taken from the SEC-EDGAR database. The smallest 
decile of the NASDAQ index is used as the benchmark index. Results are reported separately for 
“conforming” cases (n=24), “nonconforming” cases (172) and non-covered cases (n=728). 
Firms are allocated to the “conforming” portfolio if their average reported recommendation is 
classified as “conforming”, i.e., if their average recommendation is numerically lower than 3.5. Firms 
are allocated to the “nonconforming” portfolio if their average reported recommendation is classified 
as “nonconforming”, i.e., if their average recommendation is numerically higher than 3.5. All 
remaining firms for which there are no reported recommendations available within that period are 
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6.3.2.2.3. Controlling for regulatory regime 
Section 5.2.3. suggests that analyst pre-event recommendations for GCM firms became 
significantly more pessimistic after the implementation of the regulatory changes of 2002. 
In this subsection, I investigate to what extent the new reporting environment impact the 
short-term market reaction to this event. I conjecture that more pessimistic pre-GCM 
recommendations and the additional information that analysts are required to disclose 
following the implementation of the regulatory changes might have provided investors 
with better information to interpret analyst message in the GCM audit report context. If 
this is the case, I expect the differential short-term market reaction to the GCM 
announcement conditional on analyst coverage significantly reduces following the post-
regulatory change period. 
I test this hypothesis by allocating each of my sample firms to the pre (post)-NASD 2711 
period if the GCM audit report was announced before (following) the 9th of September 
2002 (when the rule was implemented). The hypotheses to test are as follows: 
H9.: In the pre-regulatory changes period, there is no difference in the short-term 
market reaction to the GCM announcement for companies with pre-event analyst 
coverage compared to companies with no pre-event analyst coverage.  
 
H10: In the post-regulatory changes period, there is no difference in the short-term 
market reaction to the GCM announcement for companies with pre-event analyst 




Table 6.7. summarizes my results. There are 723 (201) sample firms for which the GCM 
disclosure date occurred prior to (following) the implementation of NASD 2711. In panel 
A (B) of table 6.7., I compare the short-term market reaction to the GCM announcement 
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depending on analyst coverage before and after the implementation of NASD 2711. Firms 
are allocated to the “analyst coverage” portfolio if they have at least one reported (current) 
recommendation or one annual EPS forecast available within the 6-months prior to the 
GCM announcement date. In panel C, I allocate firms to the “analyst coverage” portfolio if 
they have at least one inferred recommendation or one annual EPS forecast available over 
the same period. 
I find that the differential short-term market reaction to the publication of a GCM audit 
report conditional on analyst coverage is an exclusive phenomenon of the pre-NASD 2711 
period. My results for the pre-NASD 2711 period show that the short-term market reaction 
to the GCM announcement is significantly more negative for firms with analyst coverage. 
For instance, panel A of table 6.7. reports that mean (median) CAR(-1,+1) for the “analyst 
coverage” portfolio is -7.3% (-4.9%) and -1.9% (-1.9%) for the “no analyst coverage” 
portfolio, all highly significant. Importantly, both parametric and nonparametric tests 
show that the abnormal reaction for the “analyst coverage” portfolio is significantly more 
negative than for the “no analyst coverage” portfolio. Moreover, panel B and C shows that 
results are robust when I use current and inferred recommendations to define analyst 
coverage. 
The same analysis for the post-NASD 2711 period reveals a different pattern. Interestingly, 
my results suggest that the differential short-term market reaction to the GCM 
announcement conditional on analyst coverage is no longer present after the 
implementation of the NASD 2711 Rule. Considering the reduced number of cases 
subsequent to the implementation of NASD 2711 Rule, the analysis of median values 
assumes particular importance. However, my results consistently suggest that differences 
in mean and median CARs between firms with analyst coverage and firms with no analyst 
coverage are not statistically significant. As an example, consider the results in panel A of 
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table 6.7. The mean (median) CAR(-1,+1) for the “analyst coverage” portfolio is -5.5% (-3.3%) 
and -7.0% (-5.4%) for the “no analyst coverage” portfolio, all significant at the 1% level. 
However, both parametric and nonparametric tests fail to find differences in performance 
of these two portfolios. 
Overall, my results suggest that following the implementation of the regulatory changes, 
the market is no longer more surprised by the publication of a GCM audit report by firms 
with analyst coverage. As such, I conclude that investors became more aware that relying 
solely on analyst’s recommendations for distressed firms might be unwise and that 
regulatory changes were effective in providing investors with better information to access 
analysts’ research in the GCM audit report context. Hence, I reject null hypothesis H9 but 
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Table 6.7.  
Short-term Market Reaction to the First-Time GCM Audit Report Conditional on 
Analyst Coverage – Controlling for Regulatory Regime 
 
This table presents the cumulative abnormal returns for my sample of 924 non-finance, non-utility 
industry firms listed on the NYSE, AMEX or NASDAQ, for which their auditors disclose a going-
concern modified audit report for the first-time between 01.01.1994 and 31.12.2005. Abnormal 
returns are market-adjusted returns, where trading day t=0 is the GCM announcement day taken 
from the SEC-EDGAR database. The smallest decile of the NASDAQ index is used as the benchmark 
index. The two-tailed significance of the t-test (Wilcoxon signed rank-test) is reported in parentheses 
below the mean (median) CAR. The last two columns report the mean and median differences 
between the CARs of the portfolios under analysis. The significance of the t-test (Wilcoxon-Mann-
Whitney test) is showed in brackets below the mean (median) differences. 
Firms are allocated to the “Pre-NASD 2711” portfolio if the GCM audit report was announced before 
the 9th of September 2002. All the remaining cases are allocated to the “Post-NASD 2711” portfolio. 
For each portfolio, firms are then reallocated conditional on analyst coverage.  
In panel A (panel B), firms are allocated to the “analyst coverage” portfolio if there is at least one 
reported (current) recommendations available or one annual EPS forecast within the 6-month period 
prior to the GCM announcement date. In panel C, firms are allocated to the “analyst coverage” 
portfolio if there is at least one inferred recommendation available or one annual EPS forecast within 
the 6-month period prior to the GCM announcement date. All remaining firms are allocated to the 
“no analyst coverage” portfolio. Section 4.2.2.1 provides detailed explanation about the estimation of 




Panel A: Reported Recommendations  
 Period  Mean   Median  Mean   Median  Mean   Median 
 (trading days)  CAR  CAR  CAR  CAR  CAR  CAR 
-0.019 -0.019 -0.073 -0.049 0.054 0.030
(0.0182) (0.0003) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0047)
-0.033 -0.035 -0.092 -0.065 0.059 0.030
(0.0017) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.0005) (0.0052)
-0.024 -0.035 -0.095 -0.067 0.071 0.032
(0.0396) (0.0005) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.0003) (00026)
 Period  Mean   Median  Mean   Median  Mean   Median 
 (trading days)  CAR  CAR  CAR  CAR  CAR  CAR 
-0.070 -0.054 -0.055 -0.033 -0.015 -0.021
(<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.0100) (0.0017) (0.5570) (0.3916)
-0.050 -0.029 -0.037 -0.053 -0.013 0.024
(0.0049) (0.0024) (0.3722) (0.0074) (0.7837) (0.7777)
-0.033 -0.057 -0.049 -0.055 0.016 -0.002
(0.1980) (0.0014) (0.2105) (0.0020) (0.7235) (0.6752)
NO ANALYST COVERAGE (A) ANALYST COVERAGE (B)
NO ANALYST COVERAGE (A) ANALYST COVERAGE (B)
(Pre-NASD 2711) (Pre-NASD 2711)
(n = 472) (n = 251)
(Post-NASD 2711)
(n = 66)
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Panel B: Current Recommendations  
 Period  Mean   Median  Mean   Median  Mean   Median 
 (trading days)  CAR  CAR  CAR  CAR  CAR  CAR 
-0.018 -0.020 -0.061 -0.042 0.043 0.022
(0.0324) (0.0013) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.0011) (0.0143)
-0.038 -0.038 -0.075 -0.059 0.037 0.021
(0.0005) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.0249) (0.0569)
-0.028 -0.034 -0.077 -0.058 0.049 0.024
(0.0268) (0.0006) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.0103) (0.0238)
 Period  Mean   Median  Mean   Median  Mean   Median 
 (trading days)  CAR  CAR  CAR  CAR  CAR  CAR 
-0.070 -0.052 -0.058 -0.039 -0.012 -0.013
(<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.0019) (0.0005) (0.6206) (0.4910)
-0.046 -0.029 -0.044 -0.045 -0.002 0.016
(0.0080) (0.0043) (0.2069) (0.0052) (0.9597) (0.7218)
-0.030 -0.045 -0.050 -0.063 0.020 0.018










DIFERENCE (A - B)





DIFERENCE (A - B)





Panel C: Inferred Recommendations  
 Period  Mean   Median  Mean   Median  Mean   Median 
 (trading days)  CAR  CAR  CAR  CAR  CAR  CAR 
-0.011 -0.016 -0.061 -0.041 0.050 0.025
(0.1821) (0.0182) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.0024)
-0.031 -0.033 -0.077 -0.059 0.046 0.026
(0.0074) (0.0005) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.0049) (0.0166)
-0.024 -0.035 -0.073 -0.051 0.049 0.016
(0.0717) (0.0016) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.0104) (0.0362)
 Period  Mean   Median  Mean   Median  Mean   Median 
 (trading days)  CAR  CAR  CAR  CAR  CAR  CAR 
-0.064 -0.052 -0.058 -0.048 -0.006 -0.004
(0.0008) (<0.0001) (0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.7729) (0.6016)
-0.044 -0.029 -0.060 -0.041 0.016 0.012
(0.0471) (0.0122) (0.0028) (0.0016) (0.5698) (0.8321)
-0.012 -0.058 -0.051 -0.047 0.039 -0.011





(n = 353) (n = 370)








DIFERENCE (A - B)
NO ANALYST COVERAGE (A) ANALYST COVERAGE (B)
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6.3.2.2.4. Multivariate analysis 
My previous results suggest that the short-term market reaction to the publication of a 
GCM audit report is significantly more negative for firms with analyst coverage than firms 
with no analyst coverage. I now test the robustness of this result using a multivariate test, 
which evaluates the combined effect of analyst coverage controlling for firms’ 
characteristics on the short-term market reaction to the publication of a GCM audit report. 
In particular, I use a binary logistic regression model to investigate if firms with pre-GCM 
analyst coverage are more likely to experience a strong negative short-term market 
reaction to the GCM announcement.52 The null hypothesis is defined as follows: 
H11.: Firms experiencing a strong negative abnormal reaction to the publication of a 
GCM audit report do not tend to be covered by analysts. 
 
 







+  (6.4) 
where Pr(SNCARi=1) is the probability of firm i experiencing a strong negative abnormal 
return from trading day -1 to trading day +1 relative to the GCM date (defined as day zero) 
and v represents the vector of independent variables, defined as follows: 
                                                 
 
52 There are alternative econometric techniques that could be used to perform this test. The most obvious 
approach would be to estimate a regression using an OLS procedure. However, the use of a continuous 
dependent variable would be problematic in the context I address. In fact, my data is not a simple cross-section 
nor a simple time series since I have: 1) observations that are spread over time and 2) firms that appear more than 
once in my sample. As a consequence, simply pooling the data together to run an OLS regression would result in 
biased estimates of the relevant parameters (for details see Wooldridge, 2001). I will explore these issues in more 
detail in further work. 
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The dependent variable (SNCAR) is a binary variable defined as follows. First, I compute 
the 3-day abnormal return (CAR(-1,+1)) centred on the GCM disclosure date. Firms are then 
ranked accordingly to their 3-day abnormal returns and divided into two groups. 
Specifically, the bottom 33.3% performers are allocated to the “strong negative abnormal 
reaction” group and are classified as 1. All other firms are classified as 0. 
I employ eleven independent variables in equation 6.5., which are expected to be related to 
the probability of a firm experiencing a strong negative short-term market reaction to the 
publication of a GCM audit report. The explanatory variables are defined as follows: 
 
1. Conforming recommendation (CONFORM): This is a binary variable that equals 1 
when the firm’s average reported recommendation within the 6-month period 
before the GCM date is classified as “conforming”, i.e., an “underperform” or 
“sell” recommendation. Considering my prior univariate analysis, I expect firms 
receiving “conforming” recommendations to be less likely to experience a strong 
negative short-term market reaction to the GCM announcement. 
2. Nonconforming recommendation (NONCONFORM): This is the second binary 
variable that equals 1 when the firm’s average reported recommendation within 
the 6-month period before the GCM date is classified as “nonconforming”, i.e., 
“hold”, “buy” or “strong buy” recommendation. I expect firms receiving 
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“nonconforming” recommendations to be more likely to experience a strong 
negative short-term market reaction to the publication of a GCM audit report. 
3. Market capitalization (LOGSIZE): I control my results for size, which proxies for 
the information environment. I have previously shown that the short-term market 
reaction to the publication of a GCM audit report is significantly more adverse for 
large firms, suggesting that the “surprise” associated with the publication of a 
GCM audit report is higher for these firms. As such, I expect larger firms to be 
more likely to experience a strong negative short-term market reaction to the GCM 
announcement. LOGSIZE is computed as in section 5.2.4. 
4. Number of analysts following the firm (ANALY): This is the second proxy for the 
level of information and is directly related to the analyst coverage environment. 
For the same reason as for LOGSIZE, I expect firms with a greater analyst 
following to be more likely to experience a strong negative short-term market 
reaction to the GCM announcement. ANALY is defined as section 5.2.4. 
5. Book-to-market ratio (BM): The BM ratio may potentially explain cross-sectional 
short-term abnormal returns given the relationship between BM ratio and firms’ 
expected returns (e.g., Fama and French, 1992; Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny, 
1994). If high BM firms (value stocks) are expected to experience lower returns, I 
expect firms with higher BM ratios to be more likely to experience a strong 
negative short-term market reaction to the publication of a GCM audit report. The 
BM ratio is defined as in section 4.3.2. 
6. Momentum (MOM): This is the other variable related to firms’ returns (e.g., 
DeBondt and Thaler, 1985, 1987; Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993; 2001). Momentum 
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controls for pre-GCM stock returns and is defined as in section 5.2.1.1. Given that 
market expectations of a GCM audit report are likely to be lower for firms with 
positive prior returns, I expect firms with positive momentum to be more likely to 
experience a strong negative short-term market reaction to the GCM 
announcement. 
7. Return on assets ratio (ROA): This variable proxies for firm economic performance 
and is computed as in section 5.2.4. Considering that market expectations of a 
GCM are likely to be higher for firms with negative profitability, I expect 
profitable firms to be more likely to experience a strong negative short-term 
market reaction to the GCM announcement. 
8. Altman’s (1968) z-score (ZSCORE): This variable proxies for bankruptcy risk and 
is computed as section 5.2.1.3. Considering that higher z-scores are associated with 
lower distress risk, the market expectations of a GCM audit report are likely to be 
higher for firms with lower z-scores. As such, I expect firms with higher z-scores 
(lower distress risk) to be more likely to experience a strong negative short-term 
market reaction to the GCM announcement. 
9. Probability of a GCM audit report (PREDGC): This variable proxies for market 
expectations of a forthcoming GCM audit report and is computed as in section 
6.3.1.2. The importance of this variable is related to the finding that the short-term 
market reaction to the publication of a GCM announcement depends on the 
likelihood of such an announcement (e.g., Fleak and Wilson, 1994, Jones, 1996). I 
expect firms with higher PREDGC scores (lower distress risk) to be more likely to 
experience a strong negative short-term market reaction to the GCM 
announcement. 
- 181 - 
10. Leverage (LEV): This variable proxies for default risk and is defined as in section 
5.2.4. Given that higher distress risk is associated with higher LEV ratios, the 
market expectations of a GCM audit report are likely to be higher for firms with 
low distress risk. Consequently, I expect firms with higher LEV ratios (high 
default risk) to be less likely to experience a strong negative short-term market 
reaction to the GCM announcement. 
11. Standardized unexpected earnings (SUE): This variable controls for earnings 
surprises and is defined as in section 6.3.1.2. Positive earnings surprises are 
expected to mitigate the impact of a GCM announcement, as I have previously 
shown in my univariate analysis. As such, I expect firms with positive earnings 
surprises to be less likely to experience a strong negative short-term market 
reaction to the publication of a GCM audit report.  
 
Table 6.8. provides the correlation between all variables mentioned above. As can be seen, 
there is a negative and significant correlation between SNCAR and CONFORM (Pearson 
correlation= -0.072, p-value=0.0283; Spearman rank correlation = -0.072, p-value=0.0283) 
and a positive and significant correlation between SNCAR and NONCONFORM (Pearson 
correlation= 0.098, p-value=0.0028; Spearman rank correlation = 0.098, p-value=0.0028). 
This suggests that firms for which their average reported recommendation is classified as 
“conforming” are inversely associated with strong negative abnormal returns surrounding 
the GCM date whereas firms for which their average reported recommendation is 
classified as “nonconforming” are associated with strong negative abnormal returns 
surrounding the GCM date. Although the correlation between my independent variables 
are in many cases lower than 20%, suggesting that variables are not strongly correlated, as 
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expected, LOGSIZE is highly correlated with ANALY (Pearson correlation= 0.609; 
Spearman rank correlation = 0.578, p-value<0.0001), also NONCONFORM and LOGSIZE 
and NONCONFORM and ANALY are similarly highly correlated, reflecting larger firms 
being better covered by analysts. To ensure the robustness of my results, I re-run the 
regression model defined in equation 6.4. excluding the independent variables that are 
highly correlated with the significant ones  and use a stepwise technique to estimate the 
regression. 
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TABLE 6.8. 
Pearson and Spearman correlations: Equation 6.4. Variables 
 
This table provides the Pearson (Spearman rank) correlation above (below) the diagonal between all variables used to estimate equation 6.4. for GCM firms. The two-tailed p-
value is provided in parenthesis below the correlation. GCM companies are my sample of 924 non-finance, non-utility industry firms listed on the NYSE, AMEX or NASDAQ, 
for which their auditors disclose a going-concern modified audit report for the first-time between 01.01.1994 and 31.12.2005.  
Dummy variable SNCAR=1 if the firm’s abnormal returns for the (-1,+1) trading period are in the bottom 33.3% performers within my sample firms; Dummy variable 
CONFORM=1 if the firm’s average reported recommendations within the 6-month period before the GCM date is classified as “conforming”, i.e., “underperform” or “sell” 
recommendation, and 0 otherwise; Dummy variable NONCONFORM= 1 if the firm’s average reported recommendations within the 6-month period before the GCM date is 
classified as “nonconforming”, i.e., “hold”, “buy” or “strong buy” recommendation, and 0 otherwise; LOGSIZE=natural log of market capitalization measured one year before 
the GCM announcement date; ANALY=number of analysts following the firm in quarter -4; BM= book value of equity divided by market capitalization, where book value of 
equity is taken from the last annual accounts reported prior to the date used to calculate the market capitalization at one year before the GCM announcement date; 
MOM=monthly average of prior 11 month (t-12 to t-2) raw returns; ROA=return on assets (net income/total assets); CR=current ratio (current assets/current liabilities); 
ZSCORE=financial distress measure computed as Altman (1968); PREDGC=probability of a forthcoming GCM audit report disclosure computed as Mutchler (1985); LEV=total 
debt/total assets. SUE=( ΔNIq / |NIq|), where ΔNIq is the quarterly earnings change computed as the difference between the quarterly income before extraordinary items (NIq) 
and the quarterly income before extraordinary items in the previous year (NIq-4). All variables are computed with data taken from the last annual financial accounts reported 
before the GCM date. 
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SNCAR CONFORM NONCONF LOGSIZE ANALY BM MOM ROA ZSCORE PREDGC LEV SUE
SNCAR -0.072 0.098 0.123 0.097 -0.044 -0.069 -0.006 0.071 0.038 -0.018 -0.025
(0.0283) (0.0028) (0.0002) (0.0033) (0.1846) (0.0348) (0.8631) (0.0302) (0.2525) (0.5851) (0.4485)
CONFORM -0.072 -0.078 0.109 0.118 0.015 -0.091 -0.006 -0.010 0.003 -0.008 0.193
(0.0283) (0.0176) (0.0009) (0.0003) (0.6546) (0.0058) (0.8511) (0.7567) (0.9160) (0.8036) (<0.0001)
NONCONF. 0.098 -0.078 0.448 0.530 -0.054 -0.133 -0.022 -0.045 -0.003 0.013 -0.021
(0.0028) (0.0176) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.1041) (<0.0001) (0.4958) (0.1720) (0.9272) (0.6959) (0.5102)
LOGSIZE 0.114 0.126 0.411 0.609 -0.190 -0.337 -0.095 -0.096 -0.006 0.006 0.032
(0.0005) (0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.0038) (0.0036) (0.8570) (0.8645) (0.3332)
ANALY 0.090 0.183 0.532 0.578 0.009 -0.175 -0.062 -0.070 0.051 0.016 0.061
(0.0061) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.7749) (<0.0001) (0.0608) (0.0323) (0.1219) (0.6217) (0.0627)
BM -0.028 0.039 -0.094 -0.312 0.040 0.036 0.004 0.033 0.022 -0.023 0.008
(0.3992) (0.2387) (0.0044) (<0.0001) (0.2223) (0.2734) (0.8958) (0.3193) (0.5101) (0.4799) (0.8180)
MOM -0.056 -0.111 -0.106 -0.331 -0.174 0.107 0.123 -0.004 0.007 -0.019 0.027
(0.0863) (0.0007) (0.0013) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.0011) (0.0002) (0.9122) (0.8328) (0.5734) (0.4079)
ROA -0.043 0.003 -0.006 -0.130 -0.049 0.246 0.171 -0.010 0.105 -0.052 0.008
(0.1906) (0.9253) (0.8554) (<0.0001) (0.1373) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.7570) (0.0014) (0.1170) (0.8106)
ZSCORE 0.001 -0.016 -0.105 -0.183 -0.104 0.136 0.028 0.223 0.248 -0.011 -0.025
(0.9627) (0.6328) (0.0014) (<0.0001) (0.0016) (<0.0001) (0.3981) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.7388) (0.4487)
PREDGC 0.002 -0.012 0.032 -0.102 0.032 0.254 0.101 0.416 0.374 -0.053 0.001
(0.9490) (0.7176) (0.3332) (0.0018) (0.3265) (<0.0001) (0.0021) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.1057) (0.9769)
LEV -0.032 -0.001 -0.027 -0.062 -0.072 -0.025 -0.007 0.180 -0.081 -0.545 0.015
(0.3230) (0.9759) (0.4176) (0.0590) (0.0288) (0.4513) (0.8206) (<0.0001) (0.0136) (<0.0001) (0.6551)
SUE -0.043 -0.011 -0.042 -0.086 -0.052 -0.019 -0.010 -0.310 -0.111 -0.122 -0.111
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I use only two dummy variables (CONFORM and NONCONFORM) to distinguish 
between three cases: 1) a firm with no analyst coverage; 2) a covered firm receiving a 
“conforming” recommendation; 3) a covered firm receiving a “nonconforming” 
recommendation. This procedure avoids the case of perfect collinearity by defining a 
category for which no dummy variable is assigned, known as the “base” category 
(Gujarati, 2003). In my regression, the “base” category is that for which firms have no 
analyst following (i.e., when CONFORM=0 and NONCONFORM=0). Importantly, because 
I have two dummies to discriminate between three complementary cases, the intercept has 
a particular meaning. To be precise, positive (negative) and statistically significant 
estimates of the intercept indicate that no analyst coverage increases (decreases) the 
likelihood of a firm experiencing a strong negative abnormal return with the publication of 
a GCM audit report. 
Table 6.9. summarizes my results, which are highly significant (Wald x2 = 32.60, p-
value=0.0006). I find that the model’s intercept is negative and highly significant, 
suggesting that, ceteris paribus, firms with no analyst coverage are less likely to experience 
a strong negative short-term market reaction to the GCM announcement controlling for all 
other factors. Moreover, the CONFORM variable is also negative and significant at the 5% 
level, suggesting that firms receiving “conforming” recommendations, i.e., “sell” and 
“underperform” ratings have a reduced likelihood of experiencing a strong negative short-
term abnormal reaction to the GCM event. I find two additional independent variables 
significant at the 10% level. The negative (positive) coefficient associated with the MOM 
(ZSCORE) variable suggests that firms with lower past performance (higher ZSCORE, i.e., 
lower distress risk) are more likely to experience a strong negative short-term market 
reaction to the GCM announcement. None of the remaining variables are statistically 
significant at conventional levels. Importantly, I find that my results are robust after re-
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running the model excluding the independent variables more correlated with the 
significant ones and using the stepwise technique to estimate the regression. 
In order to ensure the robustness of my results, I re-estimate equation 6.4. using different 
thresholds to define the worse performing firms. Specifically, in sequential rounds, firms 
in the bottom 10%, 20%, 30%, 40% and 50% by 3-day CAR, are classified in the “strong 
negative abnormal reaction” portfolio. I then run distinct regressions only to find that the 
intercept is highly significant for all them and that the signals associated with the 
coefficients are robust as well as their significance. 
Overall, multivariate results confirm my previous conclusion that analyst coverage, in 
general terms, amplifies the “surprise” associated with the publication of a GCM audit 
report. However, when the average analyst recommendation operates in the right 
direction (“conforming” recommendation), analysts reduce the likelihood of a firm 
experiencing a strong negative short-term market reaction to the publication of a GCM 
audit report. Hence, I reject null hypothesis H11. 
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Table 6.9.  
Logistic Regression Model Estimating the Probability of a Firm Experiencing a 
Strong Negative Short-term Market Reaction to the Publication of a GCM Audit 
Report 
 
This table presents the results of a binary logistic regression model estimating the probability of a 
GCM firm experiencing a strong negative abnormal reaction for the (-1,+1) trading period centred on 
the GCM event date. The GCM companies are my sample of 924 non-finance, non-utility industry 
firms listed on the NYSE, AMEX or NASDAQ, for which their auditors disclose a going-concern 
modified audit report for the first-time between 01.01.1994.  
The binary logistic regression model is defined in equation 6.4. The binary dependent variable 
(SNCAR) is computed as follows. First, I compute the 3-day abnormal returns (CAR(-1,+1)) centred on 
the GCM event date. Firms are ranked accordingly to their 3-day abnormal returns and divided into 
two groups. The worst 33.3% returns are classified as 1, and 0 otherwise. Eleven independent 
variables are employed to estimate equation 6.4.: Dummy variable CONFORM=1 if the firm’s 
average reported recommendations within the 6-month period before the GCM date is classified as 
“conforming”, i.e., “underperform” or “sell” recommendation, and 0 otherwise; Dummy variable 
NONCONFORM= 1 if the firm’s average reported recommendations within the 6-month period 
before the GCM date is classified as “nonconforming”, i.e., “hold”, “buy” or “strong buy” 
recommendation, and 0 otherwise; LOGSIZE=natural log of market capitalization measured one year 
before the GCM announcement date; ANALY=number of analysts following the firm in quarter -4; 
BM= book value of equity divided by market capitalization, where book value of equity is taken 
from the last annual accounts reported prior to the date used to calculate the market capitalization at 
one year before the GCM announcement date; MOM=monthly average of prior 11 month (t-12 to t-2) 
raw returns; ROA=return on assets (net income/total assets); CR = current ratio (current 
assets/current liabilities); ZSCORE=financial distress measure computed as Altman (1968); 
PREDGC=probability of a forthcoming GCM audit report disclosure computed as Mutchler (1985); 
LEV=total debt/total assets. SUE=( ΔNIq / |NIq|), where ΔNIq is the quarterly earnings change 
computed as the difference between the quarterly income before extraordinary items (NIq) and the 
quarterly income before extraordinary items in the previous year (NIq-4). All variables are computed 





Predictor Expected sign Coefficient Wald p-value
Intercept - -1.27 20.96 <0.0001
CONFORM - -1.51 5.65 0.0175
NONCONFORM + 0.08 0.13 0.7175
LOGSIZE + 0.12 2.60 0.1071
ANALY + 0.03 1.97 0.1600
BM + -0.02 0.22 0.6427
MOM + -1.84 3.27 0.0708
ROA + -0.00 0.00 0.9827
ZSCORE + 0.10 3.79 0.0517
PREDGC + -0.00 0.58 0.4449
LEV - -0.31 2.44 0.1186
SUE - -0.00 0.15 0.6983
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6.4. Summary and discussion 
This chapter investigates the role of security analysts in providing investors with value-
relevant information before the publication of a first-time GCM audit report. I use an 
event-time approach to test whether pre-GCM analyst coverage is related to the short-term 
market reaction of such a major accounting event. I additionally control my results for a 
number of firm characteristics (size, momentum, financial distress, GCM probability and 
earnings surprises), previous recommendation ratings and reporting environment. 
My results suggest that pre-GCM analyst coverage does not facilitate investors’ 
recognition of going-concern problems. In particular, I show that the short-term market 
reaction to the publication of a GCM audit report is significantly more adverse for firms 
with analyst coverage, suggesting that analyst activity increases the “surprise” associated 
with the publication of a GCM audit report. These results suggest that, despite analyst 
recommendations become relatively more pessimistic for GCM firms than for similar non-
GCM firms as the GCM date approaches, investors do not recognize an average “hold” 
recommendation as an unfavourable message even considering that it represents a 
downgrade from a previous “buy” rating.  
Consistent with the notion that security analysts may temporarily delay the incorporation 
of negative information in stock prices (Jegadeesh et al., 2004), I find that the differences in 
the short-term market reaction to the GCM announcement between covered and non-
covered firms are particularly evident for firms where other negative signals are clearer 
(negative momentum, high distress risk, high GCM probability). A more detailed analysis 
shows that the usefulness of analyst recommendations to investors depends on the 
direction of such information. When analyst recommendations are consistent with the 
forthcoming GCM (i.e., when they issue “underperform” or “sell” recommendations), they 
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facilitate the incorporation of other unfavourable signals, thus reduce the “surprise” 
associated with the publication of a GCM audit report. When analyst recommendations 
are inconsistent with the forthcoming GCM (i.e., when they issue “strong buy”, “buy” or 
“hold” recommendations), they delay the incorporation of other unfavourable signals, 
thus increase the “surprise” associated with the publication of a GCM audit report. 
Importantly, the percentage of firms where analyst average recommendation is classified 
as “conforming” is reduced explaining why the overall short-term market reaction is 
significantly more negative for firms with analyst coverage than firms with no analyst 
coverage. 
My results help to understand the SEC concerns about investors relying solely on analyst 
recommendations when buying or selling a stock. In one of their online publications 
aiming at protecting investors, the SEC is particularly clear when discussing analyst stock 
recommendations:53 “We advise all investors to do their homework before investing. If you 
purchase a security solely because analyst said the company was one of his or her ‘stock picks’, you 
may be doing yourself a disservice. Especially if the company is one you’ve never heard of (…) 
Above all, remember that even the soundest recommendation from the most trust-worthy analyst 
may not be a good choice for you. That’s one reason we caution investors never to rely solely on 
analyst’s recommendations when buying or selling a stock.”  
This chapter also shows that the significantly more negative short-term market reaction for 
firms with analyst coverage is an exclusive phenomenon of the pre-NASD 2711 period. In 
fact, after the implementation of this new regulatory regime, the significant differences in 
the short-term between covered and non-covered firms become statistically insignificant. 
This suggests that more pessimistic pre-GCM recommendations and the additional 
                                                 
 
53 See http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/analysts.htm for details. 
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information that analysts are required to disclose following the implementation of the 
regulatory changes provide investors with better information to access analysts’ research 
in the GCM audit report context. 
The next chapter provides additional evidence on the value-relevance of analyst activity in 
the GCM audit report domain. In particular, I investigate the relationship between post-
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CHAPTER 7 




In three recent studies, Taffler, Lu, and Kausar (2004), Ogneva and Subramanyam (2007) 
and Kausar, Taffler, and Tan (forthcoming) discuss the market reaction to the publication 
of a GCM audit report. Taffler, Lu, and Kausar (2004) demonstrate that the U.K. market 
takes time to assimilate the publication of such a bad news event whereas Ogneva and 
Subramanyam (2007) find no abnormal reaction following the GCM announcement for the 
U.S. and Australian markets. However, using a hand collected sample from the EDGAR 
database, appropriate adjustment for outliers and a correct treatment of post-delisting 
returns, Kausar, Taffler, and Tan (forthcoming) show that the market underreaction to the 
first-time GCM audit report is a robust phenomenon in the U.S., suggesting that Ogneva’s 
and Subramanyam (2007) conclusions are due to the use of a biased sample and 
methodological problems. 
Previous studies have also discussed the reasons for the incomplete market reaction to 
new information. In broad terms, these studies share a common idea: investors are slow in 
adjusting their expectations when receiving new information (Bernard and Thomas, 1989; 
Barberis, Schleifer, and Vishny, 1998; Hong and Stein, 1999). For instance, Bernard and 
Thomas (1989) argue in favour of investors’ delayed responses, Barberis, Schleifer, and 
Vishny (1998), in their model of investor sentiment, suggest that conservatism plays an 
important role in the underreaction phenomenon whilst Hong and Stein (1999) claim that 
- 192 - 
underreaction is due to firm-specific information diffusing gradually across the investing 
public. 
The role of security analysts in the incomplete market reaction to new information has also 
been explored in the literature. In fact, there are reasons to believe that security analysts 
may play an important role in mitigating the phenomenon of incomplete market reaction 
to new information. In particular, there is evidence that analysts’ opinions have the ability 
to move stock prices (e.g., Stickel, 1991; Stickel, 1995; Womack, 1996; Park and Stice, 2000; 
Ryan and Taffler, 2006). Moreover, the research shows that analyst coverage reduces 
information uncertainty and has a positive impact on the speed with which the market 
assimilates new information (e.g., Brennan, Jegadeesh, and Swaminathan, 1993; Walther, 
1997; Bhattacharya, 2001; Elgers, Lo, and Jr, 2001; Gleason and Lee, 2003, Zhang, 
forthcoming). 
The literature highlights the importance of security analysts in the functioning of financial 
markets. For instance, Brennan, Jegadeesh, and Swaminathan (1993) find that the market’s 
reaction to common information is faster for firms with higher levels of analyst coverage. 
Bhattacharya (2001) suggests that the post-earnings drift is stronger for firms with low-to-
moderate analyst coverage and Zhang (forthcoming) shows that the post-earnings drift 
decreases as the percentage of responsive analysts following the firm increases. Gleason 
and Lee (2003) find that the post-analyst forecast revision drift is lower for companies with 
higher levels of analyst coverage. These results are consistent with the recent findings of 
Jiang, Lee, and Zhang (2005) and Zhang (2006), who find that the incomplete market 
reaction is particularly strong for companies with greater information uncertainty. 
In this chapter, I evaluate the role of security analysts in the medium-term market reaction 
to the publication of a GCM audit report. In fact, despite the evidence that the market 
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takes time to incorporate the publication of a GCM audit report (e.g., Taffler, Lu, and 
Kausar, 2004; Kausar, Taffler, and Tan, forthcoming) and that analysts promote market 
efficiency, no study to date explores directly how security analysts affect the efficiency 
with which the market processes this accounting disclosure. 
This chapter also explores if analysts engage in self-selecting activities in the going-concern 
domain. The self-selection bias is the tendency of analysts to report on stocks about which 
they have favourable views and to avoid reporting on stocks about which they have 
unfavourable views (e.g., McNichols and O’Brien, 1997; Das, Guo, and Zhang, 2006). 
Investigating whether the analyst’s decision to cover a firm following the publication of a 
GCM audit report depends on its post-GCM return performance provides original 
evidence about analyst self-selection bias in the bad news domain. 
The chapter is organised as follows: section 2 describes the data and methodology. Section 
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7.2. Data and methodology 
The main purpose of this chapter is to evaluate the role of security analysts in the medium-
term market reaction to the publication of a GCM audit report. Similarly to the previous 
chapter, I compare the post-GCM stock price performance conditional on post-event 
analyst coverage. Once again, the definition of analyst coverage and the computation of 
abnormal returns are key issues. The data used in this chapter is from three sources: 
security analyst data is taken from the I/B/E/S/ Recommendations – Detailed File, whereas 
the market and accounting data are collected from CRSP and COMPUSTAT, respectively. 
 
7.2.1. Defining analyst coverage 
There are two common methods to define analyst coverage. The first uses the number of 
analysts following a firm in a given period. For instance, Elgers, Lo, and Jr (2001) and 
Gleason and Lee (2003) allocate firms to the high (low) coverage category if the number of 
analysts following is above (below) the sample’s median. The second method uses a 
measure of residual analyst coverage as an alternative to the raw number of analysts 
following the firm (Hong, Lim, and Stein, 2000; Das, Guo, and Zhang, 2006). This method 
aims at controlling the influence of firms’ specific characteristics such as size, BM, market 
index or industry in the number of analysts following a firm. 
However, in my thesis, I use the raw number of analysts following a firm since my sample 
firms have either no analyst coverage or very limited coverage, a fact that is especially 
clear after the GCM announcement date. This makes it almost impossible to distinguish 
between levels of analyst coverage. As such, the use of residual analyst coverage would 
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not be meaningful given little the variation in analyst coverage that occurs with my sample 
firms.54 
Analyst coverage is defined as follows. I allocate each of my 924 first-time GCM firms to 
the “analyst coverage” portfolio if there is at least one new recommendation or a new 
annual EPS forecast following the GCM announcement date. All the remaining companies 
are allocated to the “no analyst coverage” portfolio. The post-GCM window used to define 
a company as covered depends on the empirical test. Importantly, in this chapter, I work 
exclusively with reported recommendations to ensure that firms classified as covered are 
confined to those for which analysts issue new opinions following the GCM audit report, 
i.e., when it is already publicly known.  
 
7.2.2. Computing medium-term abnormal returns 
I investigate the medium-term stock market reaction to the publication of a first-time GCM 
audit report using the buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR) methodology. I use this 
approach as an alternative to cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) since the literature 
advocates BHARs as the best method to measure medium and long-term performance. For 
instance, Barber and Lyon (1997) show that BHARs accurately represent investors’ long 
term experience. These authors also advocate the use of BHARs over CARs since this 
second method is a biased predictor of BHARs. In addition, recent event studies exploring 
a similar context also use BHARs to measure stock price medium-term performance (e.g., 
Ogneva and Subramanyam, 2007; Kausar, Taffler, and Tan, forthcoming). 
                                                 
 
54 Hong et al. (2000) ignore the bottom quintile of firms by size in their residual analyst coverage regressions 
given that only 18% of these companies are followed by analysts.  
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I use a single control firm approach to compute my medium-term abnormal returns.55 
Barber and Lyon (1997) argue that, contrary to reference portfolios, the control firm 
approach eliminates the new listing bias, the rebalancing bias and the skewness problem. 
In fact, this procedure ensures that both sample and control firm are listed in the event 
month, that both sample and control firm returns are calculated without rebalancing and 
that both firms are equally likely to experience large positive or negative returns. 
Additionally, Ang and Zhang (2004) suggest that reference portfolios may not provide a 
good estimate of expected firm return since the event firm may not be near the centroid of 
the respective control portfolio, a problem that I overcome with the single firm method. 





BHAR = [1+ R ]- [1+ E(R )]∏ ∏  (7.1) 
 
As explained above, the expected return E(Rit) is given by the return of a similar non-GCM 
firm. Following Barber and Lyon (1997), sample firms are matched to a control firm on the 
basis of specific firm characteristics. As recommended by these authors, I use size and BM 
ratio in my main results. The matching procedure is described in section 4.3.2. Considering 
                                                 
 
55 Long-horizons studies require extreme caution since existing methods still have serious limitations (Kothari 
and Warner, 2007). There are several critical issues in evaluating long-term stock return performance, which 
include risk adjustment, the aggregation of security-specific abnormal returns and the calibration of the statistical 
significance of abnormal returns (Kothari and Warner, 2007). Long-run abnormal return measurement problems 
using BHARs usually occur in a 3-5 year time horizon (e.g., Kothari and Warner, 1997; Barber and Lyon 1997). 
Nevertheless, in my thesis, I restrict my BHAR calculation to a one-year period in a similar approach to Taffler et 
al. (2004), Ogneva and Subramanyam (2007) and Kausar, Taffler, and Tan (forthcoming). This is due to two 
fundamental reasons: 1) there is a significant percentage of firms delisted in the year following the GCM date; 2) 
some of the GCM firms have their GCM audit report withdrawn in the subsequent fiscal year. 
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that controlling for size and BM ratio alone does not guarantee well-specified test statistics 
(Lyon, Barber, and Tsai, 1999), I also use different matched samples based on alternative 
characteristics (pre-event momentum, industry or distress risk). Alternative control 
samples are defined as in section 5.2.1. 
The individual abnormal returns for each of my sample firms are then averaged using an 
equally weighted strategy. I use equally weighted returns in preference to value-weighted 
returns to avoid problems related to the small average size of my sample. According to 
Loughran and Ritter (2000), value-weighted returns result in low power to detect 
abnormal performance due to large standard errors and low t-statistics. Therefore, mean 
abnormal returns are given by the average of the buy-and-hold abnormal returns, wherein 







= ∑  (7.2) 
 
where BHARit is defined as above. 
I also estimate buy-and-hold raw returns (BHRR) to corroborate the results obtained with 
the BHAR methodology. According to Kausar, Taffler, and Tan (forthcoming), this method 
is viewed as a more stringent test of market mispricing that may help to highlight mis-
measurement problems associated with my various expected return proxies. BHRRs are 
calculated as follows: 
 




BHRR = [1+ R ]-1∏  
(7.3) 
 
For the same reasons discussed with BHARs, I also average individual BHRRs using an 







= ∑  (7.4) 
 
I compute both BHARs and BHRRs using daily returns since they allow a more precise 
measurement of abnormal returns (Kothari and Warner, 2007). BHARs and BHRRs are 
computed over different periods starting from trading day a to trading day b relative to 
the event date. The event date is defined as the GCM announcement date taken from the 
SEC-EDGAR database. 
As table 3.3. shows, 45.7% of my companies are delisted in the one year period following 
the GCM announcement date. Drawing on Shumway (1997) and Shumway and Warther 
(1999), I include the delisting return in the calculation of compounded returns each time a 
firm is delisted. Moreover, I assume zero abnormal returns in the post-delisting period as 
in Kausar, Taffler, and Tan (forthcoming). As these authors argue, this method minimizes 
the reinvestment bias, allowing better estimates of abnormal returns for their sample of 
GCM firms. 
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I also winzorize the extreme values at the first (99th) percentile of both tails of the BHAR 
distribution.56 I use the parametric t-test to verify the significance of the mean BHARs and 
the non-parametric Wilcoxon signed rank-test and sign-test to examine the significance of 
the median abnormal returns and if the number of negative BHARs differs to the number 
of positive BHARs, respectively. 
 
7.3. Results  
7.3.1. Revisiting medium-term market reaction to the first-time GCM 
audit report 
In this section, I visit the medium-term market reaction to the GCM announcement 
employing a control firm approach based on size and BM ratio to compute abnormal 
returns. In addition, I explore the medium-term market reaction conditional on firms’ 
characteristics to evaluate the existence of possible “correlated omitted variables” (Dichev 
and Piotroski, 2001). 
 
7.3.1.1. Initial evidence 
Table 7.1. reports mean and median post-GCM BHARs from trading day +2 over the 
following 252 trading days subsequent to the GCM date. As can be seen, first-time GCM 
audit report disclosures are followed by substantial negative abnormal returns. For 
instance, the mean (median) BHARs(+2,+126) are -13.2% (-21.1%) whereas for the (+2, +252) 
window, results are -17.4% (-30.2%) consistent with Kausar, Taffler, and Tan 
(forthcoming). More importantly, both parametric and nonparametric tests show that the 
                                                 
 
56 The non-winsorized results are not significantly different from the winsorized results. 
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BHARs are highly significant at the 1% level or better for all the post-event windows. The 
results of the sign test indicate that the number of negative BHARs is significantly greater 
than the number of positive BHARs. Interestingly, the corresponding median BHARs are 
systematically more negative than the mean BHARs, suggesting that extreme observations 
are more concentrated in the positive side. Overall, my results are in line with those of 
Taffler, Lu, and Kausar (2004) and Kausar, Taffler, and Tan (forthcoming), who conclude 
that the market underreacts to the publication of a GCM audit report. 
 
Table 7.1.  
Medium-term Market Reaction to the First-Time GCM Audit Report 
 
This table presents the buy-and-hold abnormal returns for my sample of 924 non-finance, non-utility 
industry firms listed on the NYSE, AMEX or NASDAQ, for which their auditors disclose a going-
concern modified audit report for the first-time between 01.01.1994 and 31.12.2005. The abnormal 
returns are computed in trading days, from trading day +2 over the following 250 trading days, 
where trading day t=0 is the GCM announcement day taken from the SEC-EDGAR database. Returns 
earned by delisted firms are assumed to have zero abnormal returns in the post-delisting period. The 
BHARs are computed employing the control firm approach based on size and BM. Specifically, each 
of my 924 first-time GCM companies is matched with that non-finance, non-utility, non-GCM firm 
listed on the NYSE, AMEX or NASDAQ with market value of equity between 70% and 130% of that 
of the sample firm. The control firm is then selected as that firm with BM ratio closest to that of the 
sample firm. The two-tailed significance of the t-test (Wilcoxon signed rank-test) is reported in 
parentheses below the mean (median) BHAR. The number of positive (negative) BHARs is shown in 
the positive (negative) column, whereas the significance of the sign test is reported in parentheses. 
 










551(+2,+252) 35% 65% (<0.0001)
(+2,+189) 36% 64% 580
712
(<0.0001)
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7.3.1.2. Controlling for GCM firm characteristics 
I now investigate if the underreaction phenomenon is a result of some other variable that 
is correlated with future returns. I address this issue as in section 6.3.1.2., controlling my 
results for size, momentum, distress risk, GCM probability and earnings surprise. 
Table 7.2. summarizes my results. Panel A reports the results of the portfolios of small and 
large GCM firms. Generally, I find that the market does not immediately incorporate the 
information conveyed by the GCM audit report for both small and large firms. In fact, with 
the exception of the 12-month mean BHAR for the portfolio of large firms, mean and 
median abnormal returns are negative and highly significant. Moreover, both parametric 
and nonparametric tests suggest that the differences in the mean and median BHARs 
between “small firms” and “large firms” are not significant at conventional levels. As such, 
I find that market mispricing is not more concentrated amongst small firms. 
Panel B of table 7.2. reports separate results for the post-GCM return performance of firms 
conditional on pre-event momentum. Generally, I find that, overall, the negative market 
reaction to the publication of a GCM audit report does not depend on firms’ prior raw 
returns since mean and median BHARs are significant at the conventional levels for both 
portfolios for all post-event periods. Moreover, the differences between BHARs are not 
significantly different with the exception of the shorter post-GCM window. In fact, 3-
month BHARs for the “positive momentum” portfolio are significantly more negative than 
for the “negative momentum” portfolio. In particular, mean (median) BHARs are -16.0% (-
16.4%) for “positive momentum” portfolio and -5.5% (-12.1%) for “negative momentum” 
portfolio, with the mean (median) differences significant at the 5% (10%) level. These 
results can be explained by the higher surprise with which the market receives a GCM 
audit report for firms with positive pre-event raw returns. To ensure that market abnormal 
- 202 - 
reaction to the GCM announcement is not due to the omission of this risk factor 
(momentum), I compute BHARs using the control firm approach based on size and 
momentum as in section 5.2.2.1. Results are materially the same. 
In Panel C (Panel D) of table 7.2., I present the abnormal returns for the GCM companies 
conditional on firm distress risk (GCM probability). Companies with z-scores <=1.81 
(>1.81) are allocated to the high (low) distress risk portfolio. Similarly, companies with 
PREDGC <=0.01 (>0.01) are classified as high (low) GCM probability cases. Generally, both 
Panel C and D show that the incomplete market reaction to the GCM announcement is not 
sensitive to either of these characteristics. Importantly, both parametric and nonparametric 
tests show that differences in the mean and median BHARs are not significant between 
portfolios of firms conditional on their z-score and PREDGC. Using a similar approach to 
ensure that my results are not due to the omission of this risk factor (z-score), I compute 
BHARs using the control firm approach based on size and financial distress as in section 
5.2.1.3. Once again, results are materially the same. 
Panel E of table 7.2. shows separate results for the portfolios of firms with positive and 
negative earnings surprises as in section 6.3.1.2. I find a negative and highly significant 
abnormal reaction to the publication of a GCM audit report for the “negative earnings 
surprise” portfolio for all post-GCM windows considered. However, for the portfolio of 
“positive earnings surprise”, results are mixed. As can be seen, mean BHARs are not 
significant whereas median BHARs are significant at the 10% level. More important, I 
show that the abnormal returns for the “negative earnings surprise” portfolio are 
significantly more negative than the “positive earnings surprise” portfolio. For instance, 
the 12- month mean (median) BHARs are -39.1% (-38.9%) for firms with negative earnings 
surprise and 11.3% (-12.5%) for firms with positive earnings surprise, with mean and 
median differences between the portfolios significant at the 1% level. As such, this 
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indicates that earnings surprises are important in explaining post-GCM returns and that 
negative abnormal reaction to the GCM event is concentrated in the negative earnings 
surprise firms. 
In short, I find that the incomplete market reaction to the GCM announcement is a robust 
phenomenon. In addition, I show that negative abnormal market reaction to the GCM 
event is concentrated in firms associated with negative earnings surprise. Hence, I 
conclude that the market does not immediately incorporate the information conveyed by 
the GCM announcement, supporting Taffler, Lu, and Kausar (2004) and Kausar, Taffler, 
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Table 7.2.  
Medium-term Market Reaction to the First-Time GCM Audit Report  - 
Controlling for Firm Characteristics 
 
This table presents the buy-and-hold abnormal returns for my population of 924 non-finance, non-
utility industry firms listed on the NYSE, AMEX or NASDAQ, for which their auditors disclose a 
going-concern modified audit report for the first-time between 01.01.1994 and 31.12.2005. The 
abnormal returns are computed in trading days, from trading day +2 over the following 250 trading 
days, where trading day t=0 is the GCM announcement day taken from the SEC-EDGAR database. 
Returns earned by delisted firms are assumed to have zero abnormal returns in the post-delisting 
period. The BHARs are computed employing the control firm approach based on size and BM. 
Specifically, each of my 924 first-time GCM companies is matched with that non-finance, non-utility, 
non-GCM firm listed on the NYSE, AMEX or NASDAQ with market value of equity between 70% 
and 130% of that of the sample firm. The control firm is then selected as that firm with BM ratio 
closest to that of the sample firm. The two-tailed significance of the t-test (Wilcoxon signed rank-test) 
is reported in parentheses below the mean (median) BHAR. The last two columns of each panel 
report the mean and median differences between the BHARs of each portfolio under analysis. The 
significance of the t-test (Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test) is showed in brackets below the mean 
(median) differences. 
Panel A provides separate results for the portfolio of 462 (462) GCM companies with market 
capitalization below (above) the sample median ($33.7m). Market capitalization is calculated one 
year before the GCM date. Panel B reports separate results for the portfolio of 235 (689) GCM 
companies with positive (negative) pre-event momentum. Momentum is defined as the average 
monthly raw returns for the prior 11-month period (t-12 to t-2) relative to the GCM announcement 
month. Panel C provides separate results for the portfolio of 775 (149) GCM companies with z-score 
<=1.81 (>1.81). Z-score is computed following Altman’s (1968) model using the accounting 
information from the fiscal year ending one year before the GCM announcement date. Panel D 
reports separate results for the portfolio of 454 (470) GCM companies where PREDGC is <=0.01 
(>0.01), defined as minimum cut-off score by Fleak and Wilson (1994). Panel E provides separate 
results for the portfolio of 528 (396) GCM companies where SUE is negative (positive). SUE=( ΔNIq / 
|NIq|), where ΔNIq is the quarterly earnings change computed as the difference between the 
quarterly income before extraordinary items (NIq) and the quarterly income before extraordinary 
items in the previous year (NIq-4).  
 
 
Panel A: Post-GCM announcement BHARs conditional on firm size 
Period Mean Median Listed Mean Median Listed Mean Median
(trading days) BHAR BHAR Firms BHAR BHAR Firms BHAR BHAR
-0.095 -0.160 -0.069 -0.115 -0.026 -0.045
(0.0033) (<0.0001) (0.0269) (<0.0001) (0.5686) (0.5087)
-0.157 -0.216 -0.099 -0.205 -0.058 -0.011
(0.0008) (<0.0001) (0.0345) (<0.0001) (0.3766) (0.3327)
-0.217 -0.263 -0.104 -0.216 -0.113 -0.047
(0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.0556) (<0.0001) (0.1494) (0.2626)
-0.247 -0.306 -0.108 -0.293 -0.139 -0.013
(0.0004) (<0.0001) (0.1612) (<0.0001) (0.1800) (0.3550)












Panel B: Post-GCM announcement BHARs conditional on firm momentum 
Period Mean Median Listed Mean Median Listed Mean Median
(trading days) BHAR BHAR Firms BHAR BHAR Firms BHAR BHAR
-0.055 -0.121 -0.160 -0.164 0.105 0.043
(0.0357) (<0.0001) (0.0002) (<0.0001) (0.0356) (0.0653)
-0.089 -0.220 -0.233 -0.176 0.144 -0.044
(0.0304) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.0279) (0.7157)
-0.136 -0.263 -0.255 -0.203 0.119 -0.060
(0.0043) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.1355) (0.9549)
-0.155 -0.311 -0.221 -0.282 0.066 -0.029
(0.0139) (<0.0001) (0.0122) (<0.0001) (0.5413) (0.9168)
Negative Momentum Positive Momentum
(n=689) (n=235)











- 205 - 
Panel C: Post-GCM announcement BHARs conditional on firm distress risk 
Period Mean Median Listed Mean Median Listed Mean Median
(trading days) BHAR BHAR Firms BHAR BHAR Firms BHAR BHAR
-0.088 -0.123 -0.053 -0.164 -0.035 0.041
(0.0002) (<0.0001) (0.3808) (0.0167) (0.5781) (0.9979)
-0.131 -0.200 -0.137 -0.289 0.006 0.089
(0.0002) (<0.0001) (0.1188) (<0.0001) (0.9442) (0.4645)
-0.157 -0.209 -0.187 -0.310 0.030 0.101
(0.0003) (<0.0001) (0.0650) (<0.0001) (0.7814) (0.3757)
-0.197 -0.297 -0.090 -0.336 -0.107 0.039
(0.0004) (<0.0001) (0.5086) (0.0002) (0.4663) (0.6005)
High Distress Risk (A) Low Distress Risk (B)









Panel D: Post-GCM announcement BHARs conditional on firm GCM probability 
Period Mean Median Listed Mean Median Listed Mean Median
(trading days) BHAR BHAR Firms BHAR BHAR Firms BHAR BHAR
-0.064 -0.144 -0.099 -0.116 0.035 -0.028
(0.0632) (<0.0001) (0.0006) (<0.0001) (0.4387) (0.4713)
-0.076 -0.233 -0.184 -0.204 0.108 -0.029
(0.1499) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.1079) (0.8222)
-0.104 -0.212 -0.226 -0.279 0.122 0.067
(0.0850) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.1182) (0.6033)
-0.094 -0.280 -0.254 -0.337 0.160 0.057





DIFERENCE (A - B)
(n=454) (n=470)
(+2,+63) 445 445
High GCM Probability (A) Low GCM Probability (B)
 
 
Panel E: Post-GCM announcement BHARs conditional on firm earnings surprise 
Period Mean Median Listed Mean Median Listed Mean Median
(trading days) BHAR BHAR Firms BHAR BHAR Firms BHAR BHAR
-0.138 -0.186 -0.007 -0.079 -0.131 -0.107
(<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.8527) (0.0558) (0.0041) (0.0033)
-0.239 -0.298 -0.005 -0.090 -0.234 -0.208
(<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.9202) (0.0065) (0.0005) (0.0004)
-0.318 -0.366 0.043 -0.126 -0.361 -0.240
(<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.5010) (0.0922) (<0.0001) (<0.0001)
-0.391 -0.389 0.113 -0.125 -0.504 -0.264







Negative Earnings Surprise (A) Positive Earnings Surprise (B)
DIFERENCE (A - B)
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7.3.2. Medium-term market reaction to the GCM audit report and analyst 
coverage 
Chapter 6 suggests that pre-event analyst coverage does not reduce the market impact of a 
GCM audit report disclosure. However, the role of security analysts in the post-GCM 
period remains an open question. In this section, I investigate the relationship between 
post-GCM coverage and post-GCM stock return performance. In particular, I test analyst 
contribution to the price-discovery process following the announcement of this bad news 
event and if analysts engage in self-selecting activities in my sample firms. 
 
7.3.2.1. Analyst coverage and subsequent price performance 
After the publication of a GCM audit report, investors are likely to require additional 
guidance in order to understand the implications of this accounting disclosure for firms’ 
future prospects. This is particularly important since research suggests that investors are 
slow in adjusting their expectations (Bernard and Thomas, 1989; Barberis, Schleifer, 
andVishny, 1998; Hong and Stein, 1999), especially for companies with higher information 
uncertainty (Jiang, Lee, and Zhang, 2005; Zhang, 2006).  
In this subsection, I investigate whether analysts reduce the magnitude of the post-GCM 
drift by comparing the return performance of firms following an initial post-GCM window 
to define analyst coverage.57 I allocate my GCM firms to two portfolios conditional on 
analyst coverage over different post-GCM windows. Drawing on Das, Guo, and Zhang 
(2006) and Zhang (forthcoming), I minimize the potential problem arising from the use of 
                                                 
 
57 Zhang (2005) investigates the impact of analyst responsiveness and market underreaction to earnings 
announcements. She finds that analyst responsiveness mitigates the extent of the post-earnings announcement 
drift. 
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overlapping windows to define analyst coverage and to compute the abnormal returns. 
Specifically, I define an initial post-GCM window to classify firms as covered or not and 
compute the returns after this initial window. To ensure robust results, I choose different 
post-GCM windows to classify a firm as covered (varying between 1- and 6-months post-
GCM). 
In particular, companies are allocated to the “analyst coverage” portfolio over the different 
post-GCM windows if they receive at least one new recommendation or a new annual EPS 
forecast within that period. All the remaining companies are allocated to the “no analyst 
coverage” portfolio. I then compute separate BHARs for each portfolio, starting one 
trading day after the end of the period used to define the coverage status of the firms. As 
an example, consider the (+1, +62) window used to define analyst coverage. First, I 
separate my 924 first-time GCM firms into the “analyst coverage” and “no analyst 
coverage” portfolios conditional on the existence of new recommendations or new annual 
EPS forecasts within the (+1, +62) window relative to the GCM date. BHARs are then 
computed separately for each portfolio for the (+63, +252) trading period. Finally, I test the 
significance of the mean and median BHAR differences between the two portfolios using 
the t-test and the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test respectively. If analysts are contributing to 
the price-discovery process, I expect firms with analyst coverage to experience subsequent 
abnormal returns closer to zero than firms with no analyst coverage. 
The associated null hypothesis is defined as follows: 
H12: There is no difference in the subsequent abnormal returns of firms with analyst 
coverage within an initial window relative to those with no analyst coverage. 
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Table 7.3. summarizes my results. As can be seen, there are no significant differences in the 
mean and median BHARs between the “analyst coverage” and “no analyst coverage” 
portfolios over the different windows under scrutiny. In particular, I find negative and 
significant abnormal return performance of firms with no analyst coverage over the 
different post-GCM windows. For the “analyst coverage” portfolio, mean BHARs are not 
significant whereas median BHARs are significant at conventional levels. More 
importantly, both parametric and nonparametric tests show no significant differences in 
the mean and median BHARs of both portfolios. As an example, consider the (+1, +62) 
window to define analyst coverage. I find that mean (median) BHARs(+63, +252) are -12.2% (-
6.4%) for the “no analyst coverage” portfolio and -10.7% (-11.6%) for the “analyst 
coverage” portfolio, with no significant differences in mean and median BHARs. As such, I 
conclude that analyst coverage is not reducing the magnitude of the post-GCM abnormal 
returns. 
In order to ensure the robustness of my results, I re-run my test using the alternative 
control samples based on size and momentum (as in section 5.2.1.1.), industry, size and 
BM (as in section 5.2.1.2.) and size and distress risk (as in section 5.2.1.3.) to compute the 
abnormal returns. However, I find that my conclusions do not change when I use these 
different benchmark samples to compute the abnormal returns. In addition, I also control 
my results from the potential bias arising from the relationship between delisted firms and 
analyst coverage since analysts are less likely to cover a firm that is subsequently 
delisted.58 Nevertheless, in line with my previous results, there are no significant 
differences in mean and median BHARs between the two portfolios. Hence, this suggests 
that delisted firms are not contaminating my previous conclusions. 
                                                 
 
58 Only 27% of my companies with analyst coverage following the GCM date are delisted during the year 
following the GCM announcement whereas this percentage increases to almost 50% when considering companies 
with no analyst coverage. 
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Table 7.3.  
Subsequent Return Performance Conditional on post-GCM Analyst Coverage 
 
This table presents the buy-and-hold abnormal returns for my sample of 924 non-finance, non-utility 
industry firms listed on the NYSE, AMEX or NASDAQ, for which their auditors disclose a going-
concern modified audit report for the first-time between 01.01.1994 and 31.12.2005.  
For each coverage definition window, I allocate each of my 924 companies to one of two portfolios 
conditional on analyst coverage. Companies are allocated to the “analyst coverage” portfolio if 
analysts report at least one new recommendation or issue one new annual EPS forecast within the 
coverage definition window. All the remaining firms are allocated to the “no analyst coverage” 
portfolio. Abnormal returns are then computed in trading days, starting one trading day after the 
period used to define the coverage status of the firm until trading day +252, where trading day t=0 is 
the GCM announcement day taken from the SEC-EDGAR database. Returns earned by delisted firms 
are assumed to have zero abnormal returns in the post-delisting period. The BHARs are computed 
employing the control firm approach based on size and BM. Specifically, each of my 924 first-time 
GCM companies is matched with that non-finance, non-utility, non-GCM firm listed on the NYSE, 
AMEX or NASDAQ with market value of equity between 70% and 130% of that of the sample firm. 
The control firm is then selected as that firm with BM ratio closest to that of the sample firm. 
Two-tailed significance of the t-test (Wilcoxon signed rank-test) is reported in parentheses below the 
mean (median) BHAR, whereas the significance of the sign test is shown in parentheses below the 
“Sign test” column of each portfolio. The last two columns of each panel report the mean and 
median differences between the BHARs of each portfolio under analysis. The significance of the t-
test (Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test) is showed in brackets below the mean (median) differences. 
 
 
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
BHAR BHAR BHAR BHAR BHAR BHAR
-0.181 -0.251 -0.094 -0.362 -0.087 0.111
(0.0003) (<0.0001) (0.4881) (0.0057) (0.5494) (0.8607)
-0.153 -0.138 -0.189 -0.248 0.036 0.110
(0.0007) (<0.0001) (0.0717) (0.0018) (0.7510) (0.3812)
-0.122 -0.064 -0.107 -0.116 -0.015 0.052
(0.0011) (<0.0001) (0.2103) (0.0031) (0.8696) (0.4384)
-0.105 0.000 -0.097 -0.182 -0.008 0.182
(0.0032) (<0.0001) (0.2623) (0.0014) (0.9362) (0.2052)
-0.066 0.000 -0.054 0.000 -0.012 0.000
(0.0472) (<0.0001) (0.4164) (0.0613) (0.8756) (0.8800)
-0.042 0.000 -0.019 0.000 -0.023 0.000
(0.1714) (0.0014) (0.7529) (0.0658) (0.7262) (0.6385)
NO ANALYST COVERAGE (A) ANALYST COVERAGE (B)
n n
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In an addition robustness test, I run a similar test based on a shorter window to define 
both analyst coverage and to compute the abnormal returns. This is a more powerful test 
to investigate if analyst opinions contribute to the adjustment of  prices after the GCM 
disclosure date since it is more restrictive on the definition of analyst coverage. In 
particular, companies are now allocated to the “analyst coverage” portfolio if they receive 
at least one new recommendation or a new annual EPS forecast for each of the six months 
following the GCM date. All the remaining companies are allocated to the “no analyst 
coverage” portfolio. I then calculate and compare the subsequent 3-month BHARs for each 
portfolio in a similar fashion to the previous test.59 
Table 7.4. summarizes my results. I find that my conclusions do not change significantly 
when I use shorter windows to define analyst coverage and to compute the abnormal 
returns. In fact, I find that the differences between mean and median 3-month BHARs 
following a specific month to define analyst coverage are not significant at conventional 
levels. As an example, consider the (+1, +20) window to define analyst coverage. I find that 
mean (median) abnormal returns for the (+21, +84) trading period are -6.8% (-12.9%) for the 
“no analyst coverage” portfolio and -7.4% (-10.5%) for the “analyst coverage” portfolio, 
with no significant differences in mean and median BHARs. Once again, I find similar 
results when I use the alternative benchmark samples mentioned above to compute the 
abnormal returns and when I restrict my analysis to firms listed over the different post-
GCM windows used to define analyst coverage. 
Overall, I conclude that analyst coverage does not reduce the magnitude of the abnormal 
returns following the GCM announcement. In fact, the subsequent return performance of 
                                                 
 
59 I also compute abnormal returns for the subsequent 1, 2, 4, 5 and 6-month following the coverage definition 
month. Results are materially the same. 
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my sample firms with analyst coverage is not different from the return performance of 
GCM firms with no analyst coverage, which leads me not to reject null hypothesis H12. As 
such, it seems that, in the specific case of the GCM audit report, analysts are not 
contributing to the price-discovery process. 
 
Table 7.4. 
 Subsequent Return Performance Conditional on post-GCM Analyst Coverage – A 
more restrictive test 
 
This table presents the buy-and-hold abnormal returns for my sample of 924 non-finance, non-utility 
industry firms listed on the NYSE, AMEX or NASDAQ, for which their auditors disclose a going-
concern modified audit report for the first-time between 01.01.1994 and 31.12.2005.  
For each coverage definition window, I allocate each of my 924 companies to one of two portfolios 
conditional on analyst coverage. Companies are allocated to the “analyst coverage” portfolio if 
analysts report at least one new recommendation or issue one new annual EPS forecast within the 
coverage definition window. All the remaining firms are allocated to the “no analyst coverage”. 
Abnormal returns are then computed in trading days, starting one trading day after the period used 
to define the coverage status of the firm over the subsequent 63 trading days, where trading day t=0 
is the GCM announcement day taken from the SEC-EDGAR database. Returns earned by delisted 
firms are assumed to have zero abnormal returns in the post-delisting period. The BHARs are 
computed employing the control firm approach based on size and BM. Specifically, each of my 924 
first-time GCM companies is matched with that non-finance, non-utility, non-GCM firm listed on the 
NYSE, AMEX or NASDAQ with market value of equity between 70% and 130% of that of the sample 
firm. The control firm is then selected as that firm with BM ratio closest to that of the sample firm. 
Two-tailed significance of the t-test (Wilcoxon signed rank-test) is reported in parentheses below the 
mean (median) BHAR, whereas the significance of the sign test is shown in parentheses below the 
“Sign test” column of each portfolio. The last two columns of each panel report the mean and 
median differences between the BHARs of each portfolio under analysis. The significance of the t-
test (Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test) is showed in brackets below the mean (median) differences. 
 
 
Panel A: All first-time GCM firms 
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
BHAR BHAR BHAR BHAR BHAR BHAR
-0.068 -0.129 -0.074 -0.105 0.006 -0.024
(0.0072) (<0.0001) (0.1819) (0.0472) (0.9212) (0.4848)
-0.083 -0.075 -0.099 -0.034 0.016 -0.041
(0.0002) (<0.0001) (0.0876) (0.0673) (0.7886) (0.8450)
-0.089 -0.043 0.000 -0.089 -0.089 0.046
(<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.9945) (0.3720) (0.2363) (0.3002)
-0.111 -0.021 0.003 -0.141 -0.114 0.120
(<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.9647) (0.2501) (0.1577) (0.9809)
-0.089 0.000 -0.023 -0.035 -0.066 0.035
(<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.7633) (0.5614) (0.4043) (0.5595)
-0.017 0.000 -0.026 -0.084 0.009 0.084
(0.4064) (0.0022) (0.7743) (0.5656) (0.9298) (0.8046)
n n
Return Period
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7.3.2.2. Price performance and subsequent analyst coverage 
In this subsection, I test the self-selection hypothesis in the going-concern domain by 
investigating if analysts are more likely to cover firms with better return performance after 
the GCM disclosure date. The literature on analyst self-selection bias is limited. The basic 
idea is that analysts tend to report on stocks about which their true expectations are 
favourable and avoid reporting on stocks about which their true expectations are 
unfavourable. For instance, McNichols and O’Brien (1997) show that the distribution of 
recommendations for newly added stocks is shifted significantly towards more favourable 
ratings whereas the distribution of recommendations for dropped firms is shifted towards 
less favourable ratings. In a more recent study, Das, Guo, and Zhang (2006) find that long-
term returns and operating performance of IPO firms with high residual coverage is 
significantly better than IPO firms with low residual analyst coverage. 
I test if analysts self-select GCM firms they cover after the GCM disclosure date by 
allocating my sample firms to different portfolios depending on their post-GCM return 
performance. I now start by defining initial post-GCM windows to compute firm stock 
returns, which are used to allocate firms into three different portfolios conditional on their 
post-GCM return performance. In a second step, for each of these portfolios, I classify 
firms as covered or not if they receive new recommendations or new EPS forecasts 
following the post-GCM window used to compute the abnormal returns. Once again, I use 
different post-GCM windows to ensure the robustness of my results. 
The three portfolios of firms conditional on firms’ post-GCM return performance are 
defined as follows. First, I compute post-GCM price performance (BHARs) for each of my 
924 first-time GCM firms over different post-GCM windows. For each window, firms are 
ranked according to their BHARs and divided into three portfolios: the lowest 33.3% 
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BHARs of the total sample firms (low subsequent performance), between 33.3% and 66.7% 
BHARs of the total sample firms (medium subsequent performance), and the highest 33.3% 
BHARs of the total sample firms (high subsequent performance). The percentage of firms 
followed by analysts after the initial window is then calculated separately for the “low 
performance” and “high performance” portfolios. Finally, the binomial test is used to 
investigate the significance of the differences between the percentages of covered firms in 
these two portfolios. If analysts are self-selective, I expect the percentage of firms with 
analyst coverage to be significantly higher for the “high performance” portfolio than for 
the “low performance” portfolio. 
The hypothesis to test is as follows: 
H13: There is no difference in the proportion of firms covered between the portfolio of 
firms with best stock return performance relative to those with worst stock return 
performance following the GCM announcement. 
 
 
Table 7.5. summarizes my findings. My results show that the percentage of firms with 
analyst coverage following the post-GCM windows used to define the coverage status of 
my sample firms is, generally, significantly higher for the “high performance” portfolio.  
As an example, consider the (+2, +63) window to compute the abnormal returns. I find that 
only 15.6% of firms allocated to the “low performance” portfolio are covered over the (+63, 
+252) window whereas the percentage increases to 27.6% in the case of “high 
performance” firms. Moreover, the binomial test shows that the proportion of firms 
covered in the “high performance” portfolio is significantly greater than the proportion of 
firms covered in the “low performance” portfolio at the 0.1% level. 
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Similar to the pervious subsection, I re-run my analysis using the alternative control 
samples as in section 5.2.1. to compute the abnormal returns. In addition, I exclude all the 
GCM firms that are delisted over the different windows used to compute the abnormal 
returns. Nevertheless, for both tests, the differences in the proportion of firms with analyst 
coverage between “low subsequent performance” and “high subsequent performance” 
portfolios are generally significant at the 0.1% level. These robustness tests suggests that 
my conclusions are not sensitive to the benchmark used to calculate the abnormal returns 
and are not influenced by the potential bias arising from firms being delisted in the year 
following the GCM announcement.  
To sum up, it seems that the analyst’s decision to cover a GCM firm critically depends on 
its post-GCM price performance. This is consistent with the notion that analysts selectively 
cover the GCM firms for which their true expectations are favourable and censor the firms 
for which their true expectations are unfavourable. This evidence leads me to reject null 
hypothesis H13. As such, I conclude that there is a relationship between analyst coverage 
and the post-GCM return performance. However, it is the post-GCM return performance 
of my sample firms that is driving the analyst decision to report on firms following the 
GCM date and not the analyst coverage that is driving the post-GCM return performance 
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Table 7.5. Subsequent Analyst Coverage Conditional on post-GCM Return 
Performance 
 
This table presents the buy-and-hold abnormal returns for my sample of 924 non-finance, non-utility 
industry firms listed on the NYSE, AMEX or NASDAQ, for which their auditors disclosed a going-
concern modified audit report for the first-time between 01.01.1994 and 31.12.2005. 
For each return period, I allocate each of my 924 companies to one of two portfolios conditional on 
their post-GCM return performance. Firms are ranked accordingly to their post-GCM BHARs and 
allocated into two portfolios as follows: firms with the lowest 33.3% BHARs of the total sample firms 
are allocated to the “low subsequent performance” portfolio whereas firms with the highest 33.3% 
BHARs of the total sample firms are allocated to the “high subsequent performance” portfolio. 
Abnormal returns are computed in trading days, over different return periods, where trading day 
t=0 is the GCM announcement day taken from the SEC-EDGAR database. Returns earned by delisted 
firms are assumed to have zero abnormal returns in the post-delisting period. The BHARs are 
computed employing the control firm approach based on size and BM. Specifically, each of my 924 
first-time GCM companies is matched with that non-finance, non-utility, non-GCM firm listed on the 
NYSE, AMEX or NASDAQ with market value of equity between 70% and 130% of that of the sample 
firm. The control firm is then selected as that firm with BM ratio closest to that of the sample firm. 
Percentage of covered firms is then calculated from the first trading day after the period used to 
define the subsequent performance of a firm until trading day +252. In particular, percentage of 
covered firms is computed by dividing the number of firms receiving a new recommendation or a 
new annual EPS forecast by the total number of firms in each portfolio. The binomial test is used to 
test the significance in the differences between the percentage of covered firms between the low 
performance and high performance portfolios. 
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7.4. Summary and discussion 
This chapter explores the relationship between post-GCM analyst coverage and post-GCM 
stock returns. Similar to the previous chapter, I use an event-time approach to test if post-
GCM analyst coverage reduces the incomplete market reaction to such an announcement 
and if analyst self-selection bias is also manifested in the going-concern domain. 
I find that firms receiving new recommendations or new annual EPS forecasts do not 
experience a different return performance from those with no analyst coverage in the post-
GCM period. These results are robust to different post-GCM windows to define analyst 
coverage and to compute abnormal returns, suggesting that analyst activity in the GCM 
domain does not accelerate the post-event price adjustment of my sample firms. 
These results contribute to a better understanding of the analyst role in the bad news 
domain. In fact, despite the evidence that analysts help improve the market efficiency with 
their forecast revisions (Gleason and Lee, 2003), or that analyst responsiveness contributes 
to mitigate the extent of the post-earnings drift (Zhang, forthcoming), I fail to find a similar 
pattern in my particular domain. There are some reasons that might explain why my 
results differ from previous studies. First, my sample firms are all highly financially 
distressed and associated with one of the most acute and unambiguous cases of bad news 
in the wide financial reporting domain. As such, despite the theoretical argument that the 
marginal contribution of security analysts may be greater in the dissemination of bad news 
to investors (e.g., Hong, Lim, and Stein, 2000), I confirm chapter 6ʹs results that analyst 
activity is not helping investors in this bad news domain. Second, the reduced number of 
firms with analyst coverage following the GCM announcement may increase the degree of 
information uncertainty associated with these firms, thus facilitate investors’ psychological 
biases such as overconfidence, which are related to the incomplete market reaction to new 
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information (e.g., Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam, 1998; 2001; Hirshleifer, 2001). 
Therefore, low analyst interest in following GCM companies is an appealing contribution 
to understand the post-GCM announcement drift. 
This chapter also provides original evidence that analysts self-select the GCM companies 
they cover following the disclosure of this bad news. In particular, I find that the 
proportion of covered firms with best post-GCM return performance is significantly higher 
than the proportion of covered firms with worst post-GCM return performance. The fact 
that analysts avoid reporting on GCM firms associated with worst post-GCM return 
performance provides further evidence about the low interest of analysts in disseminating 
this particular type of bad news. This provides original evidence that analysts leave 
investors with no guidance for firms suffering from GCMs, a phenomenon that is 
particularly evident when they have unfavourable views on such firms (e.g., McNichols 
and O’Brien, 1997; Das, Guo, and Zhang, 2006). Hence, investors should not expect 
analysts to disseminate the GCM audit report and should be aware that analysts’ silence is 







- 218 - 
CHAPTER 8 
CONCLUSIONS, LIMITATIONS AND FURTHER WORK 
 
8.1. Introduction 
My thesis provides the first study addressing how security analysts behave in the going-
concern domain. In particular, my findings enhance our knowledge regarding how 
appropriately these sophisticated market agents deal with one of the most acute bad news 
accounting events and whether investors benefit from analyst coverage in such an acute 
environment, both on the short and medium-term. 
In particular, my thesis is designed to provide a comprehensive analysis on the extent to 
which analyst activity reflects the negative information associated with the disclosure of a 
going concern audit report and how the market’s reaction to this event is affected by the 
nature of analyst coverage. My first chapter offers a brief introduction to my work, 
highlighting the objectives and motivations of the present study. In the second chapter, I 
conduct a critical review of the key literature that contextualizes my research, which helps 
to define my research framework. Chapter 3 describes the methodology used to identify 
my 924 first-time GCM firms and provides some descriptive statistics about these firms. 
Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7 are the empirical chapters of my thesis, in which I test my null 
hypotheses. In particular, chapter 4 investigates if analysts are able to anticipate the 
publication of a GCM audit report and whether or not they react to such a disclosure. 
Chapter 5 explores the robustness of my results using different tests and controlling for 
confounding factors. Chapter 6 investigates if the short-term market reaction to the 
publication of a GCM announcement critically depends on pre-event analyst coverage. 
Finally, chapter 7 examines if post-event analyst coverage reduces the magnitude of the 
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post-GCM announcement drift and if analysts engage in self-selective activities in the 
going-concern domain. 
In this chapter I summarize and discuss my main empirical findings, highlighting my key 
contributions to the accounting and finance literature. I also discuss the limitations of my 
research and outline possible future developments of my work. 
 
8.2. Summary and contributions 
The role of security analysts in the functioning of financial markets has been addressed in 
several studies. On the one hand, research suggests that analysts anticipate changes in 
firms’ fundamentals and that investors benefit from the information they produce. 
Moreover, there is evidence that analysts reduce information uncertainty and promote 
market efficiency (e.g., Brennan, Jegadeesh, and Swaminathan, 1993; Elgers Lo, and Jr, 
2001; Bhattacharya, 2001; Gleason and Lee, 2003; Zhang, 2005; Zhang, 2006). On the other 
hand, the literature suggests that analysts are often biased, overestimating firms’ future 
performance and self-selecting firms with specific characteristics (e.g., Brown, 1997; 
McNichols and O’Brien, 1997; Easterwood and Nutt, 1999). My thesis explores related 
issues in the going-concern domain using a sample of 924 non-finance, non-utility industry 
firms listed on the NYSE, AMEX or NASDAQ for which their auditors disclosed a GCM 
audit report for the first-time between 01.01.1994 and 31.12.2005. 
I contribute to the ongoing discussion about analyst behaviour by exploring how security 
analysts deal with one of the most extreme bad news events: the going-concern modified 
audit report. The connection between analyst behaviour and the going-concern disclosure 
is particularly important since no study to date has addressed this issue and because little 
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is known about analyst behaviour in extreme situations. Moreover, there are reasons to 
believe that analyst role in this acute bad news domain may be vital to investors given the 
evidence that markets take time to assimilate negative information (e.g., Bernard and 
Thomas, 1989; Michaely, Thaler, and Womack, 1995; Womack, 1996; Dichev and Piotroski, 
2001; Kausar, Taffler, and Tan, forthcoming). My thesis contributes directly to the 
accounting and finance literature by supplementing existent knowledge at different levels: 
security analyst behaviour, market pricing and going-concern disclosures. 
My results contribute to the analyst behaviour literature in several ways. First, I find that 
security analysts anticipate the publication of a GCM audit report using two different 
signs to communicate unfavourable information about a firm before the bad news 
disclosure: 1) they downgrade more aggressively their stock recommendations for GCM 
firms compared to control firms as the event date approaches; 2) analysts are more likely 
to cease coverage of GCM firms than similar non-GCM firms within the one-year period 
before the event date. These results provide original evidence that analysts acknowledge 
firms’ going-concern problems and provide further evidence that analysts are able to 
anticipate bad news information disclosures (e.g., Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney, 1996; 
Clarke et al., 2006; Cotter and Young, 2007). Importantly, my results are robust to the use 
of alternative control firms based on size, BM ratio, momentum, industry and distress risk. 
Second, I show that analysts react to the publication of a GCM audit report by ceasing 
coverage of such firms. Analyst propensity to cease coverage of my sample firms provides 
original evidence that analysts are less interested in following companies associated with 
going-concern problems and provides additional evidence that these sophisticated agents 
tend to replace firms associated with bad news with firms associated with good news (e.g., 
McNichols and O’Brien, 1997; Kecskés and Womack, 2007). Moreover, I also show that 
analyst decision to cease coverage of a GCM firm is accentuated in the case of value firms 
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and firms with negative momentum, providing additional evidence on analyst preference 
for growth stocks and stocks associated with positive momentum (Jegadeesh et al., 2004). 
Third, I conclude that analysts are reluctant to issue unfavourable recommendations for 
GCM stocks. This result augments the extant literature on analyst reluctance to disclose 
negative information (e.g., McNichols and O’Brien, 1997; Conrad et al., 2006) by focusing 
on an acute an unambiguous case of bad news. In particular, I find that the percentage of 
firms for which analysts issue “underperform” or “sell” recommendation is very low 
given the negative short- and medium-term market reaction to the publication of a GCM 
audit report (e.g., Citron, Taffler, and Uang, 2008; Kausar, Taffler, and Tan, forthcoming). 
In fact, it is hard to believe that an average “hold” recommendation represents a fair 
assessment for a firm immediately before the announcement of such a bad news. Analyst 
coverage cessation explains, at least partially, this phenomenon. As McNichols and 
O’Brien (1997) show, analysts do not downgrade stock recommendations when they cease 
coverage of firms. As such, the lower tail of the recommendation distribution for GCM 
firms is censored leading the average observed recommendation to be more favourable 
than the true unobservable average recommendation. This rationale sheds light on the 
words of Shefrin (2002), who state that analysts “do not always mean what they say. (…) They 
frequently say ‘hold’ but mean ‘sell’, or say ‘buy’ when they mean ‘hold” and indicates that 
coverage cessation is contributing to disguising of the analyst’s true opinion about GCM 
firms. 
Fourth, I find that the analyst’s decision to cover GCM firms following the publication of a 
GCM audit report critically depends on their post-GCM return performance. To be precise, 
I show that analyst coverage of the GCM firms with best post-event return performance is 
significantly higher than that of the GCM firms with worst post-event return performance. 
These results supplement previous literature claiming that security analysts are self-
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selective (e.g., McNichols and O’Brien, 1997; Das, Guo, and Zhang, 2006) by showing that 
the analyst coverage decision is associated with their expectations of the firm’s prospects 
even in the bad news domain. 
 
My research also allows me to contribute to the market pricing literature. In particular, I 
show that security analysts do not provide investors with value-relevant information in 
the GCM domain. Two results support this conclusion. 1) analyst pre-GCM activity does 
not reduce the “surprise” associated with the publication of a GCM audit report; 2) analyst 
post-GCM activity does not accelerate the post-event price adjustment of my sample firms.  
The short-term market reaction to the publication of a GCM audit report conditional on 
analyst coverage reveals that analyst activity influences negatively the price of GCM stocks 
over the pre-event period. In particular, I find that the short-term market reaction to the 
publication of a GCM audit report is, on average, significantly more negative for firms 
with pre-GCM coverage then for firms with no analyst coverage. This suggests that 
investors do not recognize an average “hold” recommendation and coverage cessation as 
an unfavourable message. A more detailed analysis reveals that the differential market 
reaction to the GCM announcement conditional on analyst coverage depends on the 
message being conveyed by analysts. To be precise, when analyst recommendations are 
inconsistent with the forthcoming GCM audit report (i.e., “strong buy”, “buy” or “hold” 
recommendations), they seem to obstruct the recognition of negative information in stock 
prices in the pre-GCM period, thus increasing the impact of a GCM audit report 
disclosure. In sharp contrast, when analyst recommendations are consistent with the 
forthcoming GCM audit report (i.e., “underperform” or “sell” recommendations), they 
seem to facilitate the recognition of negative information in stock prices in the pre-GCM 
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period, thus reducing the impact of a GCM audit report announcement. Interestingly, my 
results indicate that the percentage of firms with a “conforming” average recommendation 
is very reduced, which explains why the overall short-term market reaction is significantly 
more negative for firms with analyst coverage. 
It is important to highlight that the differences in the short-term market reaction between 
covered and non-covered firms are not significant following the implementation of the 
regulatory changes in 2002. This result can be explained, at least partially, by the increase 
in analyst pessimism regarding GCM firms and the new information disclosed in analyst 
reports (e.g., the distribution of stock ratings across the brokerage house coverage 
universe) as a consequence of such regulatory changes. As such, I conclude that investors 
are now provided with more useful and material information to make their investment 
decisions in the GCM domain and challenge Clarke et al’s. (2006) view that the 
implementation of the new regulatory regime was an overreaction by the regulatory 
authorities. 
The medium-term market reaction to the publication of a GCM audit report conditional on 
analyst coverage shows that analyst activity does not contribute to the price-discovery 
process of GCM stocks in the post-event period. In particular, I find no significant 
differences between the return performance of GCM firms with analyst coverage and 
GCM firms with no analyst coverage following an initial period to define the coverage 
status of a firm. This result contributes to a better understanding of the analyst’s role in the 
stock market in the specific case of firms with low levels of analyst coverage. Contrary to 
previous research suggesting that analyst coverage promote market efficiency (e.g., 
Brennan, Jegadeesh, and Swaminathan, 1993; Elgers, Lo, and Jr, 2001; Bhattacharya, 2001; 
Zhang, 2005) and that analysts contribute to the price-discovery process of stocks (e.g., 
Givoly and Lakonishok, 1980; Gleason and Lee, 2003), my results show that analyst 
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coverage per se does not reduce the magnitude of the post-GCM announcement drift. 
These results are consistent with Das, Guo, and Zhang (2006), who find that the abnormal 
returns of IPO firms with no coverage are not significantly different from those 
experienced by firms with low analyst coverage. 
 
My thesis also allows me to add to the GCM disclosure literature. For instance, I 
supplement extant literature on the short-term market reaction to the publication of a 
GCM audit report (e.g., Elliott, 1982; Fleak and Wilson, 1994; Herbohn, Ragunathan, and 
Gardsen, 2007; Citron, Taffler, and Uang, 2008) by providing original evidence that: 1) the 
short-term market reaction to such an event critically depends on analyst pre-event 
coverage; 2) analysts may temporarily delay the incorporation of other negative 
information in stock prices. These results show that, as indicated above, analyst activity 
may potentially serve to mislead of investor expectations about firms with going-concern 
problems. Moreover, it suggests that the magnitude of the downgrade (from “buy” to 
“hold”) and their associated decision to cease coverage of GCM firms does not provide 
investors with adequate value-relevant information to generate appropriate expectations 
about these firms’ future prospects. 
One way to understand why the market appears to find difficulty in interpreting analyst 
unfavourable messages before the GCM disclosure event could be related to the holding 
pattern of GCM stocks. Kausar, Taffler, and Tan (forthcoming) show that retail investors 
(unsophisticated agents) increase their holdings of these stocks as the GCM date 
approaches. In particular, retail investors hold, on average, around 74% of GCM stocks 
right before the GCM date. This is important since Malmendier and Shanthikumar (2007) 
show that small investors follow analyst recommendations literally and do not react 
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negatively to a “hold” recommendation. As such, apparent market inability to understand 
analyst unfavourable messages about GCM firms may well be associated with the low 
sophistication of investors who hold the stocks of such firms. My results clearly support 
Malmendier and Shanthikumar’s (2007) findings, by suggesting that retail investors follow 
literally analyst recommendations even in such extreme situations. 
My results also supplement the extant literature addressing the medium-term market 
reaction to the publication of a GCM audit report. In fact, I conjecture that analyst lower 
interest in firms associated with bad news provides an appealing explanation regarding 
why investors are particularly inefficient in dealing with negative information (e.g., 
Bernard and Thomas, 1989, Womack, 1996; Dichev and Piotroski, 2001, Kausar, Taffler, 
and Tan, forthcoming). For instance, Zhang (2005) argues that analyst “responsiveness”, 
i.e., prompt analyst reaction to new information, mitigates the magnitude of the post-
earnings announcement drift. In my case, it seems that analyst “no response”, i.e., analyst 
coverage cessation after the GCM disclosure, is a partial explanation for the post-GCM 
drift documented by Taffler, Lu, and Kausar (2004) and Kausar, Taffler, and Tan 
(forthcoming). 
 
From an investor perspective, my thesis suggests that investors should not rely on security 
analysts as messengers of bad news in the going-concern domain. In fact, despite analyst 
anticipation of the GCM audit report, investors should be particularly aware that analysts 
do not communicate their unfavourable views about GCM firms in a way retail investors 
understand, i.e., through the issue of “underperform” or “sell” recommendations. 
Alternatively, analysts communicate negative information in the GCM domain by 
downgrading their stock recommendations from “buy” to “sell” and by ceasing the 
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coverage of such stocks. Therefore, investors should be conscious that relying solely on 
analyst recommendation for firms associated with bad news may not be a good guide to 
understanding analysts’ true beliefs about firms’ prospects. As the SEC highlight60, “We 
advise all investors to do their homework before investing. (…)  remember that even the soundest 
recommendation from the most trust-worthy analyst may not be a good choice for you. That’s one 
reason we caution investors never to rely solely on analyst’s recommendations when buying or 
selling a stock.”  
 
8.3. Limitations 
My thesis is subject to some limitations that must be acknowledged to avoid biased 
interpretations of my results. Here, I highlight the most important aspects that readers 
should take into consideration. 
In my thesis, I work exclusively with U.S. firms for which their auditors disclose a GCM 
audit report for the first-time between 01.01.1994 and 31.12.2005. As such, all my 
conclusions should be confined to the specific case of the GCM audit report in the U.S. 
environment for the time window addressed. 
My sample of 924 first-time GCM firms is larger than the majority of the studies 
addressing going-concern issues. However, in some empirical tests requiring the sample to 
be divided into sub-groups, there is some concern about the statistical robustness of my 
results. Moreover, the fact that my sample firms have either no analyst coverage or limited 
coverage makes it almost impossible to investigate whether different levels of analyst 
                                                 
 
60 See http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/analysts.htm for details. 
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coverage impact my results. This restriction is particularly important for the post-GCM 
period for which analyst coverage is very limited. Consequently, the conclusion that 
analysts do not provide value-relevant information in the bad news domain may be 
related to the particular characteristics of my GCM firms and it should not be generalized 
to other bad news events, especially for environments characterized by higher levels of 
analyst coverage.  
Another limitation of my thesis is that it relies solely on archival data. In fact, archival 
studies may fail to determine the full extent of analyst behaviour. Experimental research 
could enhance our knowledge about analyst behaviour in the bad news domain by 
exploring the importance of analysts’ private information in this context. As such, it is 
possible that my empirical framework does not capture fully the phenomenon I address.  
I work exclusively with analyst recommendations and annual EPS forecasts, ignoring 
other informational vehicles that analysts use like price targets and conceptual narrative 
arguments supporting the forecasts and recommendations. As such, it is possible that the 
use of these sources of information could provide a clearer perspective on analyst 
behaviour in the going-concern domain. 
My thesis does not offer an unambiguous explanation of why analysts avoid providing a 
clear negative message about GCM firms. Despite the theoretical rationale that economic 
incentives are minimized in contexts of highly financial distressed firms (e.g., the potential 
to generate brokerage commissions is likely to be small compared with healthy low risk 
firms), it is possible to argue that economic incentives may still play an important role in 
my context. As such, whether analyst behaviour for GCM firms relates to their economic 
incentives or to cognitive bias remains an open question. 
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A final limitation should be noted in respect of the methodology used to compute 
abnormal returns. A crucial issue here is how to control for the risk characteristics of the 
firm experiencing the event. Put differently, it is essential that, when using the single-
matched firm approach, researchers identify a “similar” firm in terms of risk/return. 
However, given the peculiarities associated with my GCM firms, readers must be aware 
that my control firms are not “equal” to my sample firms.  
 
8.4. Further work 
My thesis provides original evidence on how security analysts deal with the going-concern 
event. There are several research opportunities that I aim to explore further to enhance the 
overall understanding of this phenomenon. 
I find that analyst recommendations become relatively more pessimistic for GCM firms 
compared to similar non-GCM firms as the GCM date approaches. However, there are 
other information vehicles that analysts use to disseminate information (e.g., EPS forecasts, 
price targets, conceptual arguments supporting their forecasts and recommendations) that 
I intend to explore in the future. These analysts’ outputs provide additional pieces of 
information that could be important to a comprehensive analysis of analyst behaviour. 
Investigating whether analysts issue optimistic EPS forecasts for GCM firms seems to be 
particularly interesting. First, analysts EPS forecasts offer a different research scenario 
since, contrary to recommendations, their outcomes are well defined and observable. If 
analyst recommendations are the best way to evaluate analysts’ preferences across stocks 
(Jegadeesh et al., 2004), analyst EPS forecasts seem to be the best way to explore analyst 
optimism. Second, there is evidence that analysts strategically choose to display optimistic 
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messages through their recommendations (which are key to small investors) whilst abstain 
from doing so through their earnings forecasts (which are key to large investors) 
(Malmendier and Shanthikumar, 2007). Exploring EPS forecasts in the GCM context 
supplements my results and provides evidence on whether analysts “speak in two 
tongues”.  
The conceptual arguments supporting forecasts and recommendations may provide a 
unique piece of information to investigate if analyst speech provides relevant information 
to detect going-concern problems and to explore their reaction to such an announcement. 
The use of a content analysis approach may supplement my empirical tests based on 
archival data and enhance our knowledge in this domain. 
Another important issue in this domain is to explore whether the economic incentives that 
analysts face impact my results. There is evidence that analysts are more optimistic when 
there is a corporate relationship between brokerage firms and their clients, reducing 
analyst objectivity and independence. Exploring to what extent these conflicts of interest 
explain why analysts avoid reporting negatively on GCM firms may provide further 
evidence in helping us understand if economic incentives play an important role in this 
domain. In addition, investigating the characteristics of analysts who continue to follow 
these firms after the GCM date may offer a compelling insight about their post-GCM 
behaviour: are they simply “loser analysts” or are they anticipating a reversal? 
 Exploring how analysts deal with other bad news events in environments characterized 
by higher levels of analyst coverage is another example of possible complementary work. 
This may provide clear evidence on whether analyst activity simply does not provide 
investors with value-relevant information in the bad news domain or if my conclusions are 
driven by the small number of analysts following GCM firms. 
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